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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an analysis of the law of vicarious liability and its application within the 
legal framework of delict in South Africa. A brief overview of the historical 
development of this branch of law is given, with reference to the influences of 
Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law. That is followed by an exposition of the 
'modem' interpretation of vicarious liability as applied in South African courts, 
highlighting apparent inconsistencies and the need for reform in what has become a 
persistently controversial area of law. Specific attention is paid to the so-called 
'course and scope enquiry' and to the enduring difficulties associated with attributing 
liability to employers for the deliberate wrongful conduct of their employees. It is 
argued that the courts have yet to reach consensus on a general principle capable of 
being applied to the facts of so-called 'deviation cases', and that consequently the 
legal divergence on these matters gives rise to uncertainty and concern. It is submitted 
that the way in which the traditional test for vicarious liability is currently applied 
fails to give true effect to the policy considerations upon which this branch of law is 
founded. By way of comparison with the South African position, a detailed account of 
the law of vicarious liability in comparable foreign jurisdictions is given, with 
emphasis placed on recent developments in England and the British Commonwealth. 
The study then moves to an analysis of the various policy considerations behind 
vicarious liability, with particular attention being paid to the role of risk-related 
liability and the role of risk-assumption in the 'course and scope' enquiry. A 
comparative analysis follows, highlighting differences between the approaches of the 
foreign jurisdictions and that taken by the South African courts. The work concludes 
with a proposal that the South African courts should broaden the scope of vicarious 
liability and opt for a model similar to that which has recently been adopted in 
Canada. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The principal object of this thesis is to examme and re-evaluate the doctrine of 
vicarious liability in the South African law of delict. Vicarious liability is that which 
attaches to a person for a delict committed by another party and is, as such, a form of 
'strict' or 'no-fault' liability. It is therefore not surprising that the doctrine is 
controversial. Its apparent departure from the principle of fault makes it difficult to 
apply in a system which is based almost exclusively on the idea that persons should 
only be held accountable for those wrongs for which they were personally 
responsible. Yet it has to be conceded that there are a number of cogent policy reasons 
for attributing liability to one for the actionable harm caused by another, where the 
latter is acting as an agent or employee of the former. These policy considerations are 
sufficiently compelling to justify the existence of the doctrine, despite the fact that it 
offends the well established principle offault. 
Although the legal basis of vicarious liability can rarely be challenged, there are 
aspects of its application with which it is particularly difficult to come to terms. It is 
accepted that the so-called 'test' for vicarious liability comprises three elements, two 
of which (those dealing with the commission of a delict and the existence of a 
relationship capable of founding liability) are fairly straightforward and are not often 
a source of contention. However, the obscurity of the third element - that which deals 
with the 'course and scope' enquiry - gives cause for concern. This study focuses on 
that element of the enquiry and particularly on problems which arise when liability is 
sought for the wilful delictual wrongs of employees committed whilst carrying out 
their appointed functions. 
It has long been recognised that cases of vicarious liability brought about by the 
deliberate and often criminal misconduct of employees present difficulties due to the 
fact that the employees' acts are almost always expressly forbidden by their 
employers and are antithetical to the duties which they are employed to perform. 
Under the traditional course and scope enquiry, it is extremely difficult to attach 
liability to employers for such conduct, even though in some instances it is clearly fair 
to do so. For instance in Ess Kay Electronics v First National Bank the respondent 
escaped liability where one of its employees had been using his position to defraud 
1 
clients. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that his actions could not be considered to 
have fallen within the course and scope of his employment in that they were 
committed in furtherance of his own interests and that they were clearly not 
authorised by his employer. This decision is a perfect example of a situation in which 
it would have been more appropriate for the employer to bear the burden of liability 
for its employee's conduct than for its customers to do so, yet the plaintiff was 
unsuccessful. 
Before the Ess Kay decision the courts were inclined to take a broader approach and 
incorporate what became known as the 'creation of risk' principle, in terms of which 
an employer would be held liable for deliberate wrongful acts of employees where 
that employer created the risk of the harmful conduct occurring. Unfortunately this 
principle was inadequately structured and provided no means of limitation. 
Consequently, the creation of risk principle was not applied consistently and was 
eventually discarded in Ess Kay. The result was that vicarious liability could no 
longer be claimed for the deliberate wrongs of employees. This position was clearly 
untenable and later in K v Minister of Safety and Security the Constitutional Court was 
forced to re-consider the issue. In this case the court recognised the need for the 
policy considerations behind vicarious liability to inform the way in which liability is 
founded, and followed an approach which appeared to incorporate the creation of risk 
into the course and scope enquiry. Unfortunately, although the court was able to 
arrive at an equitable conclusion in that particular case, it confined its decision to the 
specific facts before it, and failed to develop the principles of vicarious liability. 
Subsequent decisions on the issue have also avoided the establishment of a clear and 
unequivocal principle, leaving tlle law in a state of some uncertainty. 
The problems surrounding the application of the course and scope enquiry appear to 
be universal and by no means exclusive to the South African legal system. However, 
recent developments in Canada and the United Kingdom have shown a new, and 
perhaps improved, way of dealing with cases of vicarious liability for the deliberate 
misconduct of employees. In the light of these developments, this study will propose a 
that the South African law of vicarious liability requires re-evaluation and adjustment 
in order to meet the needs of modem society and reflect the values enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
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My analysis was facilitated by desktop research of case law and relevant literature, as 
well as comparative research on selected cases and academic works from foreign 
jurisdictions. 
The choice of which comparative jurisdictions to examine was based on a number of 
factors. Research into the English law of vicarious liability was necessary in view of 
the fact that our modem principles are based almost exclusively on the English model. 
Moreover, the English courts have recently developed existing principles in an 
attempt to rectify some of the more questionable aspects of the course and scope 
enquiry. These developments compelled close attention. 
Examination of the law in the British Commonwealth of Nations revealed a number 
of interesting and relevant developments. The Australian courts have recently come 
up with what are arguably the most comprehensive and well-defined requirements for 
establishing relationships capable of founding liability; New Zealand has made 
developments regarding the imposition of liability on employers for acts of sexual 
harassment committed by their employees in the workplace; and the Canadian 
Supreme Court is responsible for the groundbreaking decision in Bazley v Curry 
which has had, and will continue to have, a profound effect on the law of vicarious 
liability in all common law jurisdictions. 
The examination of the relevant laws in France and Germany enabled an approach to 
the subject from a different point of view. Research of civil law systems revealed that 
although they and common law jurisdictions have developed independently, many 
aspects of their systems are remarkably similar, including the confusion and 
uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the law of vicarious liability. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that common law authorities have often been reluctant to 
break away from traditional methods of founding liability, it was felt that it would be 
erroneous to examine British and Commonwealth systems exclusively and without a 
basis for comparison with those of at least two independent European jurisdictions, 
even ifthese systems did not prove particularly useful in the long run. 
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The first chapter of the thesis will focus on an historical analysis of the development 
of the doctrine of vicarious liability, touching on its roots in Roman law, the Roman-
Dutch interpretation of employer's liability and the development of the modem 
principles of vicarious liability in England. Chapter two gives a full account of the 
current test for vicarious liability as applied by our courts, paying specific attention to 
the course and scope enquiry and the problems encountered when dealing with 
intentional wrongs and the ' creation of risk' principle. The following two chapters 
trace the development of vicarious liability in comparable foreign jurisdictions, the 
former dealing with the common law jurisdictions of England and the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, and the latter with the civil law jurisdictions of France 
and Germany. The concluding chapter starts with a brief analysis of the social 
justification for the law vicarious liability and the various policy considerations upon 
which it is founded, and proceeds to evaluate the doctrine in light of the developments 
in the respective foreign jurisdictions discussed in the previous chapters. 
This thesis reflects the law as stated in the sources available to me as at I November 
2007. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
1.1. WHAT IS VICARIOUS LIABILITY? 
When used in a legal sense the word 'vicarious' means 'acting or done for another' 
and is derived from the Latin word vicarius, meaning 'substitute'. Simply expressed, 
vicarious liability is the delictual liability of one person for the actionable conduct of 
another. One of the most comprehensive definitions of the term was given by Barlow, 
who described vicarious liability in delict as: I 
" ... [T]he liability of one person for the delictual acts of another, such liability 
arising from the relationship between the person who commits the delict and 
the person who is held liable, but existing independently of any relationship 
between the injured party and the person who is held liable, and of any fault, 
mediate or immediate, on the part of the latter." 
From this it is possible to identify three defining features of vicarious liability. 2 The 
first feature is the existence of a relationship between the party having committed the 
delict and the party sought to be held liable. Relationships capable of founding 
liability are typically those in which the party having committed the delict is 
employed by the party sought to be held liable. As such, the most common 
relationship capable of founding liability is that of general employment. Other 
relationships include agents and principals, business partners, owners and drivers of 
vehicles and other categories analogous to employment. 3 As far as this first aspect is 
concerned, the general principle is that those who engage others to perform tasks on 
I T B Barlow The South Afi'ican Law of Vicarious Liability in Delict and a Comparison of the 
Principles of Other Legal Systems (1939) I.. 
2 Barlow describes these features as 'essentials'. Although this is perhaps a more accurate description, 
the use of the term 'essential' in this context is potentially misleading as the 'essentials' could be 
confused with the 'essential elements' required by the so-called 'tesl' for vicarious liability which is set 
out in chapter 2. 
3 A detailed analysis of the relationships capable of founding vicarious liability will be given in chapter 
2. 
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their behalf can be held liable for the delicts of those engaged as long as the other 
requirements of vicarious liability can be established.4 
The second feature is that the liability exists independently and does not rely on the 
existence of a contractual relationship between the injured party and the party sought 
to be held liable.5 
The third and most controversial feature of vicarious liability is the absence of fault 
on the part of the party sought to be held liable. This is a form of 'no fault liability' 
(also described as 'strict liability' ) which attaches to a person for a delict committed 
by another party who was not at fault due to the fact that the party committing the 
delict was performing a task on behalf of the other when the delict was committed. 
It is not surpnsmg that 'no-fault' liability is controversial, bearing in mind that 
modern laws of restitution are generally based on fault liability.6 The importance of 
the requirement of fault is emphasised by society'S idea of fairness and the need for 
this view to be reflected in the way in which legal systems settle disputes. Most 
members of society would baulk at the idea of holding someone responsible for 
something for which they personally were not at fault. It follows that the idea that 
someone could be held responsible for the injurious conduct of another is perhaps 
even more repugnant. Yet there is a contrary view that those who use the services of 
others to further their own aims should bear a measure of responsibility for any harm 
sustained by third parties in the performance of those services. It is this feeling, 
together with the nature of modern employment practices and a tendency towards 
compensatory litigation, which has inspired the development of the modem notion of 
vicarious liability. 
4 The test for vicarious liability in the South African law of delict will be discussed in chapter 2. 
S Being concerned with delictual liability, this branch of law aims at remedying non-contractual 
wrongs. As R G McKerron The Law of Delict 7ed (1971) 2-3 puts it: "A delict consists in the breach of 
a duty imposed by law independently of the will of the party bound." This is not to say that these two 
forms of liability (delictual and contractual) cannot exist concurrently. However, as mentioned above, 
vicarious liability is only concerned with compensating those having suffered delictual harm. For more 
on concurrence of actions, see J C van der Walt and J R Midgley Principles of Delict 3ed (2005) para 
53; J Neethling, J M Potgieter and P J Visser Law of Delict 5ed (2006) 239-242. 
6 Barlow Vicarious Liability 4. See F H Lawson "Notes on the History of Tor! in the Civil Law" (1940) 
(3" Series) 22 JeL 136 at 137-142; P S Atiyah Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (I967) 12. 
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Although there are many theoretical justifications for attributing this form of liability, 7 
it can be argued that it is simply" ... based on social policy regarding what is fair and 
reasonable and amounts to an expression of a society's legal convictions that victims 
of delictual conduct should be able to recover damages from someone who has the 
ability to pay."g 
1.2. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY 
Owing to the hybrid nature of South African law, it is not surprising to find that the 
development of our modern law of vicarious liability cannot be attributed to any 
single legal system9 Although the modern concept of vicarious liability was not 
recognised by the Romans, the Roman principle of 'master' s,IO liability has often 
been cited as the foundation upon which the law of vicarious liability is built. ll Thus 
it is relevant to examine the liability for the acts of slaves and free servants in Roman 
law. 
The Roman-Dutch authority on the subject is, as Boberg puts it, "a matter of grave 
uncertainty."l2 However, it is worth noting that although the modern law of vicarious 
liability is based almost entirely on English principles,13 a Roman-Dutch framework 
still exists l4 and will compel closer examination. 
7 The social justifications for vicarious liability are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
8 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
9 Although South AtTican law can be said to have developed along Roman-Dutch lines it is not strictly 
accurate to describe it as a Roman-Dutch legal system. The influence of English law has had a 
profound effect on many branches of South AtTican law, vicarious liability being no exception. One 
cannot but agree with H R Hahlo and E Kahn The South AJi"icon Legal System and its Background 
(1968) 586, when they make the observation: "Like a jewel in a brooch, the Roman-Dutch law in South 
AtTica today glitters in a sett ing that was made in England." 
JO The tenns 'master' and 'servant' have recently been replaced by 'employer' and 'employee' despite 
the fact that the newer terms are often misleading and do not adequately describe all relationships 
capable of founding liability. However, for the purposes of this section the words master and servant 
have to be used as they are the only terms capable of describing the types of relationship envisaged by 
the old authorities. 
II Barlow Vicarious Liability 4. 
"P Q R Boberg "Oak Tree or Acorn? - Conflicting Approaches to Our Law of Delict" (1966) 83 SAL.! 
ISO at 169. McKerron Delict 89 points out that the Roman-Dutch writers expressed conflicting views 
on the subject. 
13 McKerron Delict 89 is of the view that our modem law of vicarious liability is entirely based on the 
English doctrine of master' s liability. This is also the view of Lawson "Notes on the History of Tort in 
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1.2.1. Roman Law 
"That Roman law had a profound influence, both direct and indirect, upon the 
South African law of vicarious liability is beyond dispute. Neither the Roman-
Dutch writers nor our own Courts have hesitated to draw copiously from the 
Digest and the Institutes for illustrations of the principle of the master's 
liability.,,1 5 
It is difficult to explain how reliance could be placed upon a legal system in which no 
general principle of vicarious liability (as we now know it) existed. The principle that 
a master is liable in delict for the actionable conduct l6 of his servant committed in the 
course and scope of the latter' s appointed function would, as Barlow puts it, "have 
sounded strange to the Roman lawyer.,,17 Indeed, Lawson confirms that "the whole 
notion of a master' s liability for the wrongs of his free servant committed in the 
course of his employment is alien to Roman ideas.,,18 
In Roman law liability for the acts of slaves was not founded on such a narrow basis 
and the master's liability for the acts of free servants was still dependent on a measure 
of personal fault on the part of the former. Nevertheless, a master's liability for the 
acts of slaves and free servants (such as it then was) provided a basis for the modem 
action of vicarious liability. 
As far as slaves were concerned, an injured party (or indeed a member of that party's 
family) was entitled to take Noxal Action against the master. 19 In terms of such action 
the master was obliged to offer monetary compensation to the victim for the harm 
suffered. However, the master would never be held liable beyond the value of the 
slave and was therefore entitled to escape liability by surrendering the latter to the 
the Civil Law" 145, who believes that the respondeat superior doctrine was ' probably' English in 
origin. This is Discussed further below at 1.2.2. 
" Boberg "Oak Tree or Acorn?" 170. 
15 Barlow Vicarious Liability 12. 
16 In Roman law, liability arose from the commission of a wrongful act such as ''furtum (theft), rapina 
(robbery), damnum (damage), or injuria (injury). See W L Burdick The Principles of Roman Law and 
Theil' Relation to Modern Law (1989) 485 . However, as R W Lee An Introduction to Roman Dutch 
Law 5ed (1953) 321 points out, this classification of heads of liability was not exhaustive - other 
grounds of liability such as dolus and various so-called 'quasi-delicts' existed and will be examined 
further below. 
17 Barlow Vicarious Liability 12 . 
18 Lawson "Notes on the History of Tort in the Civil Law" 139. See also "Notes of Some Controverted 
Points of Law: Master 's Liability for Servant's Acts" (1918) 35 SALJ 25 at 27. 
19 Slaves had no legal capacity and could therefore nol sue or be sued. See A Borkowski and P Du 
Plessis Textbook 011 Roman Law 3ed (2005) 96. 
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plaintiff.2o This form of compensation was known as noxal surrender21 and was 
eventually reserved only for slaves or animals that had caused injury22 
Noxal liability is illustrative of the nature of Roman compensatory laws in that it 
demonstrates an emphasis on revenge and punishment23 In a rei persecutory system24 
in which the aim of a delictual remedy is to compensate victims rather than punish 
transgressors, there is perhaps a more persuasive social justification for this form of 
liability25 
The punitive nature of Roman laws of restitution made it difficult to justify an action 
against the master of a free servant. Where free individuals were concerned, the 
requirement of fault played a particularly important role in Roman law. During the 
classical period26 it was unusual for an man to be held liable when he himself was not 
at fault. According to Barlow, "This characteristic of the Roman legal mind tended to 
retard any development of the idea that a master could be held liable for the acts of 
20 Barlow Vicarious Liability 15; Inst. 4, 8, 3; D. 9, 4, I. See also Burdick The Principles of Roman 
Law 510. Borkowski and Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 96 point out that in early times it seemed 
that the primary duty of the master was to surrender the slave. Financial compensation would have 
been a negotiable alternative. 
21 Noxa meant ' mischief - the mischief was surrendered. Borkowski and Du Plessis Textbook on 
Roman Law 96. 
"Originally noxal action could be taken against the family of a wrongdoer. Under these circumstances 
the patresfamilias of the two families would enter into negotiations and come to an agreement as to 
how the debt would be settled. Usually the delinquent would be handed over to the aggrieved group 
who would then exact its revenge. However, in the earlier days it was apparently not uncommon for a 
surrogate fami ly member to be handed over. Although the paterfamilias was not obliged to do so, he 
could "buy off the vengeance" (Barlow Vicarious Liability 12-14); ("Notes on Some Controverted 
Points of Law" 25). 
23 As Lawson "Notes on the History of Tort in the Civil Law" 138 observes, " [O]ne general 
characterist ic seems to have persisted throughout Roman legal history: actions in delict were always 
thought of as penaL" 
24 In a reipersecutory system damages are based on the actual patrimonial loss suffered by the plaintiff. 
W J Hosten, A B Edwards, F Bosman and J Church Introduction to South African Law and Legal 
Theory 2ed (1995) 804 . South African laws of restitution are primarily rei persecutory (Barlow 
Vicarious Liability 16). 
2S The various social justifications for the modern law of vicarious liability will be examined in chapter 
5. 
2. The classical age in Roman law, identified as a period of legal reform, is said to have begun with the 
rule of the Emperor Hadrian and to cover the second century and early part of the third century AD 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica (1969) Vol. XIX 545-548). Within this period a distinction is made between 
pre-classical law (which ended with the demise of the Republic in 27 BC) and the classical law proper, 
otherwise known as the "golden age" of Roman law, which coincided with the period of the Principate 
during which the Roman Empire covered almost all of the known world. The development of Roman 
law reached its zenith during this period (Hosten et 01 Introduction to South African Law and Legal 
Theory 274 -279). 
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the employees.,,27 During this period and in Justinian's time,28 the general law was 
that no action could be brought against a master for the injurious conduct of free 
servants within his charge unless he himself could be shown to have been at fault 29 
However, it appears that exceptions to this general principle did exist and that 
vicarious liability (as we now know it), was applied in a number of cases.30 These 
early Roman cases of vicarious liability, having had a significant influence on many 
of the Dutch writers and the South African courts,3l are worthy of closer examination. 
They can be divided into two main classes: cases of custodia liability, and of 
praetorian liability .32 
As far as the former is concerned, persons would be held liable for loss or damage to 
goods or articles temporarily within their care. This form of liability was often 
imposed in cases where goods were entrusted to others for the purpose of repair, 
workmanship or safe-keeping. It was also occasionally imposed in cases where a 
contract of locatio conductio operis existed between the parties33 In these cases the 
responsibility was absolute in that it did not require dolus or culpa on the part of the 
responsible party. Therefore if a servant of the custodian were to lose, steal or damage 
the goods or articles, the aggrieved party could proceed against the employer even 
though the element of personal fault may not have existed. Although this form of 
liability did not establish a general principle of vicarious liability and was confined to 
specific contractual relationships,34 it seemed to establish the idea that it could be fair 
to hold one liable for the faults of another under certain circumstances. This was an 
idea that the Justinian interpolators found difficult to come to terms with. They were 
27 Barlow Vicarious Liability 16. 
" Perhaps more accurately described as the period of the Dominate. "[n 284 AD, the emperor 
Diocletian replaced the Principate with an absolute monarchy called the Dominate" (Hosten et al 
Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 280). Although this period was characterised by a 
decline of the Roman empire and indeed a commensurate decline in legal science, the emperor 
Justinian successfully codified Roman law with the codex constitutionum, promulgated in 529AD. 
Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 282. 
29 Barlow Vicarious Liability 16. In terms of D. 43, 16, I, 12 a master who ordered his servants to 
perform wrongful acts would be held liable as ifhe had committed the acts personally. Alternatively, if 
a master was found to have appointed a careless servant, he could be held liable for any harm 
negligently caused by that servant. 
30 Many writers describe these cases as 'Quasi-Delicts'. See Burdick Principles of Roman Law 512-
5 I 3; Borkowski and Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 96. 
31 Barlow Vicarious Liability 16-17. 
32 Barlow Vicarious Liability 17. 
33 Ibid. 
34 "Notes of Some Controverted Points of Law" 26. 
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perhaps the most vehement proponents of the schuld prinzip (fault principle) and 
although they chose to acknowledge custodia liability, they attempted to base its 
application on the presumption of negligence on the part of the custodian. 35 
As regards the second category, there were five main classes of action introduced by 
the Roman praetors, each of which concerned the absolute liability of a master for the 
acts of his servants. Fault was not a requirement, and in each case liability was based 
on a ground of public policy36 The actions were: 
(a) The liability of the carrier, the inn-keeper and the stable-keeper 
(b) The actio exercitoria 
(c) Liability of the publicanus 
(d) The actions de effoses et dejectis and de positis et suspensis 
(e) Liability under the Edict de vi et vi Armata 
The liability of carriers, inn-keepers and stable-keepers was very similar to custodian 
liability37 and was only limited by vis major. In terms of this action, those who 
availed themselves of the services of inn-keepers, stable-keepers and shipmasters 
were entitled, under certain circumstances, to claim compensation for losses incurred 
as a result of the delictual acts of the employees of men of these classes3 8 Provision 
was made for three types of action in these cases, an action on account of damage to 
goods (actio damni),39 theft,4o and reception of goods (receptum)41 This action was 
considered particularly important as it was often necessary to trust this class of person 
and allow property into their custody.42 
" Barlow Vicarious Liability 18. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Some believe it is based on custodia while others believe it to be purely praetorian. The difference 
between the actions was that in the case of custodia the action could be taken regardless of whether the 
master or servant committed the actionable conduct, whereas the liability of carriers, inn-keepers and 
stable-keepers under the Edict could only be invoked where the harm was caused by a slave or servant. 
Burdick Principles of Roman Law 509-510. 
38 "Notes of Some Controverted Points of Law" 26. Borkowski and Du Plessis Textbook on Roman 
Law 350 point out that in addition, the innkeepers were liable for the acts of permanent residents. The 
rationale behind this was that although innkeepers were not likely to select which passing travellers to 
accommodate, they were regarded as able to choose their pelmanent residents. 
J9 D. 4, 9, 7. 
40 D. 47, 5. 
41 D. 4, 9, I. 
42 Borkowski and Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 350. 
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The actio exercitoria was based on contract and made provision for the liability of an 
exercitor (a man who traded in a ship for profit) for the actions of his agents acting 
within the scope of their authority.43 The existence of a mandate in some commercial 
or professional matter was necessary, and the action was confined to cases in which 
contracts were made by agents on behalf of the exercitor.44 
The liability of the publican us (or tax-farmer) for the acts of his subordinates was 
introduced in order to provide a specific remedy for victims of theft and violence 
committed by those subordinates in the different provinces.45 As with the other forms 
of liability mentioned, it was absolute and did not require fault on the part of the 
publicanus. 
The actions de effuses et dejectis and de positis et suspensis were introduced by the 
praetors in an attempt to keep the roads of Rome safe for those travelling along 
them.46 These actions could be taken against occupiers of buildings who caused 
damage to the persons or property of pedestrians by throwing objects out of windows 
or placing objects in dangerous positions47 Ifa servant of the occupier caused harm in 
contravention of the Edict, his or her master would be liable. The liability was 
absolute48 and extended beyond the acts of servants to acts of inmates49 
Liability under the Edict de vi et vi armata dealt with the forcible ejectment of a man 
from property. 50 In these cases the dispossessed party had to apply for an interdict 
forcing the other party to restore his possession. If the respondent did not comply with 
the terms of the Interdict he would be liable for damages5 ! Specific provision was 
made for liability of a master whose servant had committed the act of ejectment. 52 
43 Barlow Vicarious Liability 21. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Barlow Vicarious Liability 21-22. D. 39,4, I, 5. 
46 Barlow Vicarious Liability 22. D. 9, 3, I, 1. 
47 The occupier need not have been the owner for the purpose of attaching liability. Burdick Principles 
of Roman Lmv 507. 
48 Borkowski and Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Lmv 350. 
49 Ibid. 
so There were originally two Edicts, one dealing with ejectment by ordinary force and the other dealing 
with ejectment by force of arms. The two Edicts were fused by Justinian for the sake of practical 
convenience. Barlow Vicarious Liability 23 . 
51 Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
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When examining the various instances in which masters were held liable for the 
actionable conduct of their servants, it becomes clear that although the Romans had 
no general principle of vicarious liability, the idea of holding a master accountable for 
the acts of his servants in the absence of personal fault was not foreign to them. 
Indeed, the praetors' recognition of the need for a wider scope of liability in certain 
cases shows a willingness to depart from entrenched principles for reasons of policy. 
This is surely one of the earliest pieces of evidence of law being directed or diverted 
by policy, or altered to accommodate specific social circumstances. perhaps this 
broad-minded approach paved the way for the modem law of vicarious liability. 
1.2.2. Roman-Dutch Law 
The Roman-Dutch law on vicarious liability lacks clarity, perhaps due to the fact that 
the old writers seemed to have had divergent opinions on the subject53 Barlow points 
out that these conflicts of opinion have led some writers to conclude that the early law 
did not recognise vicarious liability at all. 54 Indeed, it has been said that "[t]here is 
apparently not a single authority of Roman-Dutch law to be found who states that an 
employer is as a general rule, responsible for the act of his employee acting within the 
sphere of his functions. ,,55 Though this may be true, it cannot be said that early 
Roman-Dutch law had no provision for the liability of a master for wrongs committed 
by his servant. Barlow observes that there are three different systems mentioned by 
the Roman-Dutch authorities which dealt with the liability of a master for the acts of 
his servant: " (a) Liability to the extent of wages due; (b) No liability at all; and (c) 
Liability in solidum.,,56 
As regards the first system, masters would be held liable for the wrongs committed by 
their servants only to the extent of the wages due to them. According to Grotius 
masters or mistresses could not be liable for wrongs committed by their servants 
beyond the amount of their unpaid wages. 57 Voet pointed out that where a servant had 
53 Barlow Vicarious Liability 61. In Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 at 386 Lord De Villiers commented 
that the Dutch authorities "were in hopeless conflict with each other." 
54 Ibid. 
""Notes of Some Controverted Points of Law" 28. 
56 Barlow Vicarious Liability 61. 
57 J G Kotze Simon Van Leeuwen's Commentaries on Roman Dutch Law VoUI (1886) 21; Mkize v 
Martens 386-387. 
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caused harm to a third party by a wrong committed outside the scope of his 
employment, the master would be obliged to pay the injured party wages due to the 
servant58 If, however, the wrong was committed during the performance of the 
servant' s appointed tasks Voet was of the opinion that the master would be liable in 
solidum for the ensuing damages, regardless of whether or not wages were due to the 
servant. 59 It seems that most authorities were in agreement that masters would be 
liable to the extent of wages due when the wrong was committed beyond the scope of 
employment and that this limitation did not apply when the wrong was committed 
within the scope of employment60 This notwithstanding, "A small but influential 
group of Roman-Dutch writers took the view that the liability of the master was 
limited to wages due, even in those cases where the delictual act was committed 
within the servant's scope of employment.,,61 
Unfortunately Grotius' statement (which is used as authority for this proposition) is 
unclear and has been variously interpreted62 Barlow is of the view that Vander 
Keesel was perhaps the last authority to interpret the old Dutch and Roman laws 
correctly63 Van der Keesel interpreted Grotius' statement of the law to create a 
general principle applicable to nearly all cases of master's liability64 
As far as Barlow' s second 'system' is concerned, it appeared that "[aj small school of 
Roman-Dutch writers took the view, that the master was not liable for the acts of his 
servants under any circumstances.,,65 Some early authorities, such as Grotius, believed 
that a master could never be held liable for the acts of his servants in the absence of 
58 Mkize v Martens 387. 
" Barlow Vicarious Liability 61. Van der Keesel did not agree with Voet on this point and confined 
liability of the master to those cases in which he had been enriched by the conduct of his servant. 
60 Barlow Vicarious Liability 62. However, Groenewegen and Bart followed Grotius ' idea that this 
wage-based liability could be applied to all cases. 
61 Ibid . 
• , Barlow Vicarious Liability 65 ; See also Lewis v Salisbury Gold Mining Co I OR 2-3 where Katz'; JA 
comments on Grotius' explanation. Both Groenewegen and Van der Keesel accept the statement as a 
general principle capable of being applied to all cases in which a servant has comm itted a wrong, 
whereas Voet and Van Leeuwen appear to confine this type of liability to cases in which the servant's 
acts are committed beyond the scope of employment. 
'3 Barlow Vicarious Liability 70. 
'4 Ibid Van der Keesel recognised that the Roman liability of inn-keepers was extraordinary and not 
part ofany general principle . 
• , Barlow Vicarious Liability 7 1. 
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personal fault. 66 Huber67 (writing in the middle of the seventeenth century) was of the 
opinion that there was no liability for the wrongs of servants at all and that any such 
liability could not be reconciled with general legal principles6 8 Finally, van der 
Linden69 adopted Grotius' view that in order to be held liable for the wrongs of a 
servant the master must have been guilty of some personal fault. 70 
Despite Voel's interpretation of wage-liability, neither of the two systems mentioned 
above expressly recognised the principle of liability in solidum. Indeed, it is extremely 
difficult to trace the development of this principle, which seemed to offend the well-
established fault principle of Roman law. However, as already mentioned, the Roman 
exceptions to this principle were, at the very least, an acceptance ofthe possibility that 
the delictual acts of a free servant could render his or her master liable to the extent of 
the harm sustained by an injured party. 
Although liability in solidum was almost certainly influenced by these exceptions, it is 
difficult to see how the Dutch authorities managed to distil such a number of distinct 
principles relating to specific factual situations into a generalised modem rule of 
vicarious liability. According to Barlow, "the historical basis of the modern Roman-
Dutch rule is the fact of selection.,,71 He goes on to point out that the early writers 
recognised that in Corpus Juris this type of liability was based on the lack of care in 
the selection of employees. It appears that this provided the necessary link between a 
number of cases which would otherwise have been clearly distinguishable from one 
another. This principle gained significant strength and it is argued that liability in 
solidum should be regarded as "the rule of Roman-Dutch law.,,72 
66 Ibid. Even though Grotius accepted that there could have been liability under certain statutes, he was 
still "inclined to hold that the master must be guilty of some personal fault," in order to draw down 
liability. 
67 Praelectiones (Vol. 2 ad. D. 15, 1, 4). 
6. Barlow Vicarious Liability 72. 
69 Supplemenlum ad Voel (9, 4,10). 
70 Barlow Vicarious Liability 73. 
71 Barlow Vicarious Liability 76. 
72 Barlow Vicarious Liability 82. 
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1.2.3. English Law 
Though the respondeat superior73 doctrine is a relatively recent development' (having 
emerged during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries)/4 it cannot be 
disputed that liability for the acts of others can be traced back to medieval times75 
However. in England "[t]he early medieval idea of holding a master responsible for 
all his servant's wrongs gave way, with the passing of the feudal system, to the 
principle that his liability be limited to the particular acts he had ordered or afterwards 
ratified." 76 
The 'modern' concept of vicarious liability in English law is no older than three 
hundred years, and only developed its present characteristics during the earlier part of 
the nineteenth century77 Indeed, from about the early fourteenth up until the late 
seventeenth century, the idea that a master could be held liable for the wrongdoings of 
his servants in the absence of personal fault was unheard of8 and Rogers observes 
that " [a]t one time liability seems only to have arisen if the employer had expressly 
commanded the wrong.,,79 
This inclination towards what has been termed the ' general agency' or 'command' 
rule80 is well illustrated by a number of early seventeenth century cases. In Waltham 
v Mulgar81 in 1607 a servant was charged with the lawful task of confiscating the 
goods of the King's enemies. The servant unlawfully confiscated goods belonging to 
the plaintiff (who was not an enemy). It was held that his master could not be held 
liable as he had not authorised the servant's wrongful conduct either ostensibly or 
73 The Latin translation of respondeat superior is 'let the principal answer' . E A Martin (ed) Oxford 
DictionGlY of Law 4ed (1997) 403. 
74 R W Baker "The Importance of a Word in the Respondeat Superior Doctrine" (1952-1955) 2 UQLJ 
I at 4. 
75 Ibid. To go back further than the seventeenth century in an examination of the English law on the 
subject is beyond the scope of this work. However it is worth noting that the English law was heavily 
influenced by Roman law on the subject. See 0 W Holmes "Agency" (1890-1891) 4 HLR 345 at 350. 
76 J G Fleming The Law of Torts ged (1998) 409; See also W P Keeton, D B Dobbs, R E Keeton and D 
G Owen Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts Sed (1984) 500. 
71 Barlow Vicarious Liability 36; See also Fleming The Law of Torts 409; W V H Rogers Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort 17ed (2006) 882. 
78 Barlow Vicarious Liability 39; Baker "Respondeat Superior Doctrine" 4. 
79 Rogers Tort (2006) 882. 
80 Baker "Respondeat Superior Doctrine" 4. 
81 Moo. 1076; 72 ER 899. 
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otherwise. Similarly, in 1618 in Southern v How82 it was held that the aggrieved party 
could not claim from a principal who had not directed his agent to enter into an 
agreement with the latter or to make the representations which had caused this party 
hann. In 1685 in the case of Kingston v Booth83 it was held: "If I command my 
servant to do what is lawful, and he misbehave himself, or do more, I shall not answer 
for my servant, but my servant for himself, for that it was his own act.,,84 
This narrow interpretation of master' s liability gradually gave way towards the end of 
the seventeenth century, to a less restrictive approach which would eventually evolve 
into the modem law of vicarious liability. The move towards strict liability for 
employers was perhaps due to a changing socio-economic climate in Britain. Indeed, 
Fleming points out:85 
"[T]he expansion of commerce and industry, which set in towards the end of 
the 17'h century, necessitated an adjustment of this narrow rule. The change 
from home industry to ever larger units of production vitiated the assumption 
that a master could exercise a close control over his servants, and the 
increasing hazards arising from modem industry necessitated a wider range of 
responsibility than that previously countenanced." 
It is said that Chief Justice Holt was responsible for introducing the modem principle 
in England,86 and that "he and his contemporaries laid the foundations of the modem 
law.,,87 The first of the cases in which the modem principle was applied was that of 
Boson v Sand/onfS in 1691. In this case the owners of a ship were held liable for the 
negligence of the ship's master which caused the plaintiffs goods (which were being 
transported on the owners' vessel) to spoil. Eyre J held that the ship's master was no 
more than a servant of the owners. Holt CJ held: "The owners are liable in respect of 
the freight, and as employing the master; for whoever employs another is answerable 
for him and undertakes for his care to all who make use of him.,,89 Similarly, in 
Turberville v Stamp90 in 1698 a master was held liable for the damage caused by a fire 
82 34 E & E Dig, 123: 79 ER 400. 
83 Skin. 228 ; 90 ER 105. 
" 90ER lOS. 
85 Fleming The Law of Torts 409. 
86 Barlow Vicarious Liability 36; Baker "Respondeat Superior Doctrine" 5. 
87 Barlow Vicarious Liability 40. 
"2 Salk. 440; 3 Mod. 323; I Show. 29; 91 ER 382. 
89 91 ER 382. 
90 Comb, 459; I Lord Raymond, 264; Skin., 681 ; 90 ER 590 & 903. 
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set by his servant in the course and scope of the latter's duties. Holt CJ held: "[I]f my 
servant doth any thing prejudicial to another it shall bind me, where it may be 
presumed that he acts by my authority, being about my business.,,91 
The Chief Justice went further in Sir Robert Wayland 's case92 by holding that it would 
be "more reasonable" for the master to suffer for the cheats of his servants than for 
strangers and tradesmen to bear the consequent losses. In 1709 in the case of Hern v 
Nicholl/3 he made what has been described as one of his most famous statements:94 
"[T]he merchant was liable for the deceit of his factor [servant] , though not 
criminaliter, yet civiliter; for seeing somebody must be a loser by this deceit, it is 
more reason that he who employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver, than 
a stranger.,,95 Barlow points out that the principle established in these cases was 
recognised as unquestioned law in 1725,96 but it was not until 1826 in Laughter v 
Pointer97 that a degree of certainty was reached on the subject. In this case the general 
principle that a master would be liable for the acts of his servants in the absence of 
personal fault (on the part of the former) was firmly established:98 
"By the middle of the next century it was finally accepted that the existence of 
[the employment] relationship was necessary for vicarious liability99 and 
sufficient to make the employer liable, provided the act was done in the course 
of the employment. At the same time the phrase 'implied authority' which had 
been the cornerstone of the master's primary liability gives way gradually to 
the modem 'scope of employment'." 
1.3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Having examined the Roman and Roman-Dutch law relating to vicarious liability, it is 
not difficult to understand why the South African courts relied heavily on the English 
law when developing the modem principles of vicarious liability. The apparent 
confusion surrounding the early Roman-Dutch writing on the subject was never really 
91 90 ER 590. 
" 3 Salk. 234; 91 ER 797. 
93 I Salk. 288; 90 ER 1154, 91 ER 256. 
" Barlow Vicarious Liability 42. 
95 91 ER 256. 
96 Barlow Vicarious Liability 42 . 
97 5 B & C, 547; 108 ER 204 . 
98 Rogers Tort (2006) 882. 
99 Reedie v London and North Western Railway Company (1849) 4 Exch. 244; 79 ER 120 I. 
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cleared up, even though the courts were inclined to accept that liability in solidum was 
the relevant Roman-Dutch rule for vicarious liability. Research on the matter was 
superficial until Kotze crs explanation of the old authorities appeared in 1894 in 
Lewis v Salisbury Gold Mining Co, in which the Chief Justice adopted the view that 
employers would be liable in solidum for the delictual actions of employees 
committed within the scope of their employment. 100 
Despite the various references to Roman and Roman Dutch principles it is clear that 
the South African courts looked to English law for guidance. Indeed, Barlow points 
out: 
"[O)ne is forced to come to the conclusion that our early Judges fell back, at 
least subconsciously, upon the well-recognised principles of English law and, 
with these principles in their minds, tried to find supporting authority in the 
old writers." 
Insofar as this is true, it can be said that the development of the modem concept of 
vicarious liability in South African law mirrored the development of principle in 
English law. 
100 Barlow Vicarious Liability 91. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CURRENT TEST FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will outline the test for vicarious liability as it is applied by our courts. I 
The test is primarily based on two enquiries - the first to determine whether there is a 
relationship capable of founding liability,2 and the second to determine whether the 
delict was committed in the course and scope of work performed on behalf of the 
person sought to be held liable. A number of factors are considered under each 
enquiry and it is therefore necessary to examine each of these individually. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines the approach taken by the 
courts when determining whether or not a relationship between the wrongdoer and the 
party sought to be held liable is capable of founding liability. As far as this aspect is 
concerned, the various relationships which have been held to be capable of founding 
liability are examined in light of the multifaceted tese applied to determine whether 
or not such relationships exist. 
The second section deals with the more complicated and much debated question of 
which acts will be deemed to have been committed in the course and scope of 
employment. Here a number of decisions are examined chronologically in order to 
illustrate how the court's approach has varied over the years. Particular attention is 
paid to the development of the ' creation of risk ' principle since the decision In 
Feldman v Mall. 4 
I Academic theories differ as far as the application of the test for vicarious liability is concerned. 
2 This is a relationship in which a party performs appointed tasks for another and is typically one of 
employment. However, a number of relationsh ips are capable of founding liability; these relationships 
are discussed below. 
3 The test established in Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnel Bpk 1998 (3) 
SA 17 (SeA). 
4 1945 AD 733. 
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2.2. DETERMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
As pointed out above, in order for vicarious liability to arise, there has to be a 
relationship between the party who committed the delict and the party sought to be 
held liable. According to Van der Walt and Midgley, "there is no uniform or universal 
principle governing each and every case, but the classic connecting factor is the 
employment relationship."s They go further to point out that the "courts have thus far 
considered three broad categories of relationships to be sufficiently analogous to 
satisfy the creation of the necessary linle employment; mandate; and that between an 
owner and driver of a motor vehicle.,,6 These are, however, not the only categories, as 
any relationship sufficiently akin to one of employment will be capable of founding 
liability.' 
2.2.1. The Employment Relationship 
There are many factors which are considered when determining whether or not an 
employment relationship exists, the traditional one being the control exercised by an 
employer over the tasks of the employee. In terms of the ' control test', an 
employment relationship will exist if an employer has the right8 to control the tasks of 
his or her employee and the manner9 in which that employee performs the tasks. lo If 
an employer has no control over the work being performed, the 'employed ' person 
would be an independent contractor. 
As a general rule, those employing the services of an independent contractor will not 
be held vicariously liable for any delicts committed whilst those services are being 
performed. II In such circumstances liability will only arise if a separate legal duty 
, Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus 200 I (3) SA 868 (SeA). See also McKerron The Law of 
Delict 90. 
' In Rodrigues v Alves 1978 (4) SA 834 (A) it was held that 'actual control' was not a requirement as 
long as the ' right to control' existed. 
9 If there is a right to control the tasks, but not the manner in which they are performed, the relationship 
may be one of mandate and not necessarily one of employment. 
10 See 0 J Mcquaid-Mason "Vicarious and Strict Liability" (1993) 30 LAWSA para 44. 
II McKerron Delict 90. 
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exists. In Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v De Valence l 2 Goldstone AlA 
set out the requirements for holding an employer liable for delicts committed by sub-
contractors. The same approach was taken in Stein v Rising Tide Productions CCJ3 
where it was held that although there may be circumstances under which a separate 
duty is owed, the general rule is that employers are not vicariously liable for the 
delicts of independent contractors. 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser l4 note that the control test has been validly criticised 
because of its simplistic and fictional nature and Rogers makes an interesting point 
when commenting on the application of the control test: 
"In modem conditions the notion that an employer has the right to control the 
manner of work of all his servants, save perhaps in the most attenuated form, 
contains more of fiction than of fact.,,15 
This is particularly true where employees are gIven a wide discretion in the 
performance of their tasks. Van der Walt and Midgley give the examples of police, 
employed airline pilots, doctors and trustees as employees who work with a fair 
amount of discretion. 16 It is clear that where these types of employees are concerned, 
the control test does not provide a suitable indication of whether or not an 
employment relationship exists. 17 
In Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk the court took a 
broad approach and held "that in determining the relationship between the parties a 
multi-faceted test should be utilised, taking account of all relevant factors and 
circumstances of the specific case.,,18 This approach was similar to the "dominant 
impression" test applied earlier in Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner;19 
a test which was recently adopted in the Stein v Rising Tide Productions CC, where it 
" 1991 (I) SA I (A) at 12H-J. 
13 2002 (5) SA 199 (C). 
14 Neethling el al Law of Delicl 340. 
IS Rogers TorI (2006) 885. 
16 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
17 These categories of employee will be discussed further at 2.2.4. 
IS Neethling el al Law of Delicl 340. 
19 1979 (I) SA 51 (A), see also: Ongeva//ekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenoolskap A VBOB 
1976 (4) SA 446 (A); and R v Feun 1954 (I) SA 58 (T). 
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was held that "the crucial test, particularly in marginal cases, is whether or not the 
'dominant impression' of the relationship is that of a contract of employment. ,,20 
When applying the 'dominant impression' test a number of factors are considered and 
weighed against each other. Wicke points OUt:21 
"The relevant method is to weigh the indicia that tend toward the existence of 
a contract of service against those indicating a contract of a different nature. 
The Judge follows a typological approach, according to which control is not 
an indispensable requirement of the contract of service but one of a number of 
indicia, the combination of which may be decisive." 
Van Heerden J lists a number of relevant factors in his judgment in the Smit case,22 
among which are: the nature of the work performed; the manner of payment, (whether 
the payment is made at a fixed rate or on commission); the discretion given to the 
employee in the performance of his or her duties; whether the employee is restrained 
from working for another employer; whether or not the employee provides his or her 
own tools or equipment; the power of the employer to dismiss and the length of time 
ofthe employment. 
In the English case, Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security,23 Cook J 
made the following observation:24 
"No exhaustive list has been compiled and perhaps no exhaustive list can be 
compiled of the considerations which are relevant in determining that question 
(whether or not an employment relationship exists), nor can strict rules be laid 
down as to the relative weight which the various considerations should carry 
in particular cases. The most that can be said is that control will no doubt 
always have to be considered, although it can no longer be regarded as the sole 
determining factor; and that factors which may be of importance are such 
matters as whether the man performing the services provides his own 
equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risk he 
takes, what degree of responsibility for investment and management he has, 
lOAt 2060. 
21 H Wicke Vicarious Liability in Modern South African Law (1997) (Unpublished LLM Thesis: 
Stellenbosch University) 49; see also E Mureinik "The Contract of Service: an Easy Test for Hard 
Cases" (1980) 97 SAU246 at 257-266. 
22 2061-2078. 
23 (1969) 2 QB 173. 
24 184-185. 
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and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from sound 
management in the performance of his tasks." 
It seems that a similar view is taken by the South African courts as the right of control 
is now viewed merely as one of a number of indicia that an employment relationship 
exists2 5 The broad, multifaceted test adopted in the Midway case is now accepted as 
the standard test for determining the employment relationship. 
2.2.2. Mandate and Agency 
Mandators will be vicariously liable for any delicts committed by their mandataries in 
the execution of their functions 2 6 Similarly, principals will be held liable for delicts 
committed by their agents whilst performing tasks in the course and scope of their 
authority.27 
In Eksteen v Van Schalkwyk en 'n Ander28 the issue of attributing liability to a 
mandator for delicts committed by his mandatary was considered. The court sought 
guidance from Roman-Dutch law due to the apparent lacuna in the South African law 
on the subject.29 On reviewing Roman-Dutch law, the court found that as a rule a 
mandator will be liable for the delicts of a mandatary only if the mandator was party 
to the actionable conduct,3D or if he or she was personally at fault. Personal fault 
would arise where the mandator should reasonably have foreseen such conduct and 
taken the necessary steps to avoid it.ll The court found that this was in line with South 
25 Smit v Workmen 's Compensation Commission 1979 (I) SA 51 (A) at 62D- 63B. 
26 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
27 Ibid. 
28 1991 (2) SA 39 (T). 
29 J R Midgley " Mandate, Agency and Vicarious Liability: Conflicting Principles" (J 991) 108 SAL) 
419. The author explains that these gaps were caused mainly by the use of imprecise terminology 
which was introduced from English law. 
30 As held by Schriener JA in Carter & Co (Ply) Ltd v McDonald 1955 (I) SA 202 (A) 210: "A person 
is himself liable who orders another to commit a delict which he then commits, or who orders another 
to do an act which in the natural course of things will lead to the commission of a delict, the act being 
done and the delict following." Another instance in which a mandator will be held liable is where the 
actionable conduct of the mandatary is subsequently ratified or adopted ((Rectius enim dicit"r in 
maleficio ratihabitionem mandata comparari: Ulpian, D.43.16.1.14.), McKerron Delict 87). See also 
McQuaid-Mason "Vicarious and Strict Liability" para 52. 
31 Midgley "Mandate" 420. 
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African law and that as such, a mandator could not be held liable for the delict of his 
or her mandatary in the absence of involvement or personal fault32 
When determining the liability of mandators for the delicts committed by their 
mandataries it is important to note the difference between empowered and 
unempowered mandataries and to note the subtle difference between agents and 
mandataries. 
"A contract of mandate may be entered into by one who is not an agent at all, 
or by one who is an unempowered agent but is obliged to carry out certain 
instructions, or by one who is an empowered agent and is obliged to further 
his principal's interests.")) 
The distinction between a relationship of mandate and that of agency has been the 
cause some confusion. Midgley points out)4 that the court's insistence on using the 
existence of an agency relationship to found liabilitl5 in cases concerning mandates 
is erroneous as "authority is conceptually distinct from the relationship between the 
parties.,,)6 It is important to note that when determining the employment relationship, 
it does not matter whether or not the party committing the delict is an empowered or 
unempowered agent or mandatary. 
When determining the relationship between the parties, the agreement between the 
mandator and the mandatary is the most important factor as it establishes the link 
which is necessary to found liability. The authority given to agents and mandataries 
should only be considered when determining the scope of employment37 As far as 
determining the relationship between the parties is concerned, the only issue is one of 
independence. Where an agent is an ordinary employee (which is often the case) 
there is no difficulty,38 but where the agent is independent the issue becomes more 
complicated. 
32 Eksteen v Van Schalkwyk en 'n Ander 45E. 
33 A J Kerr The Law of Agency 3ed (1991) 13. 
34 Midgley "Mandate" 421. 
35 Dukes v Marthinusen 1937 AD 12. 
36 Midgley "Mandate" 421. 
37 This factor will be discussed at 2.3. 
38 An employer may be held vicariously liable for the delicts of his employees regardless of their status 
as agents, (empowered or otherwise). 
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The complication arises due to the apparent confusion between the terms 
' independent contractor' and ' independent agent'. As mentioned above,39 employers 
will not be held liable for delicts committed by independent contractors. However, 
agents, whether independent or otherwise, can still render their principals vicariously 
liable through their delictual conduct. Kerr points out that in the law of contract the 
term 'independent contractor' refers to a conductor operis, whereas in delict the term 
includes independent agents, mandataries as well as conductores operis. 4o The 
fundamental difference between mandataries, employees and independent agents is 
that the independent agent is not obliged to do any work at all if he or she does not 
wish to do S041 Although the independent agent can therefore be distinguished from 
an employee or mandatary, it does not follow that such an agent can be described as 
an ' independent contractor' .42 
2.2.3. The Relationship Between Owners and Drivers of Vehicles 
Under certain circumstances an owner of a motor vehicle may be held liable for the 
negligent actions of the driver of the vehicle. This liability arises where the driver has 
the right to control the way in which the vehicle is driven, or where the relationship 
between the owner and the driver is akin to one of employment.43 The traditional 
requirements for determining whether or not the relationship is sufficient to found 
liability were set out by Fannin J in S v Mavaneni:44 
"In South Africa the owner of a motor car is liable for the negligent driving of it 
by another person authorised by him to drive it if: 
(a) the vehicle is being driven on behalf of the owner, and 
(b) the relationship between the owner and driver is such that the former 
retains the right to control the manner in which the car shall be driven." 
39 At 2.2.1 above. 
40 A J Kerr "Mandataries and Conductores Operis" (1979) 96 SAL! 323 at 323. 
41 Kerr Agency 17. 
42 Kerr Agency 18 gives an example of the confusion between the two terms when pointing out that the 
insurance agent in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Ltd v Macdonald 1931 AD 412 was clearly an 
independent agent, "yet in two of the three opinions in the case he was described as an ' independent' 
contractor. " 
43 Messina Associated Carriers 876F. See also McKerron Delict 94. 
44 1963 (4) SA 89 (D) 9IE-G. 
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Although the legal position has not changed much as far as vicarious liability of 
vehicle owners are concerned, the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently held in 
Messina: 45 
"Ultimately the true enquiry is whether the relationship between the owner 
and the driver and the interest of the former in the driving of the latter is 
sufficiently analogous to the case of an employee driving in the course and 
scope of his employment to justify the negligence of the driver being 
attributed to the owner." 
The justification for imputing such liability lies in social policy regarding what is just 
and equitable under the circumstances46 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser point out 
how the imposition of liability in cases such as this has been explained with reference 
to the ' risk theory' .47 They draw attention to Paton v Caledonian Insurance C048 
where Henning J made the following observation: 49 
"It seems to me that the owner of a potentially dangerous thing, such as a 
motor vehicle, who retains control of it, although he allows another to handle 
it, is vicariously responsible to others for the harm caused to them by such 
handling. " 
The reason for attributing liability was oversimplified in this case. It is submitted that 
this justification for liability, although valid, cannot stand alone without reference to 
an employment or mandate relationship between the parties 50 This kind of 
relationship is necessary in that "the basis of liability on the part of the owner is that 
the vehicle is driven by the other at his instance or with his concurrence"SI and for his 
purposes. This is supported by Schriener JA in Carter & Co. (Pty) Ltd v McDonald, 52 
quoting Salmond: s3 
45 Scott JA in Messina Associated Carriers 175H-I. 
46 McQuoid-Mason "Vicarious and Strict Liability" para 55: "The rationale for the vicarious liability of 
the owner of a motor vehicle is said to be that, while drivers may be men of straw, owners are morc 
likely to be insured or may otherwise be capable of absorbing the loss." 
47 Neethl ing et al LIIW of Delict 345. 
48 1962 (2) SA 691 (D). 
49 At 695 . 
" It is interesting to note that under the OClio de pauperie the negligence of a handler of a dangerous 
animal may be used as a defence to an action against the owner of that animal. However, where the 
handler is the employee of the owner, the latter may be held vicariously liable for the former 's 
negligence: Lever v Purdy 1993 (3) SA 17 (A). 
51 J B Talbot "Car Owner's Liability for Friend's Driving" (1964) 81 SALJ 73 at 78. 
52 208B-C. 
5-
, R F V Heuston and R A Buckley Salmond and Heuston on the Lmv of Torts 1ged (1987) para 26(5). 
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"In order to render the owner liable it is necessary to find as a fact that the 
driver was acting, not for his own purposes, but for those of the owner of the 
car. If he lent the car to his friend for his friend's purposes he would not be 
liable. For control means that the journey is the journey of the principal." 
2.2.4. Discretionary Performance of Functions 
As mentioned above, 54 there are many types of employment relationship in which 
employees enjoy a wide discretion when performing their tasks. Some common 
examples of these types of employees are doctors, airline pilots, police and trustees. 55 
In Esterhuizen v Administrateur TransvaalS6 it was held that the provincial 
administration could be held liable for delicts committed by doctors in its employ, 
even though these practitioners conducted their work with wide discretion. As 
Burchell points out:57 
"[A Jny control, or even the right of control, over their conduct is limited. 
However, they fall into the category of 'servants' and if they were negligent 
while acting in the course and scope of their employment their employer (the 
Minister of Health or, in older cases, the provincial administration) would be 
vicariously liable." 
The same principle was applied in Minister van Polisie en 'n Ander v Gamble en 'n 
Ander58 where it was held that members of the police force were always under the 
control of the State when they were about police business, notwithstanding the fact 
that they were given a wide discretion in performing their appointed tasks. 
As far as trustees are concerned the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed in Van den 
Berg that their employers will be held vicariously liable for any de1icts committed by 
these employees while discharging their duties 5 9 The fact that trustees act with a wide 
discretion does not exempt their employers from liability. 
54 At 2.2.1. 
" Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
56 1957 (3) SA 710 (T). 
57 J Burchell Principles of Delict (1993) 216. See also Mtetwa v Minister of Health 1989 SA 600 (0). 
58 1979 (4) SA 759 (A). 
" Van den Berg v Coopers and Lybrand2001 (2) SA 242 (SeA). 
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2.2.5. Liability of Partners 
A partnership can be held vicariously liable for the actionable conduct of one of its 
partners. However, as Midgley points out, "[T]he rationale, and as a result, the 
requirements for liability remains unclear. ,,60 In Rodrigues v Alves & Others the 
Appellate Division touched on the issue of liability of partners, but it seems that the 
court failed to present a clear and unequivocal relationship requirement. Viljoen AlA 
made the following observation:61 
"A partner may act in many capacities for the partnership and in my view it 
depends upon the nature of the capacity in which he acts whether the 
partnership incurs vicarious liability. It is therefore not his capacity as a 
partner but the capacity in which he acts for the partnership which is 
important. " 
He went on to hold that where a partner carried out general representative work for 
the partnership, he or she would be acting as a servant of the partnership, but where 
the partner engaged in specific work for the partnership, that work would make the 
partner an independent contractor. It is difficult to see how any partner can be 
considered an independent contractor vis-a-vis the partnership. Surely, in a situation 
in which a partner engages in specific work for the partnership, that partner is acting 
as the agent of the partnership. As Midgley points out,62 this dictum suggests that the 
partnership relationship itself is insufficient to found liability. This aspect of the 
decision is not problematic, but the implication that the partner must be acting as an 
' employee' in order for liability to arise is.63 Surely the distinction between 
independent actions and those performed in the course and scope of the partnership' s 
business should be dealt with at the second stage of the enquiry?64 
McKerron points out that, although there is no direct authority in point, "The liability 
of partners for each other's delicts is governed by the same principles as the liability 
60 J R Midgley Lawyers ' Professional Liability (1992) 187. 
61 At 839 F. 
6' Midgley Lawyers' Professional Liability 187. 
63 Interestingly, McKerron is of the opinion that "the doctrine of employer' s liability is not applicable, 
since no partner is the servant or employee of any other partner, or of the partnership." McKerron 
Delic! 89. 
64 The second leg of the test for vicarious liability which is used to determine whether or not an 
employee's actions were performed during the course and scope of employment. Discussed further at 
2.3. 
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of a principal for the delicts of his agents.,,65 The fact that a partner is a representative 
of the partnership business serves as a prima facie indication that an agency 
relationship exists between the partner and the partnership. There seems to be no good 
reason therefore, to treat partnership arrangements any differently from those of 
agency when applying the principles of vicarious liability. "If a partner is not an 
employee, principles similar to those applicable to representatives should be 
applied.,,66 
2.2.6. Relationships Analogous to Employment 
The courts take a fairly broad view as far as the 'employment' relationship is 
concemed67 and therefore liability may also arise "where 'in the eye of the law' the 
one was in the position of the other's servant,,,68 even though no formal employment 
relationship existed between the parties. In the Messina Associated Carriers v 
Kleinhaus ,69 Scott JA pointed out that this is an extension of the concept of 
employment based on policy considerations. 
In terms of this principle, the relationship can be extended to any relationship 
analogous to that of employment and can include a relationship between a parent and 
child70 and even one akin to such a relationship.71 In Dowling v Diocesan College 
and Others it was held that a case of vicarious liability could be made out against a 
school for delicts committed by its prefects72 A similar application of the principle 
can be seen in Gibbins v Williams, Muller, Wright & Mostert Ingelyf en Andere, 73 
where a university was held liable for the negligent conduct of a house committee 
member during an initiation ceremony. The plaintiff was forced to dive into a 'mud 
bath' which was not deep enough for this purpose and was left paralysed due to the 
back injuries he sustained. 
65 McKerron Delic/ 89. See also McQuoid·Mason "Vicarious and Strict Liability" para 53. 
66 Midgley Lawyers' Professional Liabilily 187. 
67 Midway Two Engineering & Construc/ion Services v Transne/ 8pk 23H·J. 
68 Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus para lOH-I. 
69 Ibid 
70 As seen in Messina Associated Carriers. 
71 Dowling v The Diocesan College 1999 (3) SA 847 CC) 852H. 
72 This confinned the decision in Hitlonian Sociely v Crofton 1952 (3) SA 130 CA) where it was held 
that the actions of prefects could render a school vicariously liable where their powers duties were 
similar to those exercised by teachers. In effect, such duties rendered the prefects defacto employees. 
73 1987 (2) SA 82 CT). 
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It has recently been held that provincial government can be vicariously liable for the 
negligent acts of a cabinet minister. In Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Lid v 
Premier, Western Cape 74 it was held that the fact that the minister in question was 
accountable to parliament and in particular to the premier resulted in the relationship 
being analogous to one of employment. This decision followed the position taken in 
Mangope v Asmal,75 where it was held that the accountability of cabinet ministers to 
Government serves as a prima facie indication that Government has control over the 
way in which these ministers fulfil their functions76 This 'control ' was considered 
sufficient to create a relationship which was capable of founding liability. As such it 
was held that unless the minister could show that he was acting outside of his powers 
as a minister, the Government could be held vicariously liable for his conduct.77 The 
decisions in these two cases clearly illustrate that the courts consider the relationship 
between organs of State and cabinet ministers as one analogous to employment and is 
therefore capable of founding vicarious liability in the same way as an ordinary 
employment relationship.78 
2.2.7. Multiple Employers 
An interesting difficulty is presented when an employee who works for two or more 
employers commits a delict in the course of his or her duties. The obvious question is 
which employer bears responsibility for the employee' s conduct? 
In R H Johnson Crane Hire (Pty) Lid v Grotto Sleel Construction (Pty) Lld79 Conradie 
J held that the control test gives the best indication of where the liability should lie in 
cases where more than one employer was involved. It was held that liability should 
follow the employer who controls the manner in which the work is to be conducted as 
''the master who controls the manner in which the servant does his work is the one 
74 2002 (6) SA 180 (C) 20 I G-H . 
75 1997 (4) SA 277 (T). 
76 At291B. 
77 At 291C. 
78 See) Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The Modern Actio injllriarllm (1998) 
147-149. 
79 1992 (3) SA 907 (C). 
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who can most effectively control the risk of harm."so The issue in this case was 
whether the respondent could be held liable for the negligent conduct of a crane 
operator, who was in fact employed by the applicant. It was held that although the 
temporary employer had the right to control what the employee worked on, the 
employer had no right to control the manner in which the work was performed. It was 
therefore held that the temporary employer could not be held vicariously liable for the 
harm. This principle was later applied in Rofdo (Pty) Ltd tla Castle Crane Hire vB & 
E Quarries (Pty) Ltd,S I where it was held that although a temporary employer could 
direct an employee to perform certain tasks, a general employer who had the right to 
control the manner in which the tasks were performed would be vicariously liable for 
any delicts flowing from the performance of these tasks. 
A similar position is followed by the English courts. A good example is Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Lt~2 which presented 
very similar facts to those seen in the R H Johnson Crane Hire case. Here it was held 
that the general employer had the power to direct the way in which the employee 
operated the machine, whereas the temporary employer only had the power to direct 
what work was to be done and where. The general employer was held liable for the 
harm caused. 
In both English and South African law the general employer is prima facie liable for 
an employee's negligence - the burden of proving otherwise is placed on that 
employer. S3 If the general employer can prove that the delict was committed in respect 
of actions over which the temporary employer had control, the latter will be held 
liable84 This principle was adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Midway Two 
Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk, where a temporary employer 
was held liable for the delict of a lorry driver who was hired out by a labour broker. It 
80 At 907D-E. In this case the respondent hired a crane and the services of a crane driver to operate the 
machine fTom the applicant. The applicant sought to recover damages fTom the respondent for losses 
sustained as a result of the negligent use of the machine. An excessive load was placed on the crane, 
causing it to fall over a precipice. 
" 1999 (3) SA 941 (SE). 
82 1947 AC I. 
S3 Rofdo (Ply) Ltd tlo Castle Crane Hire vB & E Quarries (Ply) Ltd 948H. 
84 W V H Rogers Winfield and Jolowiez on Tort 16ed (2002) 711. See also Mcquaid-Mason 
"Vicarious and Strict Liability" para 45. 
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was held that the nature of the employee' s work was such that the temporary 
employer had the right to control how it was performed. 
Interestingly, the English courts follow a ' fact-specific ' approach, in terms of which 
inferences are drawn from the type of work being performed by the employee. Rogers 
observes: 85 
"A distinction is drawn between cases where a complicated piece of 
machinery and a driver are lent, and cases where labour only, particularly 
where it is not of a highly skilled character, is lent. In the former case, it is 
easier to infer that the general employer continues to control the method of 
performance .... In the latter case it is easier to infer that the hirer has control 
not merely in the sense of being able to tell the workman what he wants done, 
but also of deciding the manner of doing it." 
The South African authorities tend to favour a broader, principle-based approach, 
whereby all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case are 
considered under a multifaceted test. 86 
2.3. THE 'COURSE AND SCOPE' ENQUIRY 
"How can any wrong be in the scope of a servant's employment? No sane or 
law-abiding employer ever hires someone to tell lies, give blows or act 
carelessly. ,,87 
Most employers do not hire people to lie to, cheat, assault or steal from their clients, 
nor do they hire people knowing that these employees will act carelessly, causing 
harm to others. Unfortunately many employees act carelessly and many wilfully 
depart from their duties in order to satisfy their own, often criminal, ends. Under these 
circumstances the courts have to determine whether or not the employee's digression 
was sufficient to take his or her acts outside the course and scope of employment.88 
" Rogers Tort (2002) 711. 
" Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk 22E-23 I. 
87 Rogers Tort (2006) 892. 
" Although the term 'employment' suggests the existence of an employment relationship in the 
ordinary sense, it is used throughout this section to describe a state of affairs in which one party 
performs work for another and includes all of the categories of re lationships capable of founding 
liability discussed in 2.2 above. 
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2.3.1. The Basic Requirements 
When deciding on liability of employers for the actionable conduct of their 
employees, courts have to reach a conclusion as to whether or not the conduct 
occurred during the course and scope of the employee's service. Ifit is found that the 
conduct occurred outside the course and scope of employment the employer will not 
be held liable. This principle is neatly set out in Mkize v Martens: 89 
"A master is answerable for the torts of his servant committed in the course 
and scope of his employment, bearing in mind that an act done by a servant 
solely for his own interests and purposes, and outside his authority, is not done 
in the course of his employment, even though it may have been done during 
his employment." 
This leg of the enquiry is focused on determining whether or not an employee was 
engaged in the work of his or her employer at the time of the delict. "The focus is not 
so much on the wrong committed by the servant as upon the act he is doing when he 
conunits the wrong.,,90 
The question of whether or not an act was committed in the course and scope of 
employment is one of fact91 and there is therefore no exact test or formula. This has 
caused some confusion, particularly as the courts have yet to reach consensus on the 
issue.92 
Van der Walt and Midgley point out that in employment cases, the activity of the 
employee must relate to what that employee is generally employed to do.93 
Furthermore the functions performed by the employee must have been carried out 
with the purpose of furthering the employer's business interests94 Rogers explains 
this concept as follows: 95 
" 390. 
90 Rogers Tort (2006) 893. 
91 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29: McKen'on Delict 95. 
92 K Calitz "Vicarious liability of employers: reconsidering risk as a basis for liability" (2005) 2 TSAR 
215 at216. 
93 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Rogers Tort (2006) 893. 
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"The underlying idea is that the injury done by the servant must involve a risk 
sufficiently inherent in or characteristic of the employer' s business that it is 
just to make him bear the loss." 
First, it is necessary to establish what the employee was employed or instructed to do; 
next to determine whether a particular deviation from the employee' s work is so far 
removed from his or her appointed task as to conclude that the employee had been 
derelict in his or her duties. 
2.3.2. The Scope of an Employee's Instructions 
The scope of an employee's instructions can be determined with reference to a 
contract of service between the employee and his or her employer. However, the 
scope of authorit/6 to perform certain tasks is seldom clear. This means it is often 
necessary to go beyond the contract to make an assessment based on the facts of the 
particular case. 
There is some confusion surrounding the determination of whether certain acts are 
committed within the scope of an employee's authority. The problem this raises 
arises from the fact that courts have not been consistent in the application of an 
accepted general principle. In Minister of Law and Order v Ngob097 the court took a 
broad approach similar to that taken in Minister of Police v Rabie98 and did not go 
sufficiently into the issue of authority. In these cases the court merely asked, "Did the 
employee engage in the affairs of the employer at the time the delict was 
committed?,,99 
In Ess Kay Electronics Pte Ltd v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd, 100 however, 
Howie J A said: "The question is always: were the acts in the case under consideration 
in fact authorised; were they in fact performed in the course of the employee's 
% [t must be noted that when using the word 'authority' in this context, [ am not necessarily describing 
an agency situation. Instead 'authority' is used to describe what an employee is permitted to do in the 
course and scope of his or her employment. 
91 1992 (4) SA 822 (A). 
98 1986 (I) SA 117 (A). 
99 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
10
° 2001 (I)SA 1214 (SCA). 
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employment?"lol He went further to point out that even if the actions of the employee 
"superficially, appear to form a close link between the wrong and the employee's 
duties,,,102 the employer cannot be held liable. Van der Walt and Midgley point out 
that the emphasis on authorisation in Howie JA's formulation might be misleading 
and suggest that the second part of the question should be treated as an alternative to 
the first part. 103 
The Ess Kay decision suggests that in order for an act to be within the course and 
scope of employment, it must have been authorised. With respect, this makes very 
little sense and it is suggested that this is in fact not what the court intended. It seems 
far more likely that the intention was to frame these two questions in the alternative. 
In Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel l04 it was clearly established that employees acts do 
not have to be authorised in order to fall within the course and scope of their 
employment. 105 This principle was confirmed in Feldman v Mall where it was held 
that an employer could be held liable "even for acts which he has not authorised.,,106 
This principle makes sense in that it makes allowance for the fact that the conduct of 
an employee which leads to the delict is very frequently unauthorised. A good 
example of the principle is the classic case of drivers deviating from their authorised 
routes. 107 
If it is accepted that the scope of an employee's instructions do not necessarily 
influence the finding that certain acts were committed within the course and scope of 
employment, it must be asked what the relevance of determining an employee's 
authority has to the 'course and scope' enquiry where ordinary employment is 
concerned. lOS The answer is that the employee's instruction serves as a helpful point 
of reference from which it is possible to determine the extent of the employee's 
deviation, if any. 
101 At219para 10. 
102 Ibid. 
lO" 
, Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
104 1927 AD 141. 
105 At 147. 
106 At 774. 
I07See Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel. 
108 In cases of mandate and agency it is clear that the scope of authority has more direct bearing on the 
enquiry: Eksteen v Van Schalkwyk en 'n Ander. 
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2.3.3. Deviation from Instructions 
After the scope of employment has been established, it is necessary to detennine 
whether and how far the employee deviated from his or her instructions while 
committing the delict. Van der Walt and Midgley point out that "the test is whether 
the employee's digression is so great in respect of time and space that it cannot 
reasonably be said that the functions to which he or she was appointed are still being 
exercised."J09 They go on to explain that the courts follow a 'two-tier' approach 
which was described by Zulman JA in ABSA Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) 
(Ply) LtdllO as follows: 111 
"The effect of the 'two tier test' , as postulated by Jansen J A, is that an 
employer will only escape liability ifhis employee had the subjective intention 
of promoting solely his own interests and that the employee, objectively 
speaking, completely disassociated himself from the affairs of his employer 
when committing the act." 
The problem with this test is that it is unclear. It provides no clearly defined 
requirements and therefore too much is left to interpretation. The courts have not 
taken a concrete stance on the issue and as a result there is little legal certainty. Indeed 
in Union Government v Hawkins I 12 it was observed that the reason for the lack of a 
hard and fast rule is due to the factual basis of the enquiry which makes it difficult to 
set rigid guidelines. It is therefore necessary to examine the facts of the relevant cases 
in order to illustrate how the issue has been approached over the years. 
A good example of a simple deviation case is Viljoen v Smith. 113 In this case the 
appellant's employee, a fann labourer, caused a veld fire on the respondent's farm 
while deviating from his employer's instructionsll4 The respondent alleged that the 
employee had caused the fire negligently in the course and scope of his employment 
109 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. See also McQuoid-Mason "Vicarious and Strict Liability" para 
46. 
110 [200 I] I All SA I (A). 
III At 6D. 
I" 1944 AD 556 at 564. 
11 3 1997 (I) SA 309 (A). 
114 The employee, while working on his employer's vineyard, had climbed through a fence onto the 
respondent's farm in order to relieve himself. While doing so behind some bushes, he attempted to 
light a cigarette and the match head flew off, causing a fire. 
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and that consequently the appellant was vicariously liable for the damage sustained. It 
was argued by the appellant that the employee's actions were outside the course and 
scope of his employment in that they were for a personal purpose. It was further 
argued that the distance, some 300 metres from his place of work, that he travelled to 
reach the respondent's farm was an indication that he had abandoned the work of his 
employer. 
The court held, firstly, that not every personal act committed by an employee during 
his or her employment necessarily fell outside the course and scope of employment I 15 
and that under the circumstances, the personal nature of the employee's acts did not 
take him outside the course and scope of his employment. Regarding the appellant's 
second argument, the court held that although the employee had deviated from his 
work and had acted against his employer's wishes, 116 his degree of digression was not 
material enough to conclude that he had abandoned the work of his employer. It was 
held that he was acting within the course and scope of his employment and his 
employer was therefore liable. 
Even though the issue was not dealt with in detail in the Viljoen case, it had 
previously been established in Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel1i7 that where an 
employee deviates from the instructions of his or her employer, and commits a delict 
while deviating, the fact that the employee was unauthorised to perform the act in 
question will not necessarily free the employer from liability. In fact, an employer 
may even be held liable where an employee deliberately disobeys instructions. 118 Van 
der Walt and Midgley point out: 119 
"Where conduct has been forbidden, a distinction is drawn between a 
prohibition that limits the sphere of employment and one that restricts conduct 
within the sphere of employment. In the former instance the employee acts 
outside his or her course of employment, while in the latter instance the 
conduct falls within that scope." 
liS 315F-G. 
11 6 The respondent had forbidden his employees ITom entering the appellant ' s farm. It appears that the 
respondent did not concentrate on this fact in his argument. Even though it was briefly considered, the 
court did not find this to have an influence on the course and scope enquiry. 
117 146. See also Feldman v Mall 774. 
I I' Ibid. See also McKerron Delict 99. 
I I' Van der Walt and Midgley para 29. 
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The Estate van der Byl case neatly illustrates this principle. The appellant was sued 
for the negligent conduct of one of his drivers who, at the time of the delict, was 
deliberately disobeying his instructions. 120 The driver carried a passenger through an 
area in which he was strictly forbidden to carry passengers. On the way back from 
dropping the passengers off, the driver collided with the respondent's cart, seriously 
injuring him. 
The respondent claimed that the appellant was vicariously liable in that the driver of 
the taxi was acting in the course and scope of his employment even though he was 
acting against the instructions of his employer. It was held that because the driver was 
acting for the benefit of his employer and carrying on his employer's business, he was 
still acting in the course and scope of that business. It is clear in this case that the 
instructions of the employer prohibiting the employee's actions, merely restricted the 
conduct within the sphere of the employment and did not restrict the sphere of the 
employment itself. 121 
This approach makes sense and leaves little room for inconsistent interpretation. 
However, the situation becomes more complicated where an employee goes on what 
the courts describe as ' a frolic of his own'. 122 In this case the employee temporarily 
disengages from his or her work to further his or her own interests. The courts have 
the difficult task of having to draw a line between what is and what is not within the 
course and scope of employment. As pointed out above, there is little legal certainty 
as far as this issue is concerned, largely due to the fact that the courts have failed to 
apply a concrete test. 
In Feldman v Mall an employee of the appellant was ordered to deliver varIOus 
parcels using a company service vehicle. His instructions were to return the service 
120 The appellant owned a number of taxi cars and carried on a taxi business in Gordon ' s Bay. He did 
not have a licence to operate in the neighbouring municipality of Somerset Strand. He did, however, 
have permission to carry passengers to and from the railway station in Somerset. He expressly 
instructed his drivers that they were not permitted to carry passengers between points within the 
Strand. 
121 It must be noted that employers cannot be held liable for delicts committed by employees who take 
it upon themselves to perform functions which clearly lie outside the sphere of employment, even 
though these functions may be for the benefit of the employer: Roos v De Loor 's Ltd 1931 TPD 100. 
m This well known phrase was coined in England by Parke B in Joel v Morrison (1834) 6 C&P 50 I at 
503. See Y B Smith "Frolic and Detour" (1923) 23 CLR 444. 
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vehicle to a certain garage after having distributed the parcels. After having delivered 
the goods however, the employee drove the service vehicle to a place some miles 
away from his employer' s place of business and proceeded to drink enough alcohol so 
as to render him incapable of driving safely. While attempting to drive back to the 
garage he negligently collided with and killed the respondent's husband. The 
respondent claimed damages for loss of support for her and her two minor children. 
The court held that the appellant was liable for the delict committed by its employee, 
in that the employee had not entirely abandoned the work of the employer even 
though he had deviated from his instructions. In this case an important factor was that 
the employee had not fully disengaged from his duties when he deviated and that by 
attempting to return the service vehicle it was clear that he was engaging in the work 
of his employer. 123 
It is often easy to distinguish between acts committed in furtherance of one's own 
interests and those committed for the benefit of an employer. For example, in Carter 
& Co v McDonald an employee got permission to go to the market for his own 
purposes during work hours and was lent a company bicycle. On his way to the 
market he negligently collided with the respondent who was crossing the road. It was 
held on appeal that although the employee was using a company vehicle and was 
technically on company time, it was clear that he was engaged in carrying out his own 
business and not that of his employer. The employer could not, therefore, be held 
vicariously liable for his negligent conduct. 124 
Although this distinction seems straightforward, a difficulty arises where an employee 
is acting within the course and scope of his employment for one purpose and outside 
it for another. Examples of this are most commonly found where drivers carry 
unauthorised passengers. They are still carrying out their main duty for the employer, 
but acting outside of their scope of employment by carrying the unauthorised 
passengers. 
123 However framed, this decision is a clear example of a 'policy-based' ruling. 
124 Schriener JA observed that in this case the employee was not acting as an employee, rather as a 
bailee to whom the employer lent his property Cat 208). 
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In South African Railways and Harbours v Marais l25 an employer was sued for the 
negligent conduct of one of its train drivers who was deviating from instructions and 
performing his appointed tasks at the same time. The driver of the train allowed a 
passenger to accompany him and the fireman on the train's engine contrary to a 
standing order prohibiting him from allowing passengers from travelling on the 
engine. 126 The passenger's wife claimed damages, arguing that the actions of the 
driver rendered his employers vicariously liable for her husband 's death and the 
resultant losses she sustained. It was admitted that the accident had occurred due to 
the negligence of the driver. However, it was argued by the appellant that in allowing 
the passenger to accompany him on the engine, the driver of the train was acting 
outside the course and scope of his employment. 
This case raised an interesting difficulty as the driver of the train was plainly acting in 
the course and scope of his employment for the purpose of driving the train, but it was 
clear that he had invited the passenger to join him for his own personal purpose and 
against his employer's instructions. The court had to determine whether the 
instruction prohibiting the driver from allowing unauthorised passengers limited the 
scope of his employment. It was held that this prohibition did limit the scope of the 
driver's employment and that therefore, by allowing an unauthorised passenger access 
to the engine for personal reasons, the driver was acting outside the course and scope 
of his employment. 127 Watermeyer CJ made the following remark in summing up: 128 
"In my opinion a master cannot be held liable for the death of a person which 
is caused by an extra danger to such person not created by a negligent 
performance of the master's work but by an act done by his servant for his 
own purposes and entirely outside the scope of his employment." 
p, 
- 1950 (4) SA 610 (A). See also Rossouw v Central News Agency Ltd 1948 (2) SA 267 (W). 
12' The three of them were drinking brandy and the driver was driving at an excessive speed. It was 
proved that the excessive speed caused the train to derail, and as a result of the derailment all three men 
were killed by bums they sustained. It was also proved that had the passenger not been in the 
immediate vicinity of the engine when the train derailed, he would not have been killed. 
127 Interestingly, in the minority judgment delivered by Greenberg JA, emphasis was placed on the duty 
of care owed by the appellant to the respondent. It was held that such duty did not exist as the victim 
was not foreseeable by the appellant. See McKerron "Passenger Killed While Travelling on Engine of 
Train: Liability of Administrat ion" (1951) 68 SAL] I, where the autilOr criticises this minority 
judgment. See also P Q R Boberg The Law of Delict: Volume I - Aquilian Liability (1984) 332. 
12' At 619H-620A. 
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The same approach was recently followed in Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom, 129 where a 
19-year-old boy hitched a ride with the employee of the respondent who was busy 
carrying out his appointed tasks. '3o The vehicle was involved in an accident which 
was caused by the negligence of the driver and the young man was badly injured. His 
father sued the respondent on his son's behalf. It was held that the employer's 
instructions not to carry unauthorised passengers limited the scope of the driver's 
employment. 131 Thus, by disregarding his employer's instructions, the employee was 
acting outside the course and scope of his employment. This was an important 
decision illustrating as it did the difference between prohibitions which limited the 
scope of employment and those which merely determined the manner in which tasks 
were to be performed. I32 It was also established that an employee could 
simultaneously act within and outside the course and scope of employment and that 
the employer's liability would depend on the capacity in which the employee was 
acting when committing the delict. This follows the "dual capacity approach"I33 
which was also adopted in the English case, Twine v Beans ExpressD4 In terms of 
this approach an employee can act within the course and scope of his employment for 
one purpose and outside it for another. 135 
2.3.4. Intentional Wrongs and the Creation of Risk Principle 
It is very difficult to assess whether or not an employee is acting in the course and 
scope of his employment when committing wrongful acts which are clearly 
unauthorised by their employers. As far as the subjective part of the enquiry is 
concerned,136 it is clear in most instances that employees who deliberately commit 
wrongful delictual acts do so of their own volition and for entirely personal reasons. 
129 2003 (3) SA 83 (SCA). 
130 The driver was expressly prohibited from carrying unauthorised passengers. 
131 At 93G. 
132 In the former instance, an employer would escape liability where an employee deviates from the 
instruction, whereas in the latter instance the deviation would not take the employee's conduct outside 
the course and scope of his or her employment. 
i33K Calitz "Vicarious liability" 223. 
134 [1946]1 All ER 202 (KB). 
135 Interestingly, the Twine case dealt mainly with the ' duty of care' issue and was used as authority in 
the much criticised minority judgment in SAR v Marais. It was held that an unauthorised passenger was 
a trespasser and therefore was not a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff whom the employer would owe a 
duty of care. This illustrates a marked contrast to the South African approach to such delictual claims, 
as pointed out by McKerron in his criticism of the minority judgment in SAR v Marias. 
136 The two-tier test explained by Zulman JA in ABSA Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 
6D. 
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The question which needs to be asked in such cases is whether or not social policy 
demands that their employers be held vicariously liable for their actions, even though 
subjectively speaking they were acting on a frolic of their own? As Van der Walt and 
Midgley point out, the actionable conduct of such employees is often the antithesis of 
an act carried out in the course an scope of their employment. 137 
The general principle as far as this type of deviation is concerned was clearly set out 
in Mkize v Martens, 138 in which Innes CJ held that an act undertaken solely for an 
employee's own interests and purposes cannot render an employer vicariously liable, 
even where the act in question was committed during the employee's service.139 
In Costa da Dura Restaurant (Ply) LId Iia Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy,140 the 
respondent sought damages from the appellant after one of its employees assaulted 
him. There had been an altercation between the respondent and a bartender, who was 
in the employ of the appellant, at the latter's bar. When the respondent left the bar the 
bartender followed him outside and assaulted him. The court held: 141 
"It was a personal act of aggression done neither in furtherance of his 
employer's interests, nor under his express or implied authority, nor as an 
incident to or in consequence of anything Goldie was employed to do. The 
reasons for and circumstances leading up to the assault may have arisen from 
the fact that Goldie was employed by the appellant as a barman, but personal 
vindictiveness leading to the assaults on patrons does not render the employer 
liable." 
It is important to note that the actions of the employee were not incidental to anything 
which he was employed to do. A difficulty arises where the deliberate wrongful 
actions of employees are incidental to their employment. Burchell points out that if 
the act of the employee causing the harm was necessarily incidental to an authorised 
137 Van der Walt and Midgley para 29 fu 39. 
138 At 390. 
139 See 2.3.1 above. Although this decision appears to disregard the principle that an employer can be 
held liable for the deliberate and unauthorised delictual conduct of employees; a principle which was 
later acknowledged in Estate van der Byl v Swanepoel and confirmed in Feldman v Mall. This 
statement of the legal position fails to account for the fact that in many instances the delictual acts of 
employees committed within the course and scope of their employment are committed solely to further 
the interests of those employees. Innes eJ's decision suggests that under these circumstances 
employers can never be held accountable. The result is surely out of line with the policy considerations 
behind vicarious liability. 
140 2003 (4) SA 34 (SCA). 
I" 41H-1. 
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act, the employer will be held liable. 142 The author gives the example of Mldze v 
Martens where, despite Innes crs restrictive interpretation, the employer was held 
liable for damage caused by a fire which was started by his employees while 
attempting to cook themselves a meal. (The employer supplied the meal as per their 
employment agreement). It was held that the fact that they were permitted to have 
meals while working indicated that this fell within the scope of their employment, and 
that therefore the cooking of the meals was reasonably incidental thereto. It is difficult 
to reconcile the result of this case with Innes crs interpretation of the legal position. 
It is perhaps significant that, although the cooking of such meals was obviously in the 
interests of the employees, those interests were not sufficiently divorced from those of 
their employer to warrant a finding that they were acting outside the course and scope 
of their employment. 
It is not always easy to determine what actions are incidental to an employee's tasks, 
and although it may seem that certain acts are not reasonably incidental, these acts 
may still be committed within the general course of employment. The difficulty often 
arises where an employee's position creates the occasion for him or her to commit the 
wrongful conduct. 
Unfortunately the courts have not been clear on this issue and there are a number of 
contrasting decisions which illustrate a reluctance to accept the application of a 
defined set of guidelines. Consequently there is little legal certainty as far as this 
aspect of vicarious liability is concerned. 
The creation of risk principle was used as one of the justifications for liability by 
Watermeyer CJ in Feldman v Mall. In this case it was held that an employer who uses 
his employees to further his own legitimate ends creates the risk of harm to others 
while the employee is performing his functions. Because of this creation of risk, it 
was held that the employer was under a duty to ensure that others were not harmed by 
the employee during the performance of his appointed tasks. If an employee strayed 
from his functions and caused harm through negligence, inefficiency or even 
142 Burchell Principles of Delict 21 8. 
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intentional wrongful conduct, the employer was to be held liable due to his or her 
failure to prevent the harm. The popularly quoted dictum ofWatermeyer C J reads: 143 
"[A 1 master who does his work by the hand of a servant creates a risk of harm 
to others if the servant should prove to be negligent or inefficient or 
untrustworthy; that, because he has created this risk for his own ends he is 
under a duty to ensure that no one is injured by the servant's improper conduct 
or negligence in carrying on his work and that the mere giving by him of 
directions or orders to his servant is not a sufficient performance of that 
duty.144 It follows that if the servant's acts in doing his master's work or his 
activities incidental to or connected with it are carried out in a negligent or 
improper manner so as to cause harm to a third party, the master is responsible 
for that harm." 
This dictum was later relied upon by the Appellate Division in Minister of Police v 
Rabie where it was held that a policeman who had wrongfully assaulted, arrested and 
detained the respondent while off-duty rendered his employer liable because his 
conduct was facilitated by his position as a police official and that his employer 
created the risk of his unlawful actions when employing him. 145 When applying the 
facts of the case to the creation of risk principle outlined above, Jansen JA made the 
following observation: 146 
"By appomtmg Van der Westhuizen as a member of the force, and thus 
clothing him with all the powers involved, the State created a risk of harm to 
others, viz. the risk that van der Westhuizen could be untrustworthy and could 
abuse or misuse those powers for his own purposes or otherwise, by way of 
unjustified arrest, excess of force constituting assault and unfounded 
prosecution." 
This 'risk creation' approach was not, however, long-lived. As Neethling, Potgieter 
and Visser observe, "In later judgments the appellate division was unwilling to 
develop risk creation as an independent basis of vicarious liability.,,147 It has been 
suggested l48 that Jansen lA's failure to define the limits of liability based on the 
141 At 741. 
144 Interestingly, this raises the question of whether or not a separate legal duty is owed by an employer 
in cases where there is potential for employees to commit delicts. In such cases, an employer's liability 
would be personal and not vicarious. The implications will be discussed in chapter 5. 
145 See M StTanex "Liability for the Delicts of the Police: The Underwriter State" (1986) 103 SAL.} 190. 
146 At 134J-13 58. 
147 Neethling el 01 Law of Delici 343. 
148 K Calitz "Vicarious liability" 220. 
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creation of risk led ultimately to its rejection by the Appellate Division in Minister of 
Law and Order v Ngobo . 
In Ngobo's case two off-duty police officers, dressed in plain clothes, were involved 
in a street altercation with three men during which both policemen drew and fired 
their service revolvers. One of the shots fatally injured the respondent's son, who was 
one of the men involved in the altercation. The facts of this case were clearly 
distinguishable from those of Rabie 's case,149 as the police officers were off-duty and 
did not purport to act as police officers. Further, their conduct could not remotely be 
described as a mode of carrying out their employment. I 50 
However, notwithstanding this distinction, Kumleben JA found it necessary to attack 
Jansen JA's application of the creation of risk principle: lSI 
"In so far as Rabie's case may be said to have replaced the standard test with 
one based on creation of risk, I am for the reasons stated of the view that it 
was wrongly decided. Moreover, whether direct liability may in certain 
circumstances attach to an employer as a result of the risk created by him, this 
consideration in my opinion is not a relevant one to be taken into account 
when the standard test is to be applied in order to decide whether the master is 
vicariously liable" 
This decision effectively rejected the creation of risk principle. 152 However, the courts 
seemed reluctant to disregard the creation of risk as a ground for attributing liability 
completely. In Macala v Maokeng Town Council l 53 the court used risk as the basis of 
its enquiry into the course and scope of employment. In this case an off-duty police 
officer wearing police uniform, shot the appellant whilst attempting to shoot 
another. 154 Despite the fact that the police officer was off-duty and that his actions 
were clearly motivated by personal reasons, it was argued that his position as a police 
officer had created the opportunity and perhaps the means to commit the wrongful 
149 This much was admitted by Kumleben JA at 832B-C. 
ISO As pointed out by Kumleben JA at 832C: "Unl ike Van der Westhuizen in that case (Rabie) , the 
policemen with whom we are concerned at no stage, whether genuinely or ostensibly, acted as such or 
exercised any official function." 
l SI At 832C-D. 
152 See I N Fredericks and B S C Martin "State Liability for the Delicts of the Police: Closing the 
Circle" (1994) 57 THRflR 102. 
m 1993 (I) SA 434 (A). 
1>1 The police officer was coerced into the shooting by a woman who had enlisted his ' services' to rid 
herself of a man with whom she was having intimate relations. 
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acts, and that although his actions were self-motivated, they fell within the risk of 
harm created by his employer. ISS The court rejected this argument by holding that the 
conduct of the officer was sufficiently removed from his appointed tasks so as not to 
render his employer liable. However, the court held that "the creation of risk principle 
is directly related to the enquiry as to whether the policeman was acting in the course 
and scope of his employment as such. ,, 156 
In Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd tla 
Volkskas Bank ls7 it was held that where an employee was depositing stolen cheques 
for her own purposes whilst engaging in the work of her employer, she was still 
engaging in the functions for which she was employed. It was held that she was 
performing these functions in an improper manner and that therefore, even though her 
actions were for her own benefit, her employer should be held liable. In fact, the court 
went further to point out that her employment functions facilitated the dishonest 
conduct. The court based its decision on the principle applied in Feldman v Mall and 
specifically made mention of the leading English decision,lss Lloyd v Grace, Smith 
and CO,159 in which a firm of solicitors was held liable for the fraudulent actions of 
one of its clerks. 
Although it appeared that Ngobo had not successfully done away with the creation of 
risk principle, the Supreme Court of Appeal finally took a firm position on the issue in 
Ess Kay Electronics v First National Bank where, as pointed out by Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser, the court went "even further by declaring that the risk theory is 
merely an explanation of the principle of vicarious liability and not the formulation of 
the principle itself.,,16o 
In Ess Kay the respondent escaped liability despite the fact that its employee was 
found to be defrauding customers during the course of his employment. It was held 
that "an act done solely for the employee 's own interests and purposes, and outside 
the employee's authority, was not done in the course of employment even if it was 
15' At 440D. 
15' At 441 D-E. 
15' [1996] 4 All SA 278 (W). 
158 At 285H. 
159 1912 AC 716. This decision is discussed fully in chapter 3. 
160 Neethling el al Delic1343 . 
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done during such employment.,,161 It was held that the risk creation theory could not 
be used as a justification for holding an employer liable as this theory is concerned 
with a reason for attributing vicarious liability to employers and not a factor to be 
considered when determining whether or not they should be held liable. 162 
Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of SA Lti 63 followed the 
decision in the Ess Kay Electronics case. It was held that the theft of cheques by a 
bank employee did not render the bank liable as the employee had "completely 
disengaged himself from the duties of his contract of employment.,,164 The same 
narrow approach was followed in ABSA Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) 
Ltd where it was held that where an employee was misappropriating funds for 
himself he was engaged on a frolic of his own 165 and that therefore his employer 
could not be held liable. Although the court set out the test followed in the Feldman 
case, no consideration was given to the ' assumption of risk' principle set out by 
Watermeyer CJ. Another curious aspect of this decision was that Willis J concentrated 
on the 'control test', and held that since the employer had lost factual control over the 
employee, it could not be held liable for his actions. 166 As Scott points out, the control 
test is no longer of primary importance and furthermore, 'factual control' was never a 
requirement as far as this test was concerned. 167 
Even though these decisions seemed to bury the creation of risk approach, the 
principle resurfaced in K v Minister of Safety and Security. 168 In this case, a young 
woman was raped by three policemen who were on duty at the time of the offence. 
The Minister was sued vicariously for the harm committed by the police officers on 
grounds that they committed the offence while working for the State. The 
161 Ess Kay Electronics at 1218F-H. T J Scott "Some Reflections on Vicarious Liability and Dishonest 
Employees" 2000 Acta )uridica 265 at 272 points out, " It is implicit in the judge's remarks that a 
finding of vicarious liability on the part of an employer for an employees theft or fraud is virtually 
impossible." 
16' With respect, this makes very little sense. It is submitted that if the theory of risk assumption is 
accepted as providing the rationale for the rule, it should find its way into the application of the test. 
This is discussed in chapter 5. 
163 200 I (3) SA 132 (W). 
164 At l34E-F. 
165 At 7F. 
166 Scott "Some Reflections on Vicarious Liability and Dishonest Employees" at 274. 
167 See Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk 22E and 22H-J. It was 
clearly established in Rodrigues v Alves at 842A that only the right to control was necessary to satisfy 
the test. 
168 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC). 
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Constitutional Court held that although the offending officers were acting for their 
own benefit and clearly outside of their mandate, their failure to protect the applicant 
from harm '69 constituted a wrongful departure from their legal duty as public 
officials. The actions of the policemen rendered the respondent liable due to the fact 
that their failure to protect the plaintiff from harm was a failure connected with the 
performance of their employment duties, duties which were also owed to the plaintiff 
by their employer. 170 
It was on this basis that the court ultimately found in favour of the Appellant. 
However, as regards vicarious liability was, it was observed that the conduct of the 
policemen was facilitated by their role as police officers '7' and that therefore the 
conduct was sufficiently linked to their employer's business to render the employer 
liable. 
This aspect of the decision ties III with creation of risk principle which was 
disregarded in the Ess Kay decision. In light of this development, it seems that the 
delicate issue of vicarious liability for the wilfully wrongful conduct of employees 
was once ag~in open for reconsideration. 
In Grobler v Naspers Bpk172 the Supreme Court of Appeal had to examine the liability 
of an employer for the sexual harassment of one of its employees. '73 In this case, the 
plaintiff claimed damages from the defendant due to the trauma she had suffered as a 
result of the sexual harassment of another of its employees. When determining 
whether or not the actions of the perpetrator (who was described by the court as a 
'serial harasser') were within the course and scope of his employment, the court found 
169 A duty entrusted to them as po lice officials. 
170 This 'duty of care' was dealt with in the leading case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) where it was held that the police owed a general duty of care to the 
citizens of South AtTica whom they are sworn to protect. It was held that this duty was extended to the 
Minister who, for reasons of soc ial policy, would be held liable for the failure of police to offer such 
protection where it is due. This is in line with the Constitution, which enjoins all organs of State to 
up,hold its provisions and, in particular, the Bill of Rights. 
1 1 Being police officers, the general public would be more inclined to trust them. 
172 2004 (4) SA 220 (C). 
173 Interestingly, the plaintiff claimed damages under the common law instead of claiming in terms of 
s60 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (which deals with an employer's liability for sexual 
harassment in the workplace). Section 60 provides only for situations where both parties are employed 
by the same employer and in this case as the plaintiff and the perpetrator were employed by different 
employers the provisions of the Act did not apply. 
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that the existing rules of vicarious liability were not flexible enough to find in favour 
of the plaintiff. 174 It was observed that if the established principles were followed, an 
employer could never be held liable for the sexual harassment by one of its 
employees, as the actions of such employees would always fall outside the course and 
scope of liability. m It was held that the common law rules of vicarious liability had to 
be adapted to protect the rights of women in the workplace. 176 
The court made particular mention of the risk created by employers as far as sexual 
harassment in the workplace is concerned. It was held that the opportunity presented 
to the harasser to abuse his authority was a risk created by his employer, a risk which 
was relevant when considering the latter's liability.177 
Unfortunately, as Calitz observes,178 although the risk principle was applied in this 
case, "The court clearly intended that the new test was necessitated by the 'new' 
problem of sexual harassment and sexual abuse and did not intend formulating a 
general rule applicable to all cases of vicarious liability." 
The Supreme Court of AppeaJ,179 on appeal , confirmed the decision, but the reasons 
differed. The court placed its emphasis on the fact that the respondent's employer had 
a duty to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, and that it failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent such behaviour. Farlam JA made the following 
observation: 180 
"It is clear, in my opinion, that the legal convictions of the community require 
an employer to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of its 
employees in the workplace and to be obliged to compensate the victim for 
harm caused thereby should it negligently fail to do so." 
'74 AI 298B. 
175 The court came to this conc lusion after assessing the actions of the perpetrator with reference to the 
conduct ofthe bartender in the Costa da Dura case. 
176 At 298E-G. 
177 At 286D-H. 
178 K Calitz "Vicarious liability" 232. 
179 Media 24 Ltd and Another v Grobler 2005 (6) SA 328 (SCA). 
ISO At 350F-G. 
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The employer's liability was therefore direct and the court did not go into the issue of 
vicarious liability. The Supreme court of Appeal left the question open and did not 
comment on Nel J's approach. 181 
In Minister of Safety and Security v Luiters l82 the issue of whether or not the actions 
of an off-duty police officer were within the course and scope of employment once 
again came before the Supreme Court of Appeal. In this case the respondent had been 
shot by an off-duty police officer who was seeking to apprehend a group of people 
who had allegedly attempted to rob him. 183 It appeared that the actions of the police 
officer were personally motivated, but from the evidence of witnesses, it seemed that 
the he "looked like he wanted to arrest people.,,184 It was argued on behalf of the 
appellant that the actions were outside the course and scope of the officer's 
employment in that he was off-duty at the time of the shooting and was clearly acting 
out of a personal desire to apprehend the alleged robbers. It was conceded however, 
"that a member of the South African Police Service could, in terms of the police 
standing orders, at any time place himself on duty when an offence has been 
committed.,,185 
In his judgment, Navsa JA relied on the test adopted by the Constitutional Court in K 
v Minister of Safety and Security I 86 in which the following two questions were asked: 
"The first is whether the wrongful acts were done solely for the purposes of 
the employee. This question requires a subjective consideration of the 
employee's state of mind and is a purely factual question. Even if it is 
answered in the affirmative, however, the employer may nevertheless be liable 
vicariously if the second question, an objective one, is answered affirmatively. 
That question is whether, even though the acts done have been done solely for 
the purpose of the employee, there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link 
between the employee's acts for his own interests and the purposes and the 
business of the employer." 
181 Farlam JA made the following observation at 349B-C: " In view of the fact that I am satisfied that 
the respondent succeeded in establishing the second cause of action (the negligent breach of a legal 
duty by the employer) on which she relied against Tydskrifte, it is unnecessary for me to deal with Mr 
Burger's submissions that Nel J's finding of vicarious liability against the first appellant was 
inappropriate." 
182 2006 (4) SA 160 (SCA). 
183 The respondent had been rendered tetraplegic after being shot in the back while trying to flee the 
scene after hearing gunfire. 
184 Para 5. 
185 Para 10. 
186 Para 32. 
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It was held that in this case "there was a confluence between [the officer's] interest 
and those of the South African Police Service.,,187 Further, that although the actions 
could have been personally motivated, there was a sufficiently close link between the 
employee's actions and the purposes of his employer to render the latter vicariously 
liable for the former's actions. On application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional 
COurt l88 it was held that there were no reasonable prospects of success and the 
application was therefore dismissed. Langa CJ held: 189 
"Once off-duty police officers are found on the facts of a particular case to 
have put themselves on duty, as they are empowered and required to do by 
their employer, they are for the purposes of vicarious liability in exactly the 
same legal position as police officers who are ordinarily on duty." 
The latest decision on the issue of vicarious liability for the actions of deliberately 
dishonest employees was in the case of Minister of Finance and Others v Gore NO, 190 
where the respondent, in his capacity as a liquidator of a company, sought damages 
from the appellants for pure economic loss sustained by the company he was in the 
process of liquidating. The loss was sustained as a result of the fraudulent conduct of 
various provincial administration officials. The conduct of these officials was the 
direct cause of the company not being awarded a government tender. 191 
It was argued that the officials were acting outside the course and scope of their 
employment in that they committed a number of acts which were "alien to their 
responsibility to the provincial administration as stewards of the tender process.,,192 
The court observed that the difficulties associated with the course and scope enquiry 
where dishonest employees are concerned make it necessary to examine policy 
reasons for attributing vicarious liability when coming to a conclusion on a particular 
set of facts. 193 In view of this, it was held that there was not, nor could there be, "any 
187 Minister afSafety and Security v Luiters para 23. 
188 In Minister afSafety and Security v Luiters 2007 (2) SA 106 (cq. 
189 Para 35. 
190 2007 (I) SA I I I (SCA). 
191 The officials deliberately manipulated the tender process in order to benefit another company in 
which they held an interest. 
192 Para 26. 
193 Para 27. 
52 
general principle that an employer cannot be responsible for an employee's 
intentional wrongful conduct.,,194 The court applied the traditional ' two-pronged' test 
seen in Minister of Police v Rabie, 195 and found that although the officials may have 
been motivated by self interest, the effects of their subjective intentions were not 
wholly self-directed. 196 Because their actions were still directed at the performance of 
their mandate in awarding the tender, it was held that from an objective point of view 
the actions of these employees closely resembled what they were employed to do. 
Unfortunately, the court did not go into the reasons for attributing liability and failed 
to develop any framework upon which future similar cases can be decided. It seems 
that the court once again saw fit to leave the issue open to interpretation. 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
When examining the way in which the courts interpret and apply the legal rules which 
have developed for vicarious liability over the years, it is clear that there are some 
glaring disparities, most of which concern the second leg of the so-called ' test ,197 
There is little dispute as far as the establishment of a relationship capable of founding 
liability is concerned. The multifaceted test which was adopted by the court in the 
Midway case seems to fulfil its purpose adequately and has been applied with some 
consistency since its acceptance. 
As far as the 'course and scope ' enquiry is concerned, there is still uncertainty and 
consequently much debate. It is difficult to apply a rigid set of guidelines to different 
and often distinctive sets of facts, but it is necessary for the courts to take a clear and 
precise stand as far as the application of a general principle is concerned. When 
examining the cases, and in particular those involving dishonest employees, it is clear 
that the courts have not reached consensus on a general principle which can be 
applied to the facts of so-called 'deviation cases' . The question which requires an 
194 Ibid. 
,.5 At 134D-E. 
1% Minister of Finance and Others v Gore NO para 29. 
197 The 'course and scope I enquiry. 
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answer at this point is: Does the traditional test for vicarious liability give true effect 
to the reasons underlying this form of strict liability? 
If the rationale behind this form of strict liability is based on policy considerations as 
to what is just and fair under the prevailing circumstances, it is submitted that we need 
to take a closer look at the application of the course and scope enquiry, for "one 
cannot escape a feeling of misgiving that large banking institutions may escape 
liability towards unsuspecting, bona fide clients and third parties under circumstances 
as encountered in the cases of Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council and ESS Kay.,,198 
198 Scott "Some Reflections on Vicarious Liability and Dishonest Employees" 279. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH 
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of the law of vicarious 
liability as it is applied in England and the British Commonwealth of Nations. All 
Commonwealth countries discussed in this chapter derived their legal systems purely 
from the English common law.' Unlike South Africa,2 these countries, uninfluenced 
by other legal systems, have stayed close to their English law roots. However, each 
legal system has developed independently and is accordingly distinctive in some 
respects 3 
In spite of this, there is often little difference between the way in which the original 
principles are applied in Commonwealth countries. Due to the overwhelming 
similarity between the systems of tort law in the respective jurisdictions, the 
development of the principles of vicarious liability will be examined in one section 
which, while outlining the general features and principles applicable to all 
commonwealth legal systems, will highlight relevant differences. 
I This is because these countries were fonnerly British colonies. 
2 Having been occupied by the Dutch from 1652 to 1795, South African law was initially Roman-
Dutch. The Anglicisation of South African law only began after the second occupation of the Cape of 
Good Hope in 1806 and was only "vigorously pursued" after 1820. Despite the influence of English 
law, the South African system has remained primarily Roman-Dutch, panicularly in the area of delict. 
See Hosten el 01 Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 346-375 
J Interest ingly, the English couns are now often influenced by legal developments in the 
Commonwealth. 11 is also wonh noting that all of the fanner colonies operate under written 
Constitutions which have influenced their legal development. 
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3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN 
ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. 
3.2.1. Brief Historical Background 
Canada was originally a French colony but was ceded to the British in 1763.4 The 
English common-law system governs the private law component of Canadian law in 
nine of its provinces.5 Although the cession of the colony pre-dated the French 
revolution of 1789, the legal system in Quebec remains significantly influenced by 
French law.6 As a result, while the other provinces operate under a common-law 
system, the province of Quebec has a mixed system: its public law derives from 
English common law while its private law is derived from French civil law.7 For the 
purpose of this study however, only the predominant English system used in the other 
provinces will be examined8 Canada has operated under a written constitution since 
1982.9 
The English established Australia as a colony after settling on the eastern seaboard of 
the continent in 1787. Australia became a federation of states in 1900 and formally 
adopted a constitution in 1901 with the enactment of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act of 1900 passed in Westminster. lO Although Australia remains a 
member of the British Commonwealth, all constitutional ties with Britain were 
eventually severed in 1986 with the passing of the Australia Act. New Zealand was 
annexed by the British in 1838 as a colony and achieved Dominion status in 1907. As 
a federation of provinces, New Zealand also operates under a constitution. I I 
4 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1969) Vol. IV 734. 
' G L Gall The Canadian Legal System 3ed (1990) 165. 
6 Lawson "Notes on the History of Tort in the Civil Law" 155 points out that although the civil law in 
Quebec draws heavily from the Code Civil, it has not remained stagnant but has developed 
independently. Unfortunately, although the development of the principles of vicarious liability under 
Quebec' s civil law may differ from the development of the principles in France, a study into the 
relevant differences is beyond the scope of this work. 
7 Ibid. 
• For a detailed exposition on the reception of English law in the nine provinces see Gall The Canadian 
Legal System 50-53. 
9 Gall The Canadian Legal System 62. Although there was a constitution before this (the main written 
component of which was embodied in three British Statutes), it is generally accepted that the "new" 
constitution is the primary source of constitutional law in Canada. 
10 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1969) Vol. II 784. 
11 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1 969) Vol. XVI 453. 
56 
3.2.2. The Structure of the Common Law of Tort 
Rogers points out that the law of tort 12 is difficult to define and that although there 
have been numerous attempts to do so, no clear and accurate definition has emerged. 13 
However, for the sake of convenience he uses the definition advanced by Winfield 
which reads as follows: 14 
"Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this 
duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for 
unliquidated damages." 
Although this definition does not cover all the necessary aspects of the law of tort it 
clearly establishes the basic principle that this branch of law is concerned with 
compensation for what is considered to be actionable hann. In this sense it is no 
different from the South African law of delict15 That, however, is not to say that the 
English and South African approaches to delictual or tortious liability are the same. 
Perhaps the most important distinguishing feature of the English law of torts is that it 
is based on specific heads of liability. Rogers admits that "We [the English] have a 
collection of torts rather than a single principle.,,16 The law of torts in England has 
been shaped incrementally with the development of different fonns of action for 
different types of wrong. 17 Dugdale and Jones note: 18 
"Each tort is seen as having its own characteristics in terms of the conduct it 
sanctions and the interest it protects. In the absence of overarching principles, 
each tort requires its own exposition." 
12 The English term for 'delict'. 
13 Rogers Tort (2006) 1. 
14 Rogers Tort (2006) 5. This definition is not completely accurate, but it is a good starting point. As 
Rogers observes, "Winfield was not seeking to indicate what conduct is and what is not sufficient to 
involve a person in tortious liability, but merely to distinguish tort ITom certain other branches of law." 
15 McKerron observes that " In the Roman and Roman·Dutch authorities the term 'delict' is commonly 
used to include both criminal and civil wrongs. Sometimes, however, it is used in a narrower sense - in 
the sense in which the term ' tort' is used in English law - to denote a civil wrong (delictum privatum)." 
McKerron Delict I. The author goes on to proffer a definition of delict as follows: "The breach of a 
duty imposed by law, independently of the will of the party bound, which will ground an action for 
damages at the suit of any person to whom the duty was owed and who has suffered harm in the 
consequence of the breach." McKerron Delict 5. Like the English definition, this does not purport to be 
a 'test' for determining the existence of a delict, rather a formal definition. 
16 Rogers Tort (2006) 54. 
17 A M Dugdale and M A Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 1ged (2006) 13. 
1. Ibid. 
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It is important to note this feature of English tort law when examining the way in 
which the law of vicarious liability is applied. It must be borne in mind that in order 
for vicarious liability to arise, a tort must have been committed. 
A number of specific torts capable of rendering an employer liable have been 
recognised by the English courts. Each of these is treated with reference to the general 
principles of vicarious liability, but the way in which the principles are applied is 
occasionally unique to the species of tort. 19 It appears that although cases are often 
grouped according to the category of tort into which they fall, general principles still 
govern the distinction between cases20 
There remains a strong link between the English and Commonwealth laws of tort, 
which is perhaps due to the fact that tort is primarily based in the common law.21 
3.2.3. The Common Law Test for Vicarious Liability 
In English law vicarious liability is recognised in much the same way as it is in South 
Africa. It is viewed "not as a distinct tort, but rather a process by which one can be 
held liable for a recognised tort committed by another."n Similarly the justification 
for imposing this form of strict liability lies in public policy and cannot be attributed 
to any single theory or basis23 The basic test for vicarious liability is essentially the 
same as the South African test - for liability to arise there must be a relationship 
" A good example of this is in cases of fraud where the test for vicarious liability is specifically 
tailored to suit this type of tort. This is examined in detail in 3.3 .5.1. 
20 The most noticeable principle· based categorization occurs when determining whether or not tortious 
acts were committed in the scope of employment. Two broad categories of act can be identified, those 
which are either expressly of impliedly authorised and those which are sufficiently connected to the 
tortfeasor's employment. These categories are discussed in detail below. 
'1 The development of common law being largely influenced by precedent, it is doubtful whether any 
of the former colonies will completely shake off the influence of English law. However, since 2002 all 
Australian states have undergone legislative reform which has had a direct effect on tort law. See P 
Stewart and A Stuhmcke Australian Principles of Tort Law (2005) 215·252. The influence of this new 
legislation on the law of vicarious liability is comparatively small. Legislation in New South Wales and 
Victoria (Section 5 Q of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); and Section 44 of the Wrongs Act 
(Victoria» renders a breach of a non·delegable duty to be determined as if it were vicarious liability. 
As Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 355 observe, the manner in which these provisions will be applied 
by the courts remains uncertain. 
" R F V Heuston and R A Buckley Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts 21 ed (1996) 430. 
" S Deakin, A Johnston and B Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin 's Tort Law 5ed (2003) 572. See 
Atiyah Vicarious Liability 12-28 for a detailed exposition on the traditional and modern social 
justifications for vicarious liability in English law. 
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capable of founding liability and the tort must have been committed in the scope of 
employment24 This chapter will proceed to examine the two elements of this test 
independently.25 
3.2.4. Relationships Importing Vicarious Liability 
Typically, there are few expressly recognised categories of relationship which are 
capable of founding vicarious liability. Express recognition has been given to four 
broad categories: the common relationship between an employer and employee; the 
relationship between partners; the relationship between principals and agents26 and the 
relationship between owners and drivers of vehicles. 
For the purposes of this section, although the relationship between principal and 
agent, business partners, and that between owners and drivers of motor vehicles will 
be briefly examined, the focus will be on the general employment relationship.27 
3.2.4.1. Agency 
The term 'agent' has a broader meaning in tort than it does in contract. Trindade and 
Cane note that the term 'agent' "is used to indicate that one person acts with the 
authority of another (the principal). An agent in this sense may be a servant or an 
independent contractor, or neither.,,28 The general rule is that principals will be liable 
for the tortious conduct of agents. Indeed, Rogers observes: 29 
"It has been said on high authority that in principle the law governing 
vicarious liability for servants and agents is the same and depends upon the 
question, 'was the servant or agent acting on behalf of, and within the scope of 
the authority conferred by the master or principal?' The answer will often 
differ simply because the authority of a servant is usually more general." 
" The word 'employment' is used for convenience here, and may to interpreted to include all 
relationships capable of founding liability. 
" Although the existence of a tort is necessary and can thus rightly be regarded as another element of 
the test, the focus will be on the existence of a relationship capable of founding liability and the scope 
of employment. 
26 It appears that no distinction is made between this relationship and the relationship between 
mandators and mandataries. 
27 For the sake of convenience, the agency relationship, partnerships and the relationship between 
owners and drivers wi ll be examined before the general employment relationship. 
" F Trindade and P Cane The Law a/Torts in Alistralia 3ed (1999) 732. 
29 Rogers Tort (2006) 909. 
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Stewart and Stuhmcke observe that although agents may simultaneously be both 
employees and/or independent contractors, when performing tasks within the course 
of agency, such agents often take on the legal identity of the principal30 This occurs 
when the agent acts as an organ of the principal. It follows, therefore, that any tort 
committed whilst acting in this capacity will render the principal liable, regardless of 
the employment status of the agent. Trindade and Cane explain this principle as 
follows: 31 
"In relation to independent contractors, the notion of agency might be used to 
create exceptions to the basic rule of no-liability:32 if a person were held to be 
an agent, their status as a servant or independent contractor would be 
irrelevant. So the concept of agency could, in theory, be used to create another 
type of case where the status of the employee was irrelevant." 
Although this exception points to the specific type of agency whereby the agent acts 
as an organ of the principal in transactions with third parties, it has been suggested 
that, if applied generally, the rule of liability for torts of an agent could very well 
subsume the rule of no-liability for torts of an independent contractor33 
There is much academic debate surrounding the application of agency principles in 
tort. Indeed, McCarthy points oue4 that many well-known academics35 are of the view 
that agency has no place in the context of vicarious liability,36 and that that form of 
liability should be limited to the employer/employee relationship. Most 
30 Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 351. 
31 Trindade and Cane The Law of Torts in Australia 733. 
32 The authors point to Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizens Co-
operative Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931 ) 46 CLR 41 , where such use was made. In this case a 
distinction was drawn between ordinary work performed by agents acting on behalf of their principals 
and situations in which the agents act as representatives of their principals. Dixon J, at 49, pointed out 
that work done at the principal's request and for his benefit is considered as the independent function of 
the person who undertakes it, whereas, when the principal benefits from the agent standing in his or her 
place, the agent becomes an extension of the principal 's personality, thereby rendering the principle 
vicariously liable for any tortious acts committed by the agent. This specific category of agency is 
therefore an exception to the rule of no-liability for the acts of independent contractors, as liability 
attaches to the capacity within which the employee is acting and is not influenced by the status of the 
employee. 
33 J Swanton "Master 's Liability for the Wilful Tortious Conduct of his Servant" (1985) 16 UWALR I 
at 18 
34 L McCarthy "Vicarious Liability in the Agency Context" (2004) 4 QUTU I at 9. 
3S Among them, Fleming, Balkin, and Davis. 
36 With the exception of the tort of deceit, and the possible exception of the relationship between 
owners and drivers of motor vehicles. 
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commentators,37 however, suggest that agency does have a place in the law of 
vicarious liability. Trindade and Cane note that there are two areas in which agency 
can playa role, the first being where the agent is an employee of the principal, and the 
second where the agent is an independent contractor. They suggest that in the former 
situation the notion of agency could be used where the scope of agency is broader 
than that of employment38 It could well be that the acts of an employee fall outside 
the scope of employment, but are still within the scope of agency, in which case 
agency could be used to found liability. In the latter instance they suggest that agency 
can provide the exception to the 'no-liability for independent contractors rule,?9 
McCarthy observes4o that both academic approaches present difficulties. The former 
approach, though simple, does not appear to be in line with a number of cases where 
principals have been held liable for the torts of their agents.41 As far as the latter 
approach is concerned, it would often be difficult to distinguish between agents and 
independent contractors. Another problem which McCarthy highlights is that the 
courts are reluctant to find liability for the acts of independent contractors, even 
though they may be agents42 
It appears that the Commonwealth authorities do not draw a distinction between 
independent contractors and independent agents 43 This is probably one of the features 
of their law which causes, or at least contributes, to confusion. However, certain 
principles which have been adopted in the Commonwealth could inform the South 
African application of the test in agency cases. For example, the exception to the no-
liability for independent contractors rule, which is created when an agent acts as a 
representative in business transactions with third parties on behalf of the principal. 
Such an exception does not exist in South African law and should perhaps be 
J7 Among them, Gardiner, McGlone, Trindade and Cane, and Luntz and Hambly. 
J8 Trindade and Cane The Law of Torts in Australia 733. 
39 Ibid. 
40 McCarthy "Vicarious Liability in the Agency Context" 10. 
41 He goes on to suggest that the possible rationalisation for this approach is that where tortious acts are 
committed in the course of agency, the principal's liability could be direct and not vicarious. 
42 McCarthy gives the example of Gaitanis v Nicholas Moss Ply Ltd [2003J VSCA 63 where Phillips 
JA doubted that a principal could ever be held liable for the acts of an agent who is also considered to 
be an independent contractor. The case involved liability for the acts of a property agent. 
43 A distinction which is made in South African Law - see chapter 2 at 2.2.2. 
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investigated.44 Academic debate notwithstanding, the general rule remains that the 
tortious acts of agents will render their principals vicariously liable as long as these 
acts fall within the scope of the agent' s authority. 
3.2.4.2. Business Partners 
Business partners may be held vicariously liable for each other's torts, provided that 
the tortious conduct occurs within the scope of the partnership's business dealings. As 
in South African law, it appears that the capacity in which the partner concerned was 
acting determines whether or not the partnership will be held vicariously liable. 
In Butler v Modrak45 it was held that a partner will be liable for the negligence of his 
co-partner causing injury when engaged in the business of the partnership. It was also 
held that such a situation is treated as a special instance of the liability of an agent.46 
3.2.4.3. Owners and Drivers of Vehicles 
The relationship between owners and drivers of vehicles will only be capable of 
founding vicarious liability where it can be concluded that the relationship is 
analogous to one of agency. Therefore, when attempting to establish the link between 
owners of vehicles and drivers, it can be said that two elements are required. The first 
is that the owner of the vehicle gave the driver permission to use it;47 the second is 
that there has to be a relationship between the owner and the driver in terms of which 
the latter is acting as an agent or employee of the former. 
In England it is settled law that owners will only be liable where they have an interest 
in the purpose for which the vehicle was being used at the time of the commission of 
the tort. This principle was finally established in the leading English case of Morgans 
v Launchbur/8 in which the owner's husband permitted a third party to drive her car 
in order to take him home after having had too much to drink. Although it could 
44 This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
" (1983) 49 ACTR 3. 
46 In Australian law the liability of business parmers for cach other's torts is largely governed by the 
Parmership Act 1891 (Qld). See Stewart and Stuhmckc TOri Law 340. 
47 This requirement is fairly straightforward. If for example, the vehicle is taken without pennission, 
the owner cannot be held liable for the actions of the person who took it. 
48 [1973] AC 127. 
62 
probably have been argued that the driver was serving the owner's interests, there was 
no basis for inferring the existence of an agency relationship between the parties. 
In Australia, the position is less clear.49 However, it appears that at common law the 
requirements are the same as those used by the English. It has been recognised that 
there are two elements which must necessarily be present in order for an owner to be 
held liable for the negligent driving of his vehicle by another. These are: "(I) a 
request by the owner that the driver use the vehicle and (2) an interest by the owner in 
the purpose for which the vehicle is being driven."so In Soblusky v EganSI it was held 
that that where these two requirements are met, an agency relationship is created 
which forms the basis upon which liability can be founded. 52 
In Scott v DavisS3 the High Court of Australia recently rejected an extension of this 
principle to situations in which other types of vehicles are involved. It was held that 
the application of the principle was too wide. In this case the owners of a plane, who 
were holding a party on their property, asked a licensed pilot to give some of their 
party guests a ride in the aircraft. The pilot, through his own negligence, caused the 
plane to crash, killing himself and injuring the passengers. The plaintiffs argued that 
the principles established in Soblusky's case applied and that the owners of the plane 
were vicariously liable on the basis of an agency relationship which was created by 
their instructions to the pilot. The court held firstly , that the pilot was not the owners' 
agent due to the fact that they were in no position to control the way in which the pilot 
49 Trindade and Cane The Law oj Torts in Australia 733. In Australia, due to various statutory 
provisions, the common law principles establishing liability of vehicle owners for the torts of drivers 
are infrequently applied. In most Australian jurisdictions car owners are obliged to take out insurance 
policies covering their liability and the liability of all other drivers of the vehicle (said policies having 
to cover authorised and unauthorised drivers) for death or physical injury, caused by or arising out of 
use of the vehicle. Of course, these provisions are wide enough to impose liability on the owner, (or at 
least the owner' s insurer), in the absence of an agency relationship between the owner and driver of the 
vehicle. 
so Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 351. 
" ( 1959-60) 103 CLR 2 I 5. 
" This principle correlated with the later decision by the House of Lords in Morgans' case, where the 
court went further to point out that the purpose for which the vehicle was being driven need not 
necessarily have been commercial in order for the agency relationship to be created. Indeed the 
rrinciple would apply even if the purpose were social. 
J [2000] HCA 52. 
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was flying the plane and secondly, that the agency principle established in Soblusky's 
case should not be extended beyond ordinary motor vehicles.54 
This decision emphasises the necessity of control over the manner in which a driver or 
pilot operates the vehicle and although the Soblusky principle was not entirely 
rejected, it will be interesting to see how the Australian courts approach this type of 
case in future, after having considered the decision in Scott55 
3.2.4.4. The General Employment Relationship 
For the purposes of vicarious liability the term 'employment' is given the same wide 
interpretation as it is in South African law and includes most tasks performed by one 
party for the benefit of another. A number of factors are used to determine whether or 
not an employment relationship exists. 56 Rogers points out that a 'composite' 
approach tends to be favoured in which a number of elements of the relationship are 
considered as a whole. 57 In Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security, 
Cook J made the following observation:58 
"No exhaustive list has been compiled and perhaps no exhaustive list can be 
compiled of the considerations which are relevant in determining that question 
(whether or not an employment relationship exists), nor can strict rules be laid 
down as to the relative weight which the various considerations should carry 
in particular cases. The most that can be said is that control will no doubt 
always have to be considered, although it can no longer be regarded as the sole 
determining factor; and that factors which may be of importance are such 
matters as whether the man performing the services provides his own 
equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risk he 
takes, what degree of responsibility for investment and management he has, 
and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from sound 
management in the performance of his tasks." 
54 It is assumed that they were referring to motor cars and other road vehicles fitting into a similar 
category. 
55 Interestingly, no consideration was given to the 'right of control' in Scott's case. It could be argued 
that if this could replace actual control, as it does in South African law, the owners would have been 
held liable. The fact that they were not present in the plane at the time of the accident would not have 
detracted from their right to control the manner in which the aircraft was being operated. See chapter 2 
at 2.2.3 for a detailed account of the South African position. 
" See Leev Cheung [1990]2 AC 374. 
57 Rogers Tort (2006) 886. See Lee v Cheung. It should be noted that this composite test is similar to 
the "multi-faceted" test followed by South African courts. See 2.2 .1 above. See also Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Tort Law 576-580. 
" 184-185. 
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In this sense, there is little difference between the South African and English tests for 
determining whether or not an employment relationship exists between the parties. As 
in South African law, the general rule is that one cannot be held liable for delicts 
which are committed by independent contractors59 and therefore great emphasis is 
placed on the distinction between the employees and independent contractors. The 
factors used by the courts when making distinction are essentially those referred to 
above.6o 
When determining whether or not an employment relationship exists, the Australians 
have adopted a similar stance.61 However, they have favoured a more specific 
approach in terms of which many factors are examined with no overriding attention 
being paid to specific indicia.62 In the leading case of Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling 
Co Pty Ltd,63 the court emphasised the observation made by Cook J in the Market 
Investigations case, confirming that there was "no single ' checklist' of indicia to 
distinguish the relationship between employer-employee or employer-independent 
contractor.,,64 However, recognising the need to establish a guideline, the court 
produced a list of relevant factors. 65 This list of considerations formed the basis of the 
" J Murphy Street on Torts lied (2005) 552. Here the position is similar to that in South AtTica as an 
employer using the services of an independent contractor will be liable for hann caused by the actions 
or omissions of the contractor only if a separate legal duty is owed. In this case, liability most often 
founded on a breach of what is described as a 'non-delegable duty ' . There are certain duties, mainly 
arising from contract, which cannot be delegated to independent contractors, or even permanent 
employees for that matter. See Bull v Devon Area Health Authority [1993] 4 Med LR 117 CA. Non-
delegable duties will be discussed at 3.4. below. 
60 Street on Torts 552-554 lists three primary considerations: 'control ' ; ' personal investment ' ; and 'the 
intention of the parties'. These considerations will be weighted according to the factual circumstances 
surrounding each case. See Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 321. 
61 Zuijs v Wirth Bros (1955) 93 CLR 561. It has long been accepted that the traditional ' control test' 
does not give an adequate reflection of the type of relationship which exists, particularly in situations 
where employees are given wide discretion in perfonning their tasks. The Zuijs case involved a dispute 
over workmen's compensation for injuries sustained by an acrobat who was in the employ of the 
respondents. It was held that the control exercised over the manner in which the employee perfonned 
his duties was irrelevant when looking at the nature of the relationship. Consideration was given to the 
tenns and duration of service, the manner of payment and the status of the 'employee' in the 
organization. See also Dixon J's comments in Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 
398 at 404. 
62 Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 342. 
63 (1986) 160 CLR 16. 
64 Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 342. This decision indicated the court's final rejection of the 
'control test'. However, as in England and South Africa, the element of control remains a factor. See 
Mason J's comments in Stevens at 24, where he lists a number of relevant considerations. 
65 These factors are incorporated into the list of considerations examined in Abdalla v Viewdaze Ply Ltd 
tl as Malta Travel and are discussed in detail below. 
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landmark decision in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd, 66 where the court used them to make the 
distinction between employees and independent contractors. Stewart and Stuhmcke67 
draw attention to a particularly useful unreported judgment, Abraham Abdalla v 
Viewdaze Pty Ltd tlas Malta Travel,68 which applied the principles set out in the 
Hollis case. In Abdulla the court gave a comprehensive but practical summary of steps 
to be followed when trying to distinguish between relationships of employment and 
relationships involving independent contractors. This summary of steps is perhaps the 
most informative and well-structured guideline to date and therefore compels 
discussion.69 
The court started by pointing out that the nature of the work performed should be 
identified first, as it helps in identifying the relevant indicia and the necessary weight 
which should be attached to each. It was also recognised that an examination of the 
nature of the work may provide guidance when certain terms in the contract between 
the parties appear to be ambiguous. Having said that, the court went on to emphasise 
the importance of the terms and terminology used in the contract when attempting to 
identifY the nature of the relationship between the parties, always bearing in mind that 
the parties cannot alter the true nature of their relationship by giving it a different 
label70 It held that the various indicia which have been identified by the authorities 
over the years have to be considered7l whilst acknowledging that there is no 
comprehensive list and that the weight attached to each of the indicia will vary 
according to the circumstances of the particular case. Of course, where all information 
points overwhelmingly in the direction of a particular finding, it should be followed. 
Although it was accepted that there is no numerus clausus as far as the various indicia 
are concerned, the court took the time to present the following comprehensive list: 72 
66 (2001) 207 CLR 21. In Hollis the court con finned the broad approach followed in Stevens and 
examined a number of indicia when determining the existence of an employment relationship. 
67 Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 343-345. 
6S (Unreported PR927971 [2003] AIRC 504, 14 May 2003). 
69 The usefulness of this guideline is in no way restricted to an Australian context and can be of 
assistance to courts in all common law jurisdictions. As this is an unreported judgment, the summary 
provided by Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 343-345 is useful. The full judgment, however, can be 
found online at the' Australasian Legal Information Institute' website at 
http: //www.austrii.edu.au/au/cases/AIRCI2002/ 1504.html. 
70 This was perhaps best put by Gray J in In Re: Porter, Re Transport Workers Union oj Australia 
(1989) 34 IR 179 at 184, where he says: "The parties cannot create something which has every feature 
of a rooster, but call it a duck and insist that everyone else recognize it as a duck." 
71 A heavy emphasis was placed on the indicia identified in Stevens' case. 
72 Para 34 . 
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• Whether the putative employer exercises, or has the right to exercise, control 
over the manner in which work is performed, place of work, hours of work 
and the like. 73 
• Whether the worker performs work for others (or has a genuine and practical 
entitlement to do so). 74 
• Whether the worker has a separate place of work and/or advertises his or her 
services to the world at large. 
• Whether the worker provides and maintains significant tools or equipment.75 
• Whether the work can be delegated or subcontracted.76 
• Whether the putative employer has the right to suspend or dismiss the person 
engaged. 77 
• Whether the putative employer presents the worker to the world at large as an 
emanation of the business.78 
• Whether income tax is deducted from remuneration paid to the worker. 
• Whether the worker is remunerated by periodic wage or salary or by reference 
to completion of tasks. 79 
• Whether the worker is provided with paid holidays or sick leave. 
• Whether the work involves a profession, trade or distinct calling on the part of 
the person engaged. 8o 
• Whether the worker creates goodwill or saleable assets in the course of his or 
her work. 
73 Although it was recognised that absence of control does not necessarily indicate that an employee is 
an independent contractor, control remains a strong indicator particularly where it is present. See Zuijs 
v Wirth Bros at 571; Hollis v Vabu. 
74 The right to exclusive use of an employee's services is indicative of the existence of an emp loyment 
relationship. The opposite is true where the employee is entitled to work for others. 
75 Where the worker has made s ignificant investment in capital equipment it is usually inferred that that 
worker is an independent contractor. See Hollis v Vabu para 47. 
76 If the worker is entitled to delegate or subcontract his tasks to others, there will be a strong 
presumption that the worker is an independent contractor. See AMP v Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385 at 
389. 
77 See Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd 36. The right to suspend or dismiss usually indicates 
the existence of a contract of employment. 
78 An example of this would be the wearing of a uniform. 
79 The court observed that employees tend to be paid periodically, whereas independent contractors are 
usually paid on a task by task basis. However it was also acknow ledged that under modern conditions 
this distinction is becoming less pronounced. 
8. It was observed that specialists and professionals are more likely to be engaged as independent 
contractors. 
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• Whether a worker spends a significant portion of his remuneration on business 
expenses. 
These indicia are not the only factors which should be considered when determining 
the nature of the relationship between the parties, but they provide a guideline which 
can and will add value to the enquiry. Where, after consulting this list there is still 
uncertainty "the determination should be guided by matters which are expressive to 
the fundamental concerns underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.,,81 
3.2.4.5. Specific Forms of Employment 
The general rule is that employers will be held liable for the tortious conduct of 
employees, regardless of the independent nature of their tasks. Because the English 
courts tend to follow a fact-specific approach,82 certain rules have developed for 
determining the status of certain specific types of employee. It appears that there are 
three types of employee that have been given particular attention as far as the 
determination of status is concerned. These are: hospital staff, police officers and 
borrowed employees83 It is no coincidence that these employees perform their 
functions with a fair measure of personal discretion. That is perhaps why the English 
courts have seen fit to classify them independently so as firmly to determine their 
employment status.84 
As regards hospital staff, even those professional persons who perform their functions 
with full discretion are employees of the hospital. In Gold v Essex CC8S it was held 
that specialist radiographers would be considered employees of the hospital 
administration for the purposes of establishing a relationship capable of founding 
vicarious liability.86 Similarly, in Cassidy v Ministry of Health87 house surgeons and 
81 Para 34 (6). It is clear from this statement that the court recognised the necessity of incorporating the 
various policy considerations behind vicarious liability into this stage of the enquiry. 
82 In terms of which the legal principles are tailored to fit specific sets offacts. In South Africa the facts 
are examined in the light of general legal principles. 
83 Other specific categories which have been mentioned include: taxi drivers, agency workers, club 
servants and professionals in any field. 
84 The South African courts favour a principle·based approach and therefore try to apply a general 
principle capable of covering all types of employment when determining the status of employees. 
5 [1942]2 KB 293 . 
86 In this case the plaintiffs five-year-old daughter was severely disfigured due to the negligence of a 
specialist radiographer who failed to use the correct screen when applying Grenz ray treatment. It was 
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assistant medical officers who worked with a hospital on a full-time basis were held to 
be employees of the hospital administration88 In fact, it has even been held that part-
time anaesthetists could be considered employees of the hospital at which they 
perform their functions 89 
In terms of recent English legisiation90 the chief officer of police for any defined area 
is held liable for torts committed by subordinates under his or her control.91 Liability 
will arise where the tortious conduct of officers is committed whilst exercising, or 
purporting to exercise, their duties92 
So-called 'borrowed employees,93 present an interesting complication, as it is difficult 
to determine who of their employers should bear responsibility for their actions. The 
English have adopted a very similar approach to that followed by South African 
courts when determining liability in instances where multiple employers are involved. 
Murphy observes that "[tJhere is a very strong presumption indeed that someone 
remains the employee of the general or permanent employer although another 
employer borrows his services. ,,94 Emphasis is placed on whether or not the 
temporary employer had the right to control the manner in which the employee's tasks 
were conducted. The employer who has control over the manner in which the 
employee ' s tasks are performed will be held vicariously liable should that employee 
held that the hospital administration owed a duty to patients to ensure that they were treated properly 
by all hospital staff, including full time professional practitioners. 
87 [1951]2 KB 343. 
88 See also Collins v Hertfordshire CC [1947] KB 598; Street on Torts (2005) 555; Rogers Tort (2006) 
888-890; Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 329. 
89 See Roe v Minister of Health [1954]2 QB 66. 
90 Section 88 of the Police Act of 1996. 
9J Traditionally, police officers were not considered servants to any person or body and therefore no 
claim could be made against the Crown or the Police Authority for delicts committed by police 
officers. Chief officers are obviously not personally liable and any successful claims are paid out of the 
police fund . 
92 In Weir v Bellison [2003] All ER 273 it was held that as long as the officer was purporting to 
exercise his or her authority when committing the tort, it is not material whether or not that officer was 
on duty at the time. In this case an off-duty officer assaulted a youth who he suspected of stealing, and 
locked the boy in the back of a police van which he had appropriated for his own purposes without 
~ermissjon. 
3 A borrowed employee is simply an employee who is lent out (gratuitously or otherwise) to a 
temporary employer. 
94 Street on Torts 556. See also Fleming The Law of Torts 419. 
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commit a tort. This principle is best described in the Canadian case, Bain v Central 
Vermont Railway CO:95 
"[I]t is well established that the master in whose general service a man is, is 
not responsible for the tortious acts of a man if the control of the master had 
been, for the time being, displaced by the power of control of another master 
into whose temporary service the man had passed by being lent (even 
gratuitously) or sub-contracted. In such case it is the patron momentaine and 
not the patron habituel who is responsible." 
In Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd a crane 
driver who had been hired out to the respondents negligently caused harm to a third 
party. The court had to decide whether the general or temporary employer would be 
vicariously liable for the harm. It held that the general employer had the power to 
direct the way in which the employee operated the machine, whereas the temporary 
employer only had the power to direct what work was to be done and where. It was 
therefore concluded that the general employer would be liable. 
Under the ' fact-specific' approach followed by the English courts, inferences are 
drawn from the type of work being performed by the employee. Rogers observes: 96 
"A distinction is drawn between cases where a complicated piece of 
machinery and a driver are lent, and cases where labour only, particularly 
where it is not of a highly skilled character, is lent. In the former case, it is 
easier to infer that the general employer continues to control the method of 
performance .... In the latter case it is easier to infer that the hirer has control 
not merely in the sense of being able to tell the workman what he wants done, 
but also of deciding the manner of doing it." 
It is clear that there is very little difference between the way in which the English and 
Commonwealth courts approach the task of establishing the existence of a 
relationship capable of founding liability and the way in which the South African 
courts deal with the enquiry. Although the English tend to categorise certain types of 
employment for the sake of clarity, the general underlying principles are the same.97 
95 1921 (2) AC 412 . 
96 Rogers TorI (2002) 711. 
97 Interestingly however, in its 200 I report on vicarious liability the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission made the suggestion that legislation should be introduced to provide that, where an 
employer, including the State, lends or lets on hire an employee's services to another person and the 
employee commits a t0l1 while there continues to be a contract of service between the employer and the 
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3.2.4.6. Relationships Not Capable of Founding Liability 
Parents are not vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of their children98 Similarly, 
social services authorities are not vicariously liable for the torts of foster parents. 
Authority for this can be found in S v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council,99 where 
it was held that foster parents to whom children in the care of local authorities were 
boarded out could not be considered as agents of the child care authorities for the 
purposes of imposing vicarious liability. This principle was recently upheld in the 
Supreme Court of Canada in KLB v British Columbia,lOo where it was held that 
although foster parents act in pursuance of a public goal, they could not be regarded 
as having acted on behalf of a public authority for the purposes of vicarious 
liability. 101 
3.3. THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
As in South African law, the second part of the test for vicarious liability is 
concerned with the question of whether or not employees,102 acts were committed in 
the course and scope of their employment. If they were not, then the claim cannot 
succeed. The difficulty is where to draw the line between acts falling within the scope 
of employment and those considered to fall outside the scope of employment. That 
requires a factual enquiry to establish an objective interpretation of what acts are 
necessarily incidental to the employee's specific function. 
employee, the employer is vicariously liable for the tort. The employer would be liable to the same 
extent, if any, that he or she would have been had the employee not been lent or let to the other person 
(Queensland Law Reform Commission, Vicarious Liability, Report no. 56 (2001) at 3.4.). It appears 
that if this suggestion is followed (which is likely, due to Australia 's recent trend towards the 
codification of many aspects of tort law) liability will always attach to the general employer. 
9' Trindade and Cane The Law oj Torts in Australia 734. Although, as in South AfTica direct liability 
may arise through failure to exercise proper control over children. A good example of this can be seen 
in the South African case of Godfrey and Others v Campbell 1997 (I) SA 570 (C), a case involving the 
failure of parents to control their minor daughter who was engaged in an adulterous affair with the 
respondent's husband. The authors go further to point out that failure to exercise appropriate control 
also forms the bas is of the liability of occupiers of premises for the conduct of their visitors. See 
Wilkinson v Joyeeman [1985] I Qd R 567; and Woods v MlIltisporl Holdings Ply Ltd [2002] ALR 145 
(a case involving an injury sustained in an indoor cricket match on the respondent's premises). 
99 [1985]1 WLR 1150. 
100 [2003] SCC 51. 
101 See Rogers TorI (2006) 910. 
102 For the sake of convenience the general employment relationship will be used when discussing the 
connection between the acts of the tortfeasors and their appointed tasks. Trindade and Cane The Law oj 
Torts in AlIslralia 735 point out that " in the case of agents, the question, though the same in substance, 
is usually put in the form of whether the agent was acting within the scope of the authority." 
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In Lister and Others v Hesley Hall Lti03 Lord Clyde observed that 'scope of 
employment' and 'course of employment'104 are used interchangeably, but that the 
former is preferable as the term 'course of employment' is used in a number of 
statutory provisions dealing with other branches of law not connected with vicarious 
liability. This has the potential to cause confusion and so the more suitable term 
'scope of employment' will be used when referring to this element of the enquiry. 
Perhaps the best short description of acts falling within the scope of employment is 
given by Rogers: 105 
"The act will be within the scope of employment if it has been expressly or 
impliedly authorised by the employer l06 or is sufficiently connected with the 
employment that it can be regarded as an unauthorised manner of doing 
something which is authorised, or is necessarily incidental to something which 
the employee is employed to do." 
This definition neatly sets out the principles which govern the application of the 
'scope of employment' enquiry. From the description it is clear that there are two 
situations in which the actions of employees will be considered to fall within the 
scope of employment. First, where the conduct has been expressly or impliedly 
authorised and second, where there is a connection between the employee's acts and 
his or her employment. The second category of actions can be further subdivided into 
those which can be regarded as unauthorised modes of performing authorised tasks, 
those which can be regarded as sufficiently connected to the employee's appointed 
tasks, and those which are necessarily incidental to the type of employment. 
When categorising the varIOUS cases according to the general principles outlined 
above, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of the way in which the courts 
determine whether or not the actions of employees fall within the scope of their 
103 [2002]1 AC 215 at para [40]. 
104 Heuston and Buckley Salmond 443. 
105 Rogers Tort (2006) 893. 
106 The author points out that if the authorised act is inherently wrongful the employer will be directly 
liable as he or she will have procured a wrong and there would therefore be no need to rely on 
vicarious liability. 
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employment. It IS therefore necessary to examme cases with reference to these 
principles. 
3.3.1. Express and Implied Authority 
Employers will be held vicariously liable for acts of employees which are expressly or 
impliedly authorised. As far as express and implied authority are concerned, only the 
latter requires attention. It is clear that employers are liable for expressly authorised 
acts but there are a number of instances where implied authority is presumed - such 
as an employee's authority to act to protect his employer's property in emergencies 
where the employee has a reasonable belief that it is in danger. 107 If an employee acts 
on such authority, his or her employer will be liable unless it can be proved that the 
employee exceeded the bounds of such authority. lOS Although there are number of 
instances in which implied authority is presumed, the list is not exhaustive and the 
facts of each case are examined in order to determine the existence and extent of such 
authority. 109 
A good example of a situation in which the determination of whether or not an 
employees acts exceeded his or her implied authority is in the case of wrongful 
'mistake'] 10 Often, an employee mistakenly acts outside this authority when 
committing a tort and the court has to determine whether the departure from authority 
is sufficient to take the conduct outside the course and scope of employment. This 
often presents difficulties due to the nature of unspoken authority. In some cases it is 
difficult to define the limits of implied authority. The courts need to evaluate the 
circumstances surrounding each set of facts and come to a decision which is often 
only an application of common sense to the problem. In that case it could be argued 
that the decision becomes a matter of policy rather than principle. 
The limits, however, are easily identified in many cases. In Polland v Parr & Sons a 
carter struck a boy he believed to be pilfering sugar from his employer's wagon to the 
107 See Polland v Parr & Sons [1927] I KB 236. 
108 In Polland at 245 Atkin LJ said that "[W]here the servant does more than the emergency requires, 
the excess may be so great as to take the act out of the class." This case is discussed further below. 
109 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 584-586. 
11 0 Vicarious liability for wrongful mistakes is discussed further in 3.3.4.6. 
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back of the neck with excessive force. The court held that although the force used was 
excessive, it was not sufficiently so to take his actions outside the course and scope of 
his employment. I I I This decision is illustrative of the fact that determining whether or 
not there has been a sufficient departure from authority to put the act outside the 
course and scope of employment is simply a question of degree. 
, 
3.3.2. Unauthorised Modes of Performing Authorised Tasks 
The traditional Salmond test for determining whether or not an act was committed in 
the course and scope of employment placed emphasis on unauthorised modes of 
performing authorised tasks and has been used extensively to justify the imposition of 
vicarious liability for acts which often appeared to be outside the scope of 
employment. Simply put, the test is as follows: 
"[A 1 wrongful act is deemed to be in the course of employment 'if it is either 
(1) a wrongful act authorised by the master, or (2) a wrongful and 
unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master'." 112 
The distinction between 'authorised acts' and ' authorised modes ' is important when 
determining whether or not an act is sufficiently connected with the employment that 
for it to be regarded as an unauthorised mode of performing an act which was 
authorised. Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis observe: 1!3 
"Leaving aside the 'implied authority' fiction, the test is simply: was this what 
the employee was employed to do? Was it a bad way of doing it?" 
Of course, this approach can lead to employers being held liable for acts which are 
prohibited - a feature of the English system which widens the scope of liability 
somewhat, and is perhaps responsible for the broad approach which has recently been 
adopted by the courts in England, Australia, Canada and New Zealandl14 This has 
been recognised as a necessary evil because if prohibited acts could not incur liability 
III Rogers Tort (2006) 896. 
112 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Low 587. 
113 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 586. 
114 The effect of this principle on determining which acts fall within the scope of employment is 
discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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employers could construct their instructions in such a way as to avoid most forms of 
vicarious liability. 
3.3.2.1. Expressly Prohibited Conduct 
When determining whether or not an employer can be held liable for the tort of an 
employee committed whilst the latter was engaged in expressly prohibited conduct, 
the courts have to evaluate the nature of the employer's instructions. Ifit is found that 
the prohibition limits the scope of employment, engaging in the prohibited conduct 
will take the employee's actions outside the scope of his or her employment. 
Conversely, if the prohibition merely limits conduct within the scope of employment, 
the employee's conduct will not necessarily fall outside the scope of employment. 
There are two good examples popularly used by commentators to illustrate this 
approach, the first being the English case of Century Insurance Co Lid v Northern 
Ireland Road Transport Board l1 5 in which an employer was held liable for the harm 
caused by one of its employees when discarding an ignited match onto the floor of a 
service station while filling the station's underground petrol tanks. The match sparked 
a fire which burned down the filling station. It was held that although the employee 
was prohibited by his employer from smoking whilst filling up underground tanks 
(the match was struck to light a cigarette), this prohibition did not take the conduct 
outside the course of his employment. 
The second popular example used to illustrate the principle is Phoenix Society Inc v 
Cavenagh. 116 In this case an intoxicated bus driver collided with the plaintiffs car, 
injuring the plaintiff in the process. It was held that although the driver's employer 
had prohibited her from driving whilst under the influence, this prohibition did not 
take her actions outside the scope of her employment. The fact that the driver was 
intoxicated simply indicated that she was performing her authorised activity (driving 
the bus) in an unauthorised manner. 
liS [1942] AC 509. 
116 (1997) 25 MVR 143. 
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The general principle, as stated by Trindade and Cane, is that 117 
"for the purposes of vicarious liability the exact terms of the employees' 
service or authority are not conclusive of the scope of employment. The 
question is whether the act constituting the tort or out of which it arose was 
broadly of the class which the employee was required or permitted to do." 
Thus it can be concluded that employers will be held liable for harm arising out of 
conduct which they have prohibited as long as the conduct falls broadly within the 
scope of employment. Of course, this still begs the question - how broad is the class 
of action? Moreover, how does one determine what falls within the class of action? 
The limiting factor here is the type of prohibition. Lord Dunedin made the following 
observation in Plumb v Cobden Flour Mills Co Ltd; 118 
"There are prohibitions which limit the sphere of employment, and 
prohibitions which only deal with conduct within the sphere of employment. A 
transgression of a prohibition of the latter class leaves the sphere of 
employment where it was, and consequently will not prevent recovery of 
compensation. A transgression of the former class carries with it the result that 
the man has gone outside the sphere." 
The leading Australian case on this point is Bugge v Brown. The parties were 
neighbouring farmers in the north-west of Victoria. A farm worker in the employ of 
the respondent lit a fire on the respondent's farm which, due to negligence on the part 
of the worker, spread on to the appellant's land, destroying property to the 
approximate value of £] 022. The appellant sought to hold the respondent vicariously 
liable for the worker' s negligence, alleging that the conduct occurred within the 
course of the latter's employment. It is significant in this case that part of the 
employee's remuneration was that he should be fed, a task which was ordinarily 
carried out by the respondent's cook. On the day of the incident, however, the 
respondent's cook was not present and the employee was provided with some raw 
meat and potatoes by the respondent's wife. The respondent instructed his employee 
not to cook the meat by the dam, but to walk to another location a mile away from 
117 Trindade and Cane The Law of Torts in Australia 740. See also I1kiw v Samuels [1963] I WLR 991 
and Bugge v Brown (1916) 26 CLR 110. 
"'1914AC62at67. 
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where he was working in order to cook the food. The employee chose not to follow 
his employer's instructions and lit a fire where he was working, such fire being the 
one which spread onto the plaintiff's land. 
It was held that despite acting contrary to his instructions, the employee's conduct 
was reasonably incidental to his employment. It was held that the employer's 
instructions did not limit the sphere of employment,1 19 and therefore by disobeying 
them, the employee did not take his actions out of the course of his employment. 
Another example of a case in which a prohibition did not limit the sphere of 
employment was Limpus v London General Omnibus Co, 120 in which it was held that 
a prohibition from racing on the road merely limited conduct within the sphere of 
employment and not the sphere of employment itself. An employee caused a collision 
whilst racing and it was held that the employer was liable notwithstanding the 
instructions given to the employee prohibiting the such conduct. It was held that the 
employee was carrying out his tasks in an unauthorised manner. 
In Rose v Plenty and Another l21 a milkman enlisted a thirteen-year-old boy to help 
him with his deliveries contrary to an express prohibition by his employer. The boy 
was injured due to the milkman' s negligent driving and consequently sued the 
employer. It was held that the employer's strict instruction not to carry passengers and 
not to employ children in the performance of the employee's duties did not limit the 
sphere of employment, but merely affected the employee's mode of conduct within 
the scope of his employment. The employer was held vicariously liable because the 
employee's failure to follow instructions had not taken his conduct outside the course 
and scope of employment. 
The Rose v Plenty decision contrasts with two earlier cases in which employers were 
held not liable for harm caused to unauthorised passengers. In Twine v Bean's Express 
it was held that since the unauthorised passenger was effectively a trespasser, the 
employer owed no duty of care towards him as he was not a foreseeable plaintiff. The 
119 At 119. 
120 [1862]1 H&C526. 
121 [1976]1 All ER 97. 
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employer was therefore held not to be liable. 122 In Conway v George Wimpey & Co 
Lti23 a driver employed by the defendants to transport workmen around a 
construction site negligently caused injury to the plaintiff while giving him a lift. The 
driver was given specific instructions not to transport anyone who was not an 
employee of the defendants' firm. The plaintiff was not one of the defendants ' 
employees and was therefore an unauthorised passenger. It was held that the 
employee was acting outside the course and scope of his employment as the 
prohibition limited the scope of that employment. 
It is difficult to reconcile these cases. Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis l24 are of the 
view that "such a reconciliation is neither always possible, nor even desirable, since 
decisions in this area of the law should not be used like tintacks with which to nail 
down particular solutions, but simply as starting-points in a process of reasoning by 
analogy, by the use of contrasting examples, guided by common sense." It could be 
argued that although such cases are not always reconcilable, the courts should at least 
try to find some common thread of reasoning, particularly as the distinction between 
examples is often devoid of common sense. 
3.3.2.2. Temporary Deviation from Instructions 
Equally inconclusive are cases where employees commit torts while deviating from 
their employers ' instructions. This type of case most often presents itself when drivers 
temporarily deviate from their designated route in order to pursue some personal aim, 
causing harm whilst on their detour. In these cases, employees will be regarded as 
having acted outside the course and scope of their employment if they were on a 
' frolic of their own'. This test is singularly obscure as it depends solely on an 
interpretation of a factual situation. Moreover, "much depends on the way in which 
122 It must be noted, however, that the Twine Bean decision has come under severe criticism. Trindade 
and Cane The Law of Torts in Australia 740 are of the view that the grounds upon which this decision 
were based are now 'suspect'. The authors highlight the fact that the main ground upon which the 
decision was based was rejected by Lord Denning MR in Rose v Plenty on the basis that it is no longer 
the law that occupiers owe no duty to trespassers on their premises. They go further to point out that 
the decision is also suspect because it is assumed that a master can only be held liable if that master 
owes a duty to the plaintiff. The role played by the duty to take care in the law of vicarious liability will 
be discussed in more detail below at 3.4. 
123 [1951 ] 2 KB 266. 
124 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 589. 
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the factual statement is phrased.,,125 Further, it may be argued that classifying an act 
as a 'frolic ' does not provide a clearly-defined explanation of whether or not it was 
outside the course and scope of employment. Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis point 
out: 126 
"To call an action a frolic is not to give reason why it is outside the course and 
scope of employment; it only expresses a decision already made that it is 
outside. " 
Fleming observes l27 that if the driver's "private errand were alone decisive, he would 
in logic leave the scope of his employment as soon as he started his detour and not re-
enter until he returned to his original route." The law, however, does not follow this 
logic: it takes a broader, more practical view when confronted with the problem. It has 
long been accepted that certain departures from strict instruction are inevitable, and 
that most of these departures cannot, in fairness, be viewed as sufficiently removed 
from an employee's tasks so as to conclude that the work of the employer was 
abandoned. The courts therefore conduct an objective enquiry into the nature of the 
deviation. As Fleming puts it: 128 "[I]t (the court) embarks on the uneasy task of 
striking a pragmatic compromise, having regard to the space, time and purpose of the 
deviation. " 
Of course if we are to accept that the test is as stated above,129 it is not surprising that 
its application has done little to promote legal certainty. There is no consistent 
guidance as to what constitutes a sufficient departure and therefore courts have to 
treat each situation on its own merits. Although this may not be particularly desirable, 
it is difficult to see how comprehensive guidelines could be introduced, bearing in 
mind that the enquiry into whether or not an act can rightly be described as a frolic is 
always a question of fact. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Fleming The Law of Torts 424. 
128 Ibid. 
129 As it has not been stated in more precise tenns, we are entitled to accept that the test is merely 
whether or not, objectively speaking, the actions of the employee in deviating from his or her 
instructions were so great in respect of time and space as to conclude that the employee was engaging 
on a ' ITalic of his or her own'. See the comments made by Parke B in Joel v Morrison. 
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In Storey v Ashton 130 it was established that in determining whether or not a deviation 
is sufficient to take the actions of an employee outside the scope of employment, the 
question is simply one of degree. 13 1 Although this exposition of the principle makes 
sense, it does little to dispel uncertainty. It appears that the court's decision hinges on 
the seemingly unguided opinion of the presiding officer after having been given a 
subjective account of a factual situation. 
Difficulties abound due to the number of differing circumstances which may be 
present in each case. Murphy recognises that "the diversity of employment 
relationships is so great that it will not be surprising to discover that these issues of 
fact are frequently of exceptional difficulty.,,132 It seems that the courts have 
recognised these difficulties, particularly in cases where employees act purely for 
their own benefit when committing torts. 133 In Lister's case it was recognised that the 
traditional distinction between what constituted an unauthorised mode of performing 
authorised duties, and conduct falling outside the scope of employment, did not offer 
much help in cases of deliberate wrongful conduct committed solely to further the 
employee's own interests. As Murphy points out: 134 
" [I]t is quite properly uncontentious to regard negligence in the performance 
of a job as a wrongful mode of doing an authorised act. But deliberate, heinous 
acts by an employee are far more difficult to classifY in such terms." 
This notwithstanding, it has been recognised that in certain circumstances liability can 
and should attach to employers whose employees have acted in furtherance of their 
(the employees') own interests. 135 
". (! 869) LR 4 QB 476. 
131 48. 
132 Street on Torts 565. 
133 See Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 337. 
134 Street on Torts 566. 
'" Heuston and Buckley Salmond 447; Rogers Tort (2006) 898. See also Lloyd v Grace Smith and Co 
Ltd 
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3.3.3. Acts Incidental to Employment 
As far as acts incidental to employment are concerned, "an act done by an employee 
will not necessarily be excluded from the course of the employee's employment 
merely because it is not an act which the employee is actually employed to 
perform.,,136 As long as the act in question is reasonably incidental to the 
employment, the employer will be held responsible. In Staton v National Coal 
Boari 37 it was held that a first aid attendant was acting within the course and scope 
of his employment while cycling along a road within the precincts of the colliery at 
which he was employed. It was held that although the purpose of his cycling was to 
collect his wages from the pay office, and was therefore not in furtherance of his 
duties, his conduct was reasonably incidental to his employment. 
On the face of it, the English test for determining whether or not an act was 
committed in the scope of employment is vague and open to widely variable 
interpretation. 
The English authorities have gone to great lengths to point out that the enquiry is one 
of both law and fact, as it involves the application of legal principle to fact. 138 
However, the factual circumstances of each case are of primary importance when 
attempting to establish a link between the conduct and the employee's scope of 
employment. As Rogers observes, the test "is not one that lends itself to the 
imposition of mechanical or precise formulae.,,139 
136 Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 340. 
137 [1957] I WLR 893. 
138 See Rogers Tort (2006) 893; Street on Torts 565; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam and Others 
[2003] 2 AC 366 at para 24. 
139 Rogers Tort (2006) 893. 
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3.3.4. Wilful Wrongs and the 'Sufficient Connection' Test 
It has long been accepted that deliberate, even criminal, tortious conduct on the part of 
employees will not necessarily fall outside the scope of employment. 140 However, as 
Fl . b 141 emmg 0 serves: 
"[C]oncem over imposing too onerous a burden on employers, combined with 
a hesitation to make one person responsible for another' s misconduct 
involving a taint of moral delinquency, has often in the past led to a noticeably 
narrower definition of responsibility." 
Isaacs J noted in Bugge v Brown142 that it is far more difficult to view deliberate 
misconduct as a mode of perfonning an authorised duty than it is to view negligence 
as SUCh.143 This is particularly true when the conduct in question appears to have the 
sole aim of furthering the employee's interests. Indeed, where the conduct is a product 
ofthe employee's wish to further his or her employer's interests, the courts will be far 
more inclined to view the conduct as reasonably incidental to the tortfeasor's 
employment. 144 
Therefore it is not surpnsmg that intentional torts give rise to problems when 
determining whether or not they are sufficiently connected to an employee's tasks. In 
most circumstances it is singularly difficult to offer a convincing argument that the 
deliberate wrongful conduct of an employee constitutes an unauthorised mode of 
perfonning an authorised task (unless of course the wrongful act itself was 
authorised). Equally difficult is an attempt to found liability by claiming that wilfully 
wrongful and often criminal acts are incidental to an employee's job. It is for this 
reason that the English and Commonwealth courts have broadened their approach and 
applied what has been described as the test of ' sufficient connection' between the 
140 Macdonald v Dickson (1868) 2 SALR 32. See Trindade and Cane The Law of Torts in Allstralia 
737; Fleming The Law of Torts 426; Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 349. 
141 Fleming The Law of Torts 426. 
142 At 116. 
143 This is perhaps because deliberate misconduct is almost always antithetical to an employee ' s 
appointed tasks and aimed solely at furthering the letter's interests. Negligence is, by definition, 
unintentional and is therefore more likely to be connected to the employee's appointed tasks as it has 
no particular aim or intention. It could be argued that by deliberately committing a wrongful act whilst 
performing asks on behalf of an employer, the employee is consciously departing ITom these tasks. 
144 See Hayward v Georges [1966] VR 202. 
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wrong committed and scope of the employee 's employment. 14s In terms of this test 
the court looks at all the surrounding circumstances and decides whether or not there 
was a sufficient connection between the employees' conduct and their employment. 
The specific forms of deliberately wrongful conduct which have been identified are 
the recognised torts of theft, assault, sexual assault and fraud. 146 Vicarious liability for 
sexual harassment is now also a possibility. 147 With the exception of fraud (which is 
based on ostensible authority), all of these forms of conduct can render employers 
liable where it is found that there is a sufficient connection between the conduct and 
the fact of employment. Although in many cases the traditional Salmond test is used 
to justify the imposition of liability, it appears that the sufficient connection test is 
perhaps better suited to cases of intentional tort. 
3.3.4.1. Fraud 
Fraud is treated differently from other forms of intentional wrong when determining 
vicarious liability. This is not surprising, as the nature of fraud creates problems 
specific to this type of wrong. 148 In Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA The Ocean Fros/ 49 
the House of Lords accepted that the rules and principles applicable to vicarious 
liability for fraud are particular to this wrong and therefore do not follow the same 
line of authority as those dealing with other torts such as negligence or trespass. 150 
As with theft, the courts were traditionally reluctant to impose vicarious liability in 
fraud cases. lsl The possibility of vicarious liability being imposed for the fraudulent 
conduct of an employee was first accepted in Barwick v English Joint Stock Bank, 152 
but it was not until Lloyd v Grace Smith & Co that liability was accepted for fraud 
I" Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tori Law 591. See liSleI' v Hesley Hall Lid. 
146 Other examples of wrongful conduct for which employers have been held liable include, arson and 
trespass. See Pholo Produclion Lid v Securicor Lid [1980] AC 827; League Againsl Cruel Sports v 
Scali [1986] QB 240. 
147 This was recently considered in New Zealand and will be discussed below. 
1<8 Rogers Tort (2006) 906; Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 348. 
149[1986]1 AC717. 
150 See Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torls 348; Sireei on Torls 574. 
151 As with all other wilful wrongs, this reluctance stemmed from the fact that such acts were almost 
always committed in furtherance of the employee's own interests and outside the scope of their 
instructions. 
152 1867 LR 2 Ex 259. This case involved liability of a bank for the fraudulent conduct of one of its 
managers. 
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where the employer did not benefit from its commission. i5J Before this, liability was 
restricted and would only be imposed where the acts were, at least partially, to the 
benefit of the employer. Perhaps the most important principle which was derived from 
the Lloyd case was that an employee's conduct would be within the scope of 
employment if such conduct fell within that employee ' s actual or ostensible authority. 
In Lloyd a solicitor's clerk defrauded a client by persuading the client to entrust 
certain title deeds, thereafter disposing of the property for his own benefit. It was clear 
that the clerk had apparent authority to deal with matters involving title deeds as his 
employer had often allowed him to do so, thereby representing that he had the 
necessary authority. 154 Earl Lorebum commented: 155 
"If the agent commits the fraud purporting to act in the course of business such 
as he was authorised, or held out as authorised, to transact on account of his 
principal, then the latter may be held liable for it." 
In cases where an employee has deceived the claimant, it is incumbent on such a 
claimant to prove that he or she relied on the employee's ostensible authority. 156 This 
is what distinguishes fraud cases from ordinary wrongs committed by employees. 157 If 
the claimant was aware that the employee had no authority, he or she would not be 
able to succeed in a claim against the employer. 158 
3.3.4.2. Theft 
Traditionally, the courts were of the view that an employer could not be liable for 
thefts perpetrated by their employees,159 but this position has now changed160 In 
Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltdl 61 the plaintiff sent her mink coat to the defendants 
'" Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 592; Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 349. 
' 54 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 592. 
'" At 725. 
" , Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 592; Street on Torts 574. 
157 It was recognised in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam and Others that "Reliance on ostensible 
authority does not arise in most cases of vicarious liability, and it is never relevant when the act was the 
very thing that caused the loss." See also Uxbridge Permanent Benefit Building Society v Pickard 
[1939]2 KB 248. 
". See Kooragang Investments Pty Ltd v Richardson and Wrench Ltd [1982] AC 462 . 
'" In Cheshire v Bailey [1905] I KB 237 it was held that the act of stealing could only be done outside 
the scope of employment. 
160 Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 346. 
'61 [1966] I QB 7 16. 
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for cleaning. 162 An employee of the defendants, to whom the job of cleaning was 
entrusted, stole the coat and the defendants were held liable for the criminal conduct 
of that employee. Liability was based on the fact that the defendant company was a 
bailee for reward and therefore was under a duty to protect the bailed goods from theft 
or depredation. This duty is non-delegable: therefore if it is entrusted to an employee 
or agent, liability for breach of the duty by such employee or agent still attaches to the 
employer. 163 
Although it was held that the defendants were liable for breach of their own non-
delegable duty and their liability was therefore direct and not strictly vicarious, the 
English commentators have agreed that the principles established in this case are 
applicable to vicarious liability.l64 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis observe that the 
employee in Morris ' case could be said to have done what he had been asked to do 
improperly,165 thereby performing authorised functions in an unauthorised manner. 
This decisive principle was supported by the Privy Council in Port Swettenham 
Authority v TW Wu Co, 166 where Lord Salmon stated: 
"The heresy that any dishonest act on the part of a servant employed to take 
care of the goods is necessarily outside the scope of his employment, and that 
the master cannot be liable for the dishonest act unless done for his benefit or 
with his privity, was exorcised by Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co. It was on the 
basis of this heresy that Cheshire v Bailey laid down the startling proposition 
of law that a master who was under a duty to guard another's goods was liable 
if the servant he sent to perform the duty for him performed it so negligently 
as to enable thieves to steal the goods, but was not liable if that servant joined 
with the thieves in the very theft. This proposition is clearly contrary (0 
principle and common sense." 
It is difficult to see the logic of the ruling in this case which accepted that the 
employee had been performing authorised tasks in an unauthorised manner in order to 
commit theft. It is not easy to see how the act of theft could be considered a mode of 
162 She originally sent it to a furrier who, with her pemlission, subcontracted the work to the 
defendants. 
163 It must be noted that in the case the defendants were sub-bailees, but the principles applicable to 
ordinary bailees still applied. 
164 In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd it was held that principles set down by Diplock 
and Salmon LJ in Morris' case are of general application. This view was adopted by Lord Steyn in 
Lister v Hesley Hall where he commented that Morris could not be dismissed merely as a case of 
bailment. 
165 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 592. See also Rogers Tort (2006) 904-905. 
166 [1979] AC 580. 
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performing authorised activities. Surely it makes more sense simply to conclude that 
the employee's theft was sufficiently connected to his or her employment? 
That view was upheld in Nahhas v Pier House (Cheyne Walk) Management. 167 A 
porter in the employ of the defendants burgled a flat using keys entrusted to him by 
his employer. It was held that although the defendant company was not a bailee of the 
property, it was nevertheless liable as it had entrusted the keys to the employee. It was 
clear in this case that liabil ity was based on a sufficient connection between the 
employment and the tort. 
It must be noted, that where an employee is found to have stolen property, an 
employer will only be liable where such property has been entrusted to that employee 
in some way or another. In Heasmans v Clarity Cleaning Co Ltdl68 it was held that an 
employer will not be held liable merely because the opportunity to commit the 
offence was created by the employee's position. 169 
3.3.4.3. Assault 
It is well established that acts committed out of personal spite and resentment will not 
render employers vicariously liable, regardless of whether or not they are generated in 
the course of the employee's service. l7o The popular Australian example of this 
principle is Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew,171 a case in which a barmaid severely injured a 
customer by throwing a beer glass at him. She threw the glass out of anger, after 
having been treated badly by the customer. It was held that the barmaid's actions 
could not render her employer liable as they were clearly motivated by personal 
resentment and anger and were in no way incidental to her employment. If, however, 
she had been charged with maintaining order in the bar as a condition of employment, 
it might have been held that her actions were incidental to that employment and thus 
167 (1984) 270 EO 328. 
168 [1987] ICR 949. 
169 In this case a cleaner employed by the defendant to clean the plaintiffs premises used the plaintiffs 
telephones to make international calls. This carried on for six months and cost the plaintiff over 
£1400.00. The cleaning company was held not to be liable as the mere fact that they created the 
0f,portunity for such conduct could not render them liable. 
I 0 Dugdale and Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 344. See also Trindade and Cane The Law of Torts in 
Australia 739. 
171 (1949) 79 CLR 370. 
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her motives would not have influenced the finding as the action of throwing the glass 
would almost certainly have been viewed as an improper way of performing her 
appointed task. 172 
An example of a situation in which such conduct was found to be within the scope of 
employment is the New Zealand case of Petterson v Royal Oak Hotel Ltd. 173 In this 
case a barman refused to serve an intoxicated customer, who consequently threw a 
glass at him. As the customer was leaving the establishment the barman threw a piece 
of glass in his direction, which missed and lodged in the eye of the plaintiff, who was 
one of the other customers in the bar. It was held that although the barman had acted 
out of personal ill-will, his actions constituted an improper manner of performing his 
task of maintaining order in the bar. Of course, it could be argued that this decision is 
another example of the court stretching what can rightly be described as authorised 
conduct in order to find for the plaintiff. Surely the throwing of a sharp object cannot 
be regarded as being sufficiently cOlmected to the task of keeping order to conclude 
that it was merely an unauthorised mode of doing so? 
This principle is also neatly illustrated by Warren v Henlys Ltd,1 74 where a petrol 
attendant at a service station assaulted a customer after having been threatened by 
him.17S It was clear in this case that the employee was acting in furtherance of his own 
interests and out of personal spite and vengeance. It was held that the employer was 
not responsible for the employee's conduct. 
These cases are readily distinguishable from cases in which assaults are committed in 
furtherance of the employer's interests. In such cases, employers will be held liable 
regardless of whether or not the conduct is in fact authorised. For example, in Dyer v 
Mundayl76 an assault by the defendant's manager rendered it vicariously liable as the 
conduct was in furtherance of the defendant's interests . In this case the employee was 
172 See the comments of Gleeson CJ in New South Wales v Lepore and Another; Samin v Queensland 
and Others; Rich v Queensland and Others [2003]2 He 4 at 65. 
173[ 1948] NZLR 136. 
174 [1948]2 All ER 935. 
I7S The customer threatened to report the attendant to his superiors after the attendant had used violent 
language towards him . In his own words, the attendant admitted that in response to the threat he "gave 
him one on the chin to get on with." 
176 [1895] I QB 742. 
87 
thwarted in his attempts to recover some furniture which was hired out by his 
employer. The furniture had been pledged to the hirer's landlord as security for 
unpaid rent and the landlord's wife attempted to stop the defendant's employee from 
removing it, whereupon the employee assaulted her. It was held that the employee 
was acting in furtherance of his employer' s interests, despite the fact that such 
conduct was neither sanctioned nor authorised. 
This position was endorsed in Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd177 where it was 
held that if the employee's acts are motivated by a desire to protect an employer's 
interests, the employer will be held liable, even where there is no express or implied 
authority for such conduct. The enquiry is focused on whether or not the unauthorised 
conduct is personally motivated. 
In Fennelly's case a ticket inspector assaulted a railway passenger following an 
altercation over the inspection of the passenger's ticket. The passenger refused to 
submit his ticket for inspection, claiming that it had already been inspected. During 
this altercation the defendant's employee reacted to being called a fool by the 
claimant and assaulted him by putting him in a headlock and dragging him down 
some steps. The court held that the assault could not be divorced from the original 
altercation which was started in furtherance of the employer' s interests. Inexplicably, 
the court held that there was nothing to suggest that the ticket inspector had acted in 
furtherance of his own interests; yet the undisputed facts compel the conclusion that 
the assault was a personal reaction to the verbal abuse of the claimant. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the assault took place after the claimant had 
shown the inspector his ticket, thereby enabling the latter to fulfil his authorised task. 
Nevertheless the court held the defendant liable for the conduct of its employee. 
Similarly, in Mattis v Pollock l 78 a nightclub owner was held liable for a brutal assault 
on a patron by one of his employees. The employee in question was hired as a 
doorman and was, in fact, encouraged by his employer to use force in the performance 
177 [2001]IRLR 390. 
178 [2004]4 All ER 85 . 
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of his duties. 179 The incident which gave rise to the action occurred after a brawl in 
the defendant's night club involving some of the claimant's friends and the doorman. 
After being assaulted by a number of patrons, the doorman managed to escape the 
club and return home, where he armed himself with a knife. Bearing this weapon he 
returned to the scene and stabbed the claimant, who happened to be the first person he 
was able to apprehend. It was held that the doorman' s actions were so closely 
connected with his appointed functions that his employer was vicariously liable for 
the harm caused to the claimant. 
The Fennelly and Mattis cases blur the distinction between acts of personal aggression 
and those in furtherance of an employer's interests. There is no doubt in either of 
these cases that the conduct of the respective employees began in furtherance of their 
employers' interests, but it is extremely doubtful that the assaults were not personally 
motivated. These decisions suggest that as long as the assault was triggered by an 
employee's desire to serve his or her employer's interests, that employer will be held 
liable for any resulting harm. 180 It appears that the principle in assault cases may 
therefore be similar to that of fraud in that liability is based on actual or ostensible 
authority. This broad interpretation of the principles of vicarious liability seems to be 
gaining ground in England and it has been argued that it is possible that the net of 
liability is being cast too far. 181 
3.3.4.4. Sexual Harassment 
Sexual harassment in the workplace has become an area in which the laws governing 
vicarious liability have been interpreted generously. Although the act of sexual 
harassment is not in itself, a tort, employers may be held vicariously liable for their 
employees' breach of anti-discrimination legislation. 182 In Bracebridge Engineering 
179 His primary function was to intimidate and eject unruly patrons, a task which he seemed to perform 
with whal can best be described as unnecessary enthusiasm. Such behaviour became cause for concern 
among his fellow employees, who, on more than one occasion, expressed their misgivings to their 
employer. 
IRQ It may be argued that this position cannot be reconciled with the decision in Warren 's case as it is 
clear that the employee's actions were triggered by a desire to protect his employer's interests. 
I"See R Weekes "Vicarious Liability for Violent Employees" (2004) 64 eLf 53. This argument is 
discussed in detail at 3.5. below. 
"2 Street on Torts 572. It has been argued that the law of torts should be developed to include an action 
for sexual harassment, as although statutory remedies exist, they do not cover all possible instances of 
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Ltd v Darby,183 a female employee of the appellants was sexually harassed by two 
fellow employees, both of whom were appointed in supervisory positions. It was held 
that although the act of harassment was independently motivated and was not done in 
furtherance of the employer's interests, it was nevertheless committed within the 
scope of the employees' duties. It was held that the act of harassment constituted an 
improper mode of carrying out a supervisory function. 
Once again it could be argued that the court was stretching the idea of what could be 
described as 'supervision'. Surely, under no circumstances can sexual harassment be 
considered a part of performing the task of supervision. It appears that although the 
court justified its finding by attempting to fit the facts into the traditional Salmond 
formulation, it was simply following the sufficient connection test. 
One of the latest significant decisions on vicarious liability for sexual harassment is 
the New Zealand case, Proceedings Commissioner v Ali Hatem,184 in which a 
partnership was held liable for acts of sexual harassment committed by one of its 
partners. Although the firm's liability was based on the Partnership Act of 1908, the 
test applied by the court was ostensibly the same as that applied under the common 
law and a determination as to whether or not the partner's acts fell within the ordinary 
course of business had to be made. Section 13 of the Partnership Act reads: 
" 13. Liability of the firm for wrongs: Where, by the wrongful act or omission 
of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, or with 
the authority of its co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person not being 
a partner in the firm, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefore to 
the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act." 
The court held that the determination of whether or not the acts committed by the 
partner were in the ordinary course of business should be guided by policy 
harassment. See J Conaghan "Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual) Harassment" 
(1996) 160JLS407at 412-413. 
'83 [1990] IRLR 3 EAT. An appeal from the decision of an Industrial Tribunal. The action was brought 
in terms of sections: 1(1)(a), 6(2)(b), and 41(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, and section 
55(2)(c) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978. 
'84 [1999] I NZLR 305. 
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considerations and that the purpose behind the legislation must be kept in mind when 
coming to a conclusion. Tipping J said the following: 185 
"In the ultimate judgment which has to be made, issues of policy may arise. 
For example, in the present case, sexual harassment of an employee by one 
partner, if it is not the responsibility of the firm as a whole, is likely to be less 
vigorously policed. One purpose of the legislation is obviously to deter sexual 
harassment and to provide a remedy for its victims. That purpose will be better 
achieved by holding the firm as a whole liable, rather than just the individual 
partner. Obviously policy matters cannot lead to a result which is otherwise 
untenable, but in a case involving matters of degree, as most contested cases 
will, it is legitimate to keep the purpose of the legislation in mind." 
It was observed that although the acts committed by the partner could not be regarded 
as part of the firm's business, they were committed while the partner was engaged in 
the firm ' s businessl86 and indeed while the partner was engaged in the authorised task 
of dealing with staff. It was accepted that partners in a firm generally have the 
authority to deal with the employees of the firm, 187 and,188 
"If they deal with them badly, rather than well, they are nevertheless doing 
something within the ordinary course of the business of the firm. They are 
doing something generally authorised, albeit they are doing the particular acts 
in a tortious manner." 
As pointed out by Calitz,189 the court did not apply the new 'close connection' test, 
but stuck to the original Salmond rule, holding that the partner was engaged in an 
unauthorised mode of performing authorised tasks. This generous interpretation of the 
rule seems to confirm the trend towards a wider scope of liability for the wrongful 
acts of employees, although it seems that the courts still insist on using the 
'unauthorised mode' rationale for attributing liability, even where it appears to make 
little sense. As mentioned above, it is very difficult to accept that sexual harassment 
can be regarded as a mode of performing an authorised task. 
185 Para 19. 
186 Para 23 . 
187 This was particularly true of the partner in question, who was charged with dealing with the staff 
because he spoke better English than the other partner. 
188 Para 24. 
189 K Cal itz "Vicarious liability" 230. 
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3.3.4.5. Sexual Assault 
The difficulties encountered when attempting to connect the conduct of employees 
with their appointed tasks are particularly severe in cases where sexual assault has 
been committed by an employee. In these cases there can be no doubt that the 
offender was acting in furtherance of his or her own interests. However, that does not 
prevent employers from being held vicariously liable for the employee's actions. 19o 
The influence of Bazley v Curryl91 on the approach to cases of sexual assault (and 
indeed on most recent decisions involving the liability of employer's for the 
personally motivated criminal acts of their servants) cannot be overstated. This 
decision has and will continue to have a marked influence on the application of the 
principles of vicarious liability in all common-law jurisdictions, and thus compels 
attention. 
The facts were as follows: The appellant, a charitable organisation, operated two 
residential care facilities for the treatment of emotionally troubled children. One of 
their employees (Curry) was found to have systematically sexually abused the 
children at one of the homes and was consequently dismissed. Curry was later 
convicted on 19 counts of sexual abuse, two of which related to the respondent. The 
respondent sued the organisation, claiming that it was vicariously liable for the 
employee' s tortious conduct. The trial court upheld the respondent' s claim, as did the 
court of appeal. The appellant was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
The main issue faced by the court in this matter was whether or not the employers 
could be held vicariously liable for their employees' sexual assaults on persons within 
their care. l92 The court recognised that in cases such as this, the application of the 
190 Rogers Tort 901 ; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 593. See also P Cane "Vicarious 
Liability for Sexual Abuse" (2000) 116 LQR 21 ; P Giliker "Rough Justice in an Unjust World" (2002) 
65 MLR 269. 
'" (1999) 174 DLR (4'") 45. 
192 There was a second ancillary issue of whether or not non-profit employers should be exempted ITom 
liability. This issue was not the focus oftbe decision and therefore requires little attention. Suffice it to 
say that the court found absolutely no sound reason why non-profit organizations should be exempted 
92 
traditional test for VicarIOUS liability (the Salmond test) presented a number of 
difficulties. Perhaps most significant among these was that the test does not set clear 
guidelines for distinguishing between unauthorised modes of performing authorised 
acts, and entirely independent acts. McLachlin J suggested that one way to answer 
this question was to look at settled cases with similar evidentiary backgrounds.193 
However, as Fleming rightly pointed out, "precedents are helpful only when they 
present a suggestive uniformity on parallel facts.,,194 Where no suitable precedent 
exists, this method of drawing the distinction cannot be followed, and other means of 
making the distinction are necessary. 
The court observed that the recent trend in situations where no clear precedent could 
be found is to tum to policy for guidance. 195 Attention was drawn to the comments of 
La Forest J in London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International Lti96 who 
recognised that the application of the test for vicarious liability should be informed by 
the policy considerations behind this form of liability. 
The court suggested that the determination of the second part of the Salmond test197 
should be approached in two stepsJ 98 
"First, a court should determine whether there are precedents which 
unambiguously determine on which side of the line between vicarious liability 
and no liability the case falls. If prior cases do not clearly suggest a solution, 
the next step is to determine whether vicarious liability should be imposed in 
light ofthe broader policy rationales behind strict liability." 
As far as the first step is concerned, it is difficult to distil clear principles from a line 
of authority in which general principles have been applied to materially different sets 
of facts. This notwithstanding, the court managed to break down the previously 
from compensating victims, regardless of their charitable intent and the service they render to the 
community. 
J9' 
, Para 12. The court quoted the comment made by Heuston and Buckley Salmond and Hellston on the 
Law a/Torts 1ged 522 "[T]he principle is easy to state but difficult to apply. All that can be done is to 
~rovide illustrations on either side of the line." 
'" Fleming The Law a/Torts 421 . Cited at para 12. 
195 Para 14. 
196 [1992] 3 SCR 299. 
197 That which deals with the determination of whether or not an employee's acts were unauthorised 
modes of performing authorised activities. 
198 Para 15. 
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decided cases into three broad categories. It was suggested that if a common thread 
could be found between the three categories, it could help to interpret the way in 
which the test should be interpreted. 199 The categories defined by the court were:200 
"(1) cases based on the rationale of 'furtherance of the employer' s aims'; (2) 
cases based on the employer's creation of a situation of friction; and (3) the 
dishonest employee cases." 
McLachlin J held that the first category relies on the notion that the employee, by 
acting in furtherance of his or her employer's aims, has to have 'ostensible ' or 
'implied' authority to perform the unauthorised act201 She observed that although this 
rationale can be used effectively in cases of negligence, other than in cases of fraud it 
does not provide an adequate basis for intentional torts . She noted that202 "It is 
difficult to maintain the fiction that an employee who commits an assault or theft was 
authorised to do so, even ' ostensibly'." The court found it best to place cases they 
described as those "addressing the distinction between a frolic and a detour" or so-
called 'deviation' cases into this category. 
As regards the second category, an employer is held liable where that employer' s aim 
or enterprise incidentally creates a situation of 'friction,203 which may give rise to 
employees committing tortious acts . The court found that intentional torts arising 
from such situations can be likened to accidents in that they stem from certain 
inevitable risks attendant to the employer's type of business204 McLachlin J pointed 
out:205 
"Like accidents, they [the torts] occur in circumstances where such incidents 
can be expected to arise because of the nature of the business, and hence their 
ramifications appropriately fOlm part of the cost of doing business." 
'99 Para 17. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Para 18. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Friction in this sense is used to describe a situation in which an increased risk of harm is present. 
For example, hiring an employee whose job is to maintain order in a public house or night club creates 
a situation of friction . 
2(" Para 19. 
2.' Ibid. 
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Although the court did not specifically express which type of cases would fall into 
this category, the examples they cited suggest that cases of assault committed by 
employees whose tasks created a risk of confrontation would most readily fit this 
mould.206 
It was recognised that cases involving dishonest employees could not be categorised 
under any of these headings. The court quite accurately observed:207 
"A bank employee stealing a client's money cannot be said to be furthering 
the bank's aims. Nor does the logic of a situation of friction apply, unless one 
believes that any money-handling operation generates an inexorable 
temptation to steal." 
Despite this, the court accepted that employers are increasingly being held liable for 
the fraud and theft of their employees, and that in the absence of a logical connection 
to established principles, the courts are tending towards a more policy-driven 
approach. 
Of particular concern in Bazley v Curry was the categorisation of sexual abuse. After 
the controversial decision in the English case, ST v North Yorkshire County 
Council,208 the status of sexual assaults in cases of vicarious liability was disturbingly 
uncertain2 09 In that case it was held that the act of sexual abuse cannot be viewed as 
an unauthorised mode of performing an authorised act and that therefore it could not, 
in terms of the Salmond test, fall within the scope of employment. Butler-Sloss LJ 
came to the conclusion that acts of sexual assault are closest to acts of ordinary assault 
and that therefore such cases should be treated in the same manner210 It was held that 
since the acts of assault were personally motivated and in no way incidental to the 
employee' s tasks, the employer could not be liable. 
206 For example, Dyer v Munday, Matlis v Pollock, Fennelly v Connex. In all of these cases it could be 
argued that a situation of friction existed. 
207 Para 20. 
208 [1999]IRLR 98. 
209ln the case the plaintiff, a student at the defendants' school for the mentally handicapped, was 
sexually assaulted by the deputy headmaster of the establishment while on a school excursion in Spain. 
210 At 101. Butler-Sloss LJ said: "The line of decisions which is, in my view, the most relevant to 
consider involved assaults by employees." 
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It is not difficult to see the court's logic here as, when viewed in the context of 
ordinary assault, it is clear that a distinction can be drawn between cases in which a 
situation of friction is created and those in which it is not. It seems that only in the 
former category of cases are employers held liable (presumably due to the fiction of 
ostensible authority). In cases of sexual assault a situation of friction is almost never 
created by the employer. Thus the grouping of sexual assault with ordinary assault 
will inevitably lead to a situation whereby employers will never be held liable for the 
sexual assaults of their employees. 
The ST decision was criticised in Bazley, with the comment that the conclusion that 
sexual assault is closer to an ordinary assault than it is to deceitful conduct is 
questionable in that while the tort is of a physical nature, it is equally arguable that the 
trust-abusing character of child abuse fits more into the dishonesty genre.211 Leaving 
the categorisation aside, the court in Bazley went further to repeat the statement made 
by Lowry J in the court a quO: 212 
"If a postal clerk's theft and a solicitor's clerk's fraud can be said to have been 
committed in the course of their employment, I can see no sound basis in 
principle on which it can be concluded that Curry's criminal conduct should 
not attract vicarious liability." 
In this sense the court found that the reasoning in ST v North Yorkshire County 
Council would lead to anomalies. In GJ v Griffiths213 Wilkinson J was less subtle in 
his criticism of ST, saying: " [SJurely a distinction is not to be drawn attributing a 
higher standard to the way society looks after its jewellery than its children." 
It seems that we cannot view sexual assault in the same light as ordinary assault when 
determining whether or not the act is committed within the course and scope of 
employment. To do so would be to pronounce that acts of sexual assault cannot be 
committed in the course and scope of employment. That would surely defeat the 
purpose of vicarious liability and result in serious injustice. 
211 Para 24. 
m Sub-nom P A B v Cuny (1995) 9 BCLR (3d) 217 at 263. 
213 [1995] BCJ No. 2370 (QL) (SC) para 76. 
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Returning to what was said earlier in the judgment about finding a common thread 
between the categories of cases, the court emphasised the need for what it described 
as a unifying principle. It was found that there was a common feature shared by all 
three categories, namely the creation of risk. The court recognised that:214 
"The common theme resides in the idea that where the employee's conduct is 
closely tied to a risk that the employer's enterprise has placed in the 
community, the employer may justly be held vicariously liable for the 
employee's wrong." 
Although this may be seen as a mere exposition of the policy rationale behind 
attributing liability to employers for the acts of their employees which seem 
antithetical to the employers' business aims, it cannot be discarded as such. In Bazley 
it was finally accepted that principle needs to be reconciled with policy in cases where 
a connection between the patently dishonest acts of an employee and his or her 
employment is sought to be made. 
The court reviewed a number of policy considerations215 and came up with two 
principles which should guide the courts in cases where precedent is inconclusive: 
First, the courts should approach the question of liability in a more general manner, 
focusing on the purpose behind vicarious liability 216 and second, the courts must 
recognise that the fundamental question is whether the wrongful act is sufficiently 
related to the employer's business to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. It 
will be sufficiently related where there is a clearly discernable connection between 
the creation or enhancement of risk and the wrongful conduct. 217 
In order to determine whether or not the connection between the employer' s creation 
or enhancement of risk and the wrong committed by the employee is sufficient to 
found liability, the following factors may be considered: 218 
2J4 Para 22. 
m Ali of which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
216 Para 41(1). 
217 Para 4 1(2). (My emphasis). 
218 Para 4(3)(a-e). The list is non-exhaustive and relevant factors may vary. 
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"(a) The opportunity that the enterprise afforded to the employee to abuse his 
or her power; 
(b) The extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer's 
aims (and hence be more likely to have been committed by the employee); 
(c) The extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation 
or intimacy inherent in the employer's enterprise; 
(d) The extent of power conferred on the employee (by the employer) in 
relation to the victim; 
(e) The vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the 
employee's power." 
The question of what would introduce or necessarily enhance the risk of harm 
occurring was dealt with by the court with reference to sexual abuse cases.219 The 
court held that the risk of an employee abusing a child will be materially enhanced by 
giving the employee an opportunity to commit the abuseI20 Furthermore, the risk of 
harm can be enhanced by the nature of the relationship created by the type of 
employment.221 McLachlin J found: 222 
"The more an enterprise requires the exercise of power or authority for its 
successful operation, the more materially likely it is that an abuse of that 
power relationship can be fairly ascribed to the employer." 
In summary, the court came to the conclusion that the test for vicarious liability 
should not focus on interpreting the semantic nuances encountered when trying to 
distinguish between which types of conduct can and cannot be considered to fall 
within the course of an employee' s service. It should rather focus "on whether the 
employer's enterprise and empowerment ofthe employee materially increased the risk 
of the sexual assault and hence the harm.,,223 
This decision has effectively set the benchmark for cases where vicarious liability is 
sought for sexual abuse committed by employees. Although it may be argued that the 
219 Although this area was given specific attention, the principles are quite capable of being moulded to 
fit different factual situations. 
220 Para 43. If an employee is penmitted or required to spend long periods alone with the child, the 
opportunity for abuse is greater, whereas, if the employee is only penmitted or required to spend short 
periods with the child, the risk is reduced. Further, if in addition to being permitted to spend extended 
periods alone with the child, the employee is expected to supervise intimate activities such as bathing 
or toi leting, the risk ofhann increases, 
22 1 Para 44. Employment wh ich places the employee in an intimate re lationship with chi ldren (such as a 
parent-like ro le) and gives the employee a position of power, will enhance the risk as the employee will 
be able to use the position to his or her advantage. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Para 46. 
98 
approach is too broad, it seems that the courts have looked favourably on the decision. 
Perhaps it is felt that the policy considerations behind the imposition of liability for 
this type of case warrant a departure from a more traditional, narrow approach. 
The Bazley decision was recently followed in the leading English case of Lister and 
Others v Hesley Hall Ltd. In this case the defendants, a children's home, were held 
liable for the sexual assaults of one of their employees who had been using his 
position as a warden to sexually abuse the claimants. The court applied what is now 
popularly described as the 'sufficient connection' test,224 criticising previous awkward 
references to "improper modes" of performing an employee's tasks.225 In terms of this 
test a broad enquiry into the nature of the employment and the circumstances 
surrounding the employee's functions is made. Although the court stressed that the 
mere creation of opportunity to commit the offence would not be sufficient to found 
liability. 
Unfortunately, the House of Lords in Lister was not as explicit as the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Bazley v Curry. Although the court followed the example set by 
Bazley v Curry, it was far more conservative and refrained from taking a more policy-
driven approach. 226 Apart from adopting a particularly broad stance, the court did not 
change the core principles underlying the test for vicarious liability. Indeed, Deakin, 
Johnson and Markesinis are of the view that "Lister simply replaces one verbal 
formula (the distinction between 'authorised acts' and 'unauthorised modes') with 
another (' sufficient connection') which in the long run may prove no more adequate 
to the task in hand. ,,227 
It is difficult to argue with this view, particularly since the 'new' test has done little to 
eliminate the awkwardness of the old one. That being the case, the decision gives rise 
to concern that the new test has extended the scope of vicarious liability quite 
224 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 593. 
225 At 245. Rogers Tort (2006) 901-902 is of the opinion that Lord Steyn was perhaps being too harsh 
on the reference to improper modes of performing authorised tasks. He feels that the facts of Lister 
could easily have been accommodated by the traditional test, producing the same result. 
226 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 593 . 
227 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 595 . 
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drastically. There is a fear, particularly among insurers and employers, that it may 
cause floodgates to open.228 
Although courts in many jurisdictions seem to be opemng up to the idea of 
broadening the application of the principles of vicarious liability in cases of sexual 
assault,229 it appears that the Australian courts have been more reserved on the issue 
and have yet to take a clear position230 In New South Wales v Lepore and Another; 
Samin v Queensland and Others; Rich v Queensland and Others the majority of the 
court came to the conclusion that, in principle, there is no sound reason why a school 
authority should not be held vicariously liable for the acts of sexual abuse committed 
by schoolteachers whilst performing their duties so long as those acts are closely 
related to their employment. However, the court found that there were insufficient 
facts for a finding of liability in the case and the issue was not addressed in sufficient 
depth. This notwithstanding, it appears from the comments of Gleeson CJ that the 
Australian courts will most likely move in the direction of the English, Canadian and 
New Zealand authorities when deciding like cases in future?31 
3.3.4.6. The Tort of Negligence 
In English law 'negligence' is itself an independent tort.232 The tort of negligence was 
recognised as an independent tort for the first time in 1932 in Donoghue v 
Stevenson,233 and has since gained ground as a cause of action. This acceptance of 
228 Giliker "Rough Justice" 276. 
229 This more liberal attitude seems to flow from the broad approach recently adopted by the courts in 
England (with Lister v Hesley Half), Canada (with Bazely v Curry) and New Zealand (S v Attorney 
General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 and Proceedings Commissioner v Ali Hatem). 
230 Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 349. 
2)] The Chief lustice was of the view that where the relationship between teachers and pupils is 
invested with a high degree of power and intimacy, the use of that power and intimacy to commit 
sexual abuse may provide a sufficient connection between acts of sexual assault and the teacher's 
employment. This view suggests that liability could very well be based on the notion that the working 
environment creates an opportunity to commit the offence. The English authorities have gone to great 
lengths to point out that this basis for imposing liability does not suffice. However, it is doubtful 
whether their formulation of the required connection between employment and misconduct is any 
different in principle. 
232 Rogers Tort (2006) 74. It must be noted, however, that it is also a state of mind which is one 
element of the tort. Of course it is also used as an element in a number of other torts. 
233 [1932] AC 562. In this case the appellant was poisoned by a decomposed snail which was contained 
in a bottle of ginger beer manufactured by the respondent. This case established that there is a duty on 
manufacturers to ensure that products are free fTom defects which could cause foreseeable harm to 
person or property. See also Deakin, lohnston and Markesinis Tort Law 76. 
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negligence as a tort in its own right has widened the net of liability. Negligence would 
previously have been limited to forming an element in a complex relationship or in 
some specialised breach of a duty.234 
Rogers describes the elements of the tort of negligence as follows: 235 
"(1) a legal duty on the part ofD towards C to exercise care in such conduct of 
D as falls within the scope of the duty; (2) breach of that duty, i.e. a failure to 
come up to the standard required by law; and (3) Consequential damage to C 
which can be attributed to D' s conduct." 
Simply put, the elements making up a claim for negligence are: "Duty, breach, 
causation and damage.,,236 In the tort of negligence, "the 'duty' is the core ingredient 
of the tort,,,237 and not the tort itself.238 
The structure of the negligence enquiry has direct influence on the way in which the 
test for vicarious liability is applied in cases where an employee's negligence is at 
issue. It is also particularly relevant where a duty is placed on the employer to take 
care when dealing with clients, customers or even third parties239 For the purposes of 
this section only the carelessness of employees and their wrongful mistakes will be 
discussed. 
In Lockgelly Iron and Coal Co v M'Mullan24o Lord Wright pointed OUt: 241 
"In strict legal analysis, negligence means more than heedless or careless 
conduct, whether in omission or commission: it properly connotes the 
234 Heuston and Buckley Salmond 430. See also Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1936) AC 85 at 
103. 
m Rogers TorI (2006) 132. 
236 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis TorI Law 74. 
231 Rogers TorI (2006) 134. 
238 It must be noted that this ' duty ' forms an element of all torts and is not confined to the tort of 
negligence. However in most other torts the obligation is negative and therefore needs no explicit 
attention. As Rogers TorI (2006) 134 suggests, "all that duty signifies in those torts is the 
comparatively simple proposition that you must not commit them: they have their own, detailed, 
internal rules which define the circumstances in which they are committed and duty ads nothing to 
those." 
139 This duty will be discussed in at 3.5. below, where the intersection between individual and vicarious 
liability is examined. 
240 (1934) AC I. 
241 At 25. 
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complex concept of duty, breach and damage thereby suffered by the person to 
whom the duty was owing." 
Although it is clear that mere carelessness is insufficient to found liability without the 
existence of a recognised legal duty, it must be accepted that carelessness is a 
necessary ingredient of the negligence enquiry and, of course, all enquiries in which 
negligence is a factor. 
As far as the careless conduct of employees is concerned, carelessness may give rise 
to a claim based on the tort of negligence itself, or may form part of a claim in which 
negligence is an ingredient. The fact that an employee's conduct was negligent does 
not take it out of the scope of employment. Furthermore, those negligent acts 
committed whilst the employee was deviating from instructions will not necessarily 
be regarded as having been committed outside the scope of employment242 As Rogers 
comments: "[I]t (negligence) may still be in the course of employment even if the 
servant is not acting strictly in the performance of his duty provided he is not 'on a 
frolic of his own,.,,243 
A good illustration of how the principle applies to mistake can be seen in the case of 
Bayley v Manchesler, Sheffield and Lincolnshire R/44 where it was held that an 
employer would be liable for the actions of an employee who was doing what he or 
she was employed to do in a "blundering way,,245 The fact that the actions of the 
employee are not authorised does not release the employer from responsibility. The 
reason for this is that the employee is still pursuing an authorised activity, albeit in an 
unauthorised manner. 246 
242 As in all cases where vicarious liability is sought, an inquiry into the nature and degree of deviation 
is necessary in order to determine whether or not an employer should be held responsible. See Storey v 
Ashton. 
243 Rogers Tort (2006) 894. 
244 (1873) LR 8 CP 148. 
245 Rogers Tort (2006) 896. In Bayley's case a porter employed by the defendants mistakenly removed 
a train passenger (by force) after the passenger told him that he was going to Macclesfield. The porter 
was under the impression that the train was going to a different destination. However, it was going to 
Macclesfield. 
246 This principle is well illustrated in Bayley's case. The porter had the job of ensuring that passengers 
were in the correct trains; the fact that he mistakenly removed a passenger did not take his actions 
outside the scope of his employment. 
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The question in this type of case is one of degree. The courts have to determine how 
far the employee deviated from his or her authority. If the deviation is great enough it 
can be said that the employee acted outside the course and scope of his or her 
employment. This is a question which the court has to assess on a case by case basis 
and typically leaves room for varying interpretation. 
An employer will also be held liable where an employee ' s digression from authority 
amounts to negligence. Where this is the case, the usual principles attaching to the tort 
of negligence apply. In Ilkiw v Samueli47 a driver employed by the defendants 
allowed a third (unauthorised) party to drive on his behalf. The unauthorised driver 
negligently caused an accident. It was held that the original driver's conduct in 
allowing the other party to drive the vehicle without enquiring as to this party' s ability 
to perform the task amounted to negligence. Such negligence fell within the course of 
his employment, and rendered the defendants vicariously liable.248 
3.4. NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES: A FORM OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY? 
In the law of contract, certain duties can be delegated to a third party, but only with 
the express agreement of the party to whom the duty is owed249 However, in most 
instances the delegating of such a dUI/50 does not free the delegator from his or her 
responsibilities under the conlract251 Therefore, having ordered a third party to 
perform on his or her behalf, the debtor remains liable, as the third party is merely a 
mandatar/52 and has not replaced the debtor as far as the creditor is concerned. The 
debtor cannot claim that since he or she has delegated a responsibility, that 
responsibility no longer resides with him or her. 
247 See also Ricketts v Thomas Tilling Ltd [1915]1 KB 644. 
248 It seems that the issue of causation was not given much weight by the court in this case. It is curious 
that the court did consider the negligent acts of the unauthorised driver as a novus actus interveniens 
which broke the chain of causation. Although this opens an interesting enquiry, it is not necessary to 
enter a debate on the element of causation for the purposes of this section. 
249 R H Christie The Law a/Contract 4ed (200 I) 537. 
250 For example, ordering a third party to pay a creditor or to render certain services on behalf of the 
contracting party giving the order. 
251 Unless of course the original contract had been changed and the debtor had been replaced by 
agreement. 
252 Christie Contract 537. 
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To a certain extent the same principle applies with delictual duties, even though the 
scope of these duties is often wider than it is in contract. 253 There are certain 
responsibilities which cannot be avoided by claiming that they were delegated to 
another. In English law, these are known as non-delegable duties.254 
It appears that in a number of English and Commonwealth cases vicarious liability 
has been based on failure to provide that care was taken where a duty to do so was 
present.255 The liability has been described as vicarious as this duty, which binds the 
party sought to be held liable, is breached by an employee or agent of this party. In 
these cases liability is based on the fact that the employer's duty is non-delegable and 
therefore cannot be escaped. As such the status of the employee or agent is irrelevant 
and liability can be imposed even where the duty was delegated to an independent 
contractor. It has therefore been said that "a non-delegable duty may be viewed as an 
exception to the rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for the torts of an 
independent contractor. ,,256 
It appears that although liability in these cases is still often described as vicarious, it is 
more accurate to describe it as personal. Indeed Giliker points out: "Reference to 
duties 'entrusted' and 'delegated' to the employee seem more indicative of primary 
2-7 liability, rendering the tenn 'vicarious' redundant in the circumstances.") It is 
perhaps for this reason that liability for non-delegable duties has never been 
introduced into the South African law of delict. In our law there remains a clear 
distinction between individual and vicarious liability, a difference which is closely 
guarded. 
253 The delictual duty to take care is wider in that it does not require the existence of a contractual 
relationship between the injured party and the party sought to be held liable. 
"4 Although the term 'non-delegable' suggests that the duties in question cannot be delegated, it 
merely expresses the fact that the party owing the duty cannot escape his or her obligation by 
delegating. Such duties can be delegated, but at the delegator's own risk. Determining the existence of 
such a duty has been the subject of much debate and is beyond the scope of this work. For a detailed 
exposition of the doctrine of non-delegable duties see G Williams "Liability for Independent 
Contractors" (1956) CLl 180. 
m Rogers Tort (2006) 912 points out that in these cases a 'duty to take reasonable care' has to be 
distinguished fTom a 'duty to ensure that care is taken '. Where the former duty is present the employer 
only has to ensure that a competent contractor was hired to do the work. However, where there is a 
duty to ensure that care is taken, the employer cannot escape liability in this way and is under a 
personal obligation to ensure that the contractor performs hi s or her tasks with care. 
256 Stewart and Stuhmcke Tort Law 353. 
251 Giliker "Rough Justice in an Unjust World" 275. 
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3.5. POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Atiyah made an interesting observation relating to the distinction between personal 
and vicarious liabi lity: 258 
"[T]he distinction between personal and vicarious liability - although well 
rooted in legal thinking - is not nearly so clear-cut as is often thought, and 
where the traditional theory would produce clearly absurd or unsatisfactory 
results there is no reason why it should not be jettisoned." 
Weekes259 carefully examined the new 'close connection test' adopted by the House 
of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall and followed in Dubai Aluminium Company Ltd v 
Salaam and Mattis v Pollock, also drawing attention to the influential decision in 
Bazley v Curry. His views on the links between the new test and individual liability 
are interesting and warrant close consideration. He states that three competing 
rationales26o have emerged from the recent expansion of the test for vicarious liability 
which "either explain, or perhaps offer alternatives to, the degree of close connection 
required.,,261 These are the ' risk rationale', the 'assumption of responsibility 
rationale' , and the 'policy rationale'. He goes on to say that each of these rationales 
"mimics an element of the test for imposing a direct duty of care in negligence,,,262 
and that in so doing "they revive the 'master's tort theory' of vicarious liability.,,263 In 
terms of that theory employers are liable for the acts of their employees which breach 
their own (the employer' s) duty of care towards third parties264 
As regards the first of these rationales, English courts have imported what Weekes 
describes as the "North American concept of enterprise risk,,265 in terms of which an 
258 Atiyah Vicarious Liability I I. 
259 Weekes "Vicarious Liability for Violent Employees". 
260 The use of the term 'rationale' is perhaps slightly misleading when used in this context as it suggests 
that the rationale is used as a basis upon which liability is founded . It seems that Weekes merely used 
the term to describe the reason for attributing liability without attaching any theoretical justification. 
26 1 Weekes "Vicarious Liability for Violent Employees" 54. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid 
264 See Broom v Morgan [1953] I QB 597 at 607-609 where Denning LJ commented on the nature of 
employer's liability. He stated that the employer himself was under a duty to see that care was 
exercised in the carrying out of his business, and held " If the (employed) driver is negligent there is a 
breach of duty not only by the driver himself, but also by the master." 
2" Weekes "Vicarious Liability for Violent Employees" 55. 
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employer's liability is based on an assumption of risk. In New South Wales v Lepore 
and Another266 Gleeson CJ noted that the risk assumption principle could be used to 
justifY the decision in Deatons Ply Ltd v Flew,267 as it could be argued that the actions 
of the employee in that case were in no way incidental to her employment and that 
therefore her employer had not created the risk of harmful conduct. He made the 
following obiter observation:268 
"The fact that it was no part of the barmaid 's responsibilities to keep order in 
the bar was important. If that had been part of her duties, then presumably 
there would have been an increased risk that any violent propensities on her 
part could result in harm to customers." 
This rationale appears to explain the decisions in Petterson v Royal Oak Hotel Ltd, 
Warren v Henlys Ltd and perhaps even Fennelly v Connex South Eastern LId 
discussed above 269 It certainly played a major role in Mallis v Pollock. Weekes points 
out that "[t]he judgment in Mallis adopts an unarticulated risk rationale.,,27o It is quite 
obvious that hiring a bouncer at a night club and charging him with the task of 
ejecting unruly patrons creates risk of injury to customers. Weekes is of the view that 
the use of the risk rationale in Mattis "seems intuitively unjust,,,271 in that the 
' faultless ' employer is held liable for the intentional criminal acts of his employee. He 
suggests that in cases in which employees are guilty of committing deliberate 
wrongs, a clear contrast emerges between "the ' innocence ' of the employer and the 
(proven criminal guilt) of the employee."m Of course, many would argue that by 
running a nightclub - an enterprise which is inherently surrounded by the risk of 
confrontation - an employer willingly takes on all attendant risks involved. After all, 
examination of the policy consideration of risk assumption reveals that these cases are 
in line with the purpose behind the law of vicarious liability, even though decisions 
like that of Mallis appear to promote what could be described as 'rough justice'. 
266 See 3.3.4.5. above. 
26' See 3.3.4.3 above. 
268 At 65. 
269 See 3.3.4.3. above. 
270 Weekes "Vicarious Liability for Violent Employees" 55. 
271 Weekes "Vicarious Liability for Violent Employees" 56. 
272 Ibid 
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Though the risk rationale appears to promote the policy considerations upon which 
vicarious liability is based, there is a convincing argument that the use of the risk 
rationale as a reason for imposing liability leads to the blurring of the distinction 
between direct and vicarious liability. As pointed out by Laddie J in Balfron Trustees 
v Pelerson,273 the focus seems to have shifted from the relationship between the 
employer and employee to the relationship between the employer and the victim. 
Under Weekes' second rationale, the assumption of responsibility rationale, 
employers will be held liable where their own duty of care towards the plaintiff has 
been breached by an employee. In Lister v Hesley Ha1l274 Lord Hobhouse observed 
that certain classes of persons or institutions assume a duty of care towards those with 
whom they conduct business by virtue of the relationship which is created between 
the parties. Examples of such relationships include inter alia those associated with 
schools, prisons and hospitals. Where such a relationship exists an employer's duty is 
extended to those to whom it is entrusted and if breached will render the employer 
liable as if that employer personally breached the duty. Lord Hobhouse went on to 
point out:275 
"The liability of the employers derives from their voluntary assumption of the 
relationship towards the plaintiff and the duties that arise from that 
relationship and their choosing to entrust the performance of those duties to 
their servant." 
Of course this rationale is based on the English concept of non-delegable duties and is 
perhaps not as relevant to the South African model as that of the assumption of risk 
rationale. Nevertheless it is worth mentioning as it could be argued that the 
assumption of risk barely differs from the assumption of responsibility. The only real 
difference is that the former focuses on the creation of a risk-bearing situation, 
whereas the latter focuses on the extension of a specific duty. 
273 [200l)lRLR 758 para 27. 
274 Paras 54-55 . 
27S Para 55. 
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The third, 'policy rationale', as Weekes describes it, was the rationale behind the 
decision in Bazley v Curry. The test applied by McLachlin J relies on what she 
claimed to be 'broader policy rationales' , taking a list of independent non-exhaustive 
criteria into account.276 However, it appears that this 'policy-driven' approach is 
firmly based on the creation and enhancement of risk by the employer' s enterprise 
and it is difficult to see how a distinction can be made between the 'policy rationale' 
and the ' risk rationale' . Indeed, the court in Bazley v Curry made no such distinction, 
holding that the primary focus should be on the creation of risk and that various 
' policy considerations' should be used as a guideline to determine the extent of the 
risk created. 
It is clear that the so-called ' risk rationale' for attributing liability is beginning to gain 
momentum, and is being used by the courts, (deliberately or otherwise), as a reason 
for attributing liability. However, Weekes suggests that the intersection between 
direct and vicarious liability created by this rationale has the potential to create unjust 
results. He uses Mattis v Pollock!77 as an example. The case was pleaded on the basis 
of direct liability in the first instance, and failed, yet was successful on appeal where 
vicarious liability was pleaded, the test being almost identical in both instances. 
It is obvious that the whole purpose of attributing vicarious liability is to offer a 
prospect of success in a case where direct liability will almost surely fail , but there 
must be some safeguard to limit liability. As Weekes points out, the risk rationale 
relies heavily on the concept of a duty of care owed by the employer to the victim. In 
cases involving the wrongs of employees it is particularly difficult to discharge that 
duty. Indeed, in Feldman v Mall it is suggested that the giving of directions or 
imposition of certain restrictions on the activities of employees is not a sufficient 
performance of the duty. This poses the question: What limits liability where an 
unarticulated risk rationale is used to establish vicarious liability? 
Under the traditional test for vicarious liability, the employer's responsibility is 
limited by the fact that the employee' s conduct had to have been committed within the 
course and scope of the latter's functions. Under an unarticulated risk rationale this 
276 Para 4(3)(a-e). See 3.3.4.5. above. 
277 See 3.3.4.3. above. 
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limitation is replaced by "a single factor - that the employer owes a duty of care to the 
customer in question.,,278 Weekes suggests that this approach is too broad and leaves 
no room for limitation. Indeed, it seems that in cases where risk assumption is used 
without qualification, liability will almost certainly be imposed and there is virtually 
nothing that the employer can do to avoid it. However, it is submitted that the 
decision in Bazley v Curry offers a solution to the problem. Although the court based 
its new ' test' on the assumption and enhancement of risk, the rationale cannot be 
described as ' unarticulated' in that the various criteria used to determine the extent of 
the risk created by the employer provide an in-built limitation.279 
It is clear that the broadening of the test for vicarious liability creates an intersection 
between it and direct liability, and although it may seem desirable to separate the two, 
such a division is not always practicaL It is submitted that using the assumption of 
risk to found liability is perfectly acceptable as long as sensible limitations are 
introduced to mitigate the burden placed on employers. 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that in general terms there are a number of practical differences 
between South African and English common law approaches to delictual liability, the 
laws of vicarious liability applied in England and the British Commonwealth are 
strikingly similar to those in South Africa.28o Thus it is not surprising, that the 
difficulties surrounding this branch of law are not confined to our system, and it is 
reasonable to expect that any development in the wider constituency leading towards 
clarification or reform will be closely followed in South Africa. 
The English and Commonwealth jurisdictions examined in this chapter have begun to 
follow a broad approach when determining whether or no an employee ' s conduct can 
be considered to fall within the course and scope of the latter's appointed functions. It 
seems that the courts are more readily imposing liability in what could be described as 
'borderline' cases, and are becoming more inclined to impose vicarious liability on 
278 Weekes " Vicarious Liabi li ty for Violent Employees" 62. 
279 The practical implications of this test will be discussed below at 5.6.2. 
280 This is not unexpected given the influence of English law on our legal system and the fact that both 
the Roman-Dutch and English principles remain strongly tied to their Roman law roots. 
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employers for the deliberate wrongful acts of their employees. Whether or not this 
broad approach, which smacks of allowing a desirable verdict to influence judgment, 
is logical or fair remains in question, but if eventually it leads to a measure of codified 
legal practise it should find favour in South Africa. Indeed it could be argued that the 
South African judiciary has a compelling motive to attempt a degree of reform of its 
own volition. Rapid socio-economic development in the Republic combined with a 
tendency to rush to litigation to support compensatory claims281 will make a greater 
degree of codification in cases of vicarious liabi lity desirable. 
281 A tendency which is most likely a result of globalization. The influence of litigious societies such as 
the United Slales and perhaps even the United Kingdom will only strengthen in years to come. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW IN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 
4.1. CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS 
Although in principle, the law of torts is similar throughout the western world, the 
structure of the various legal systems has a marked effect on the way in which the law 
is applied. The English law of torts has stayed close to its Roman roots and has often 
been said to follow a "pigeon-hole" approach, 1 in that it relies on specific heads of 
tortious liability instead of on general principles. The French and German tort laws 
are, however, more general in application, even though these systems are nominally 
codified. 
In spite of the fact that civil and common law jurisdictions have developed 
independently, many aspects of the different systems are similar, and it is important to 
note that each can offer valuable assistance to the other2 It is therefore necessary to 
examine the way in which civil law jurisdictions approach the problem of vicarious 
liability. 
4.2. FRANCE 
French civil law is largely based on the Code Civil,3 which has been in force since the 
early part of the nineteenth century.4 The law of vicarious liability is entirely based on 
the Code and has not changed significantly since its enactment.s 
J W Van Gerven, J Lever and P Larouche Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and 
International Tort Law (2000) 2. 
2 This is particularly true where common and civil law converge on certain issues. B Markesinis 
"Judicial Style and Judicial Reasoning in England and Gennany" (2000) 59(2) CLJ 294 believes that 
there is a" gradual convergence" of common law and modem civil law. 
3 The Code civil des Franr;ais was promulgated in 1804. Its title was changed to the Code Napoleon in 
1807 and was changed back and forth until 1870 when it finally became the Code Civil (C Dadamo and 
S Farran The French Legal System (1993) 9). It must be noted that although the Code makes up the 
largest part of the French civil law, it is not the only written source of this section of private law. 
Dadamo and Farran The French Legal System 25 point out that "a number of written laws exist outside 
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The structure of the Code does not differ greatly from that of the German civil code. It 
has an introductory part and is divided into three books which are subdivided into 
Articles. The first book covers Articles 7 to 515 and deals with the law of persons. 
The second covers Articles 516 to 710 and is concerned with the definitions and rights 
in property. The third and most voluminous book covers Articles 711 to 2281 and 
contains provisions relating to the acquisition of property,6 succession, contract, 
delict, matrimonial property law, unjust enrichment and many other branches of civil 
law. 7 
Unlike the German code, the Code Civil is remarkably broad and open to judicial 
interpretation. Dadomo and Farran observe:8 
"[FJrom the outset, the compressed legislative style of the Code gave the 
courts scope to interpret its provisions to make the law applicable to 
unforeseen individual cases, and to changes in the circumstances of society, 
which the legislators could not, and did not attempt to, envisage. Thus the 
Code sets out general principles and maxims of the law, leaving it to the judge 
and legislator to apply them or supplement them as necessary." 
the Code, whose status is neither more nor less because they have not been incorporated into the 
Code." 
4 The Code Civil was intended to replace all previous laws on matters contained in its provisions. 
Despite this wish to break away ITom the old legal system the Code was heavily influenced by certain 
areas of Roman law and indeed by Germanic customary law which was prevalent in the North of 
France at the time. The Code Civil unified the system of private law which was disturbingly segmented 
and unclear. K Zweigert and H Katz Introduction to Comparative Law 3ed (Translated by T Weir) 
(1998) 74-84 give a comprehensive account of the history of French law and of the significance of the 
Code Civil in unifying the French legal system. See also Dadamo and Farran The French Legal System 
1-10. 
5 Although there have been calls for reform since the early 1900's (it is not a coincidence that these 
challenges occurred shortly after the promulgation of the very advanced German Code in 1900) the 
Code Civil has remained largely untouched despite various amendments in certain areas. The only 
significant reforms have been in the areas of family law, matrimonial regimes and co-ownership. See 
Dadamo and Farran The French Legal System 10-11. The Code was a remarkable and revolutionary 
piece of law and it is not surprising that it remains in force today. Napoleon himself was quoted as 
saying: " It is not in winning 40 battles that my real glory lies, for all those victories will be eclipsed by 
Watcrloo. But my Code civil will not be forgotten, it will live forever." (Dadamo and Farran The 
French Legal System 10- I I). 
6 It is not surprising that the Code placed an emphasis on all laws and rights relating to property for it 
has been said that the original Code was "the law-book of the third estate" (Zweigert and K5tz 
Introduction to Comparative Law 93). The bourgeoisie were mainly land owners and it is believed that 
the draftsmen of the Code sought primarily to protect land owners interests and property rights. 
7 Dadamo and Farran The French Legal System 25. 
8 Ibid. 
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It is not surprising then that the French code fails to provide specific guidance on 
many of its provisions. In many instances, vicarious liability being one, the Code 
merely provides a general rule and goes no further in setting out specific 
requirements. 
4.2.1. The French Law of Delict 
The French law of delict is a perfect example of the revolutionary style of the Code 
Civil. Van Gerven, Larouche and Lever observe:9 
"[T]he French Code civil of 1804, in the spirit of the French revolution, sought 
to eradicate the institutions of the past and did away with the different heads of 
tort by laying down the celebrated general clause of Article 1382 C.civ. that 
'anyone who through his act, causes damage to another by his fault shall be 
obliged to compensate the damage'. Article 1383 then goes on to provide that 
'everyone is responsible for the damage caused not only by his act but also by 
his negligence or carelessness'." 
These provisions are remarkably broad, especially when viewed against the common 
law and German systems. The French do not make provision for the 'duty of care' 
which makes up the foundation of the common Jaw concept of negligence, nor do 
they set out a finite list of protected interests. 10 Furthermore, the French concept of 
harm (dommage) is seemingly unlimited and is in no way restricted by the 
classifications found in common law systems such as personal injury, pure economic 
loss, injury to reputation and so forth.l1 Whittaker points OUt: 12 "In principle, all 
faults, all categories of injury and all injured persons, whether foreseeable or not, are 
included with the protection of delict." 
9 Van Gerven et a/ International Tort Law 2. 
\0 S Whittaker " Privity of Contract and The Law of Tort: The French Experience" (1995) 15 OJLS 327 
at 331. 
II Ibid. The French, however, do refer to three broad types of harm: Prejudice materiel (often referred 
to as prejudice economique), which is what we would describe as patrimonial harm; prejudice corpore/ 
(personal injury); and dommage 1I10ral, which covers mental distress, grief, nervous shock and even 
damage to reputation. 
12 Whittaker "Privity of Contract and The Law of Tort: The French Experience" 331·332. 
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This broad approach notwithstanding, the Code still provides for certain specific 
delictual actions, vicarious liability being one. 13 Although the law of vicarious 
liability is specifically provided for, the provisions relating to that form of liability 
follow the tendency of the rest of the Code and are very broad. 
4.2.2. Articles 1384(1) and 1384(5) Code Civil 
The liability of an employer for the delicts of his or her employee is governed by 
Article 1384 (5) C.civ., which has to be read in conjunction with Article 1384 (I) 
C.CiV.: 14 
"[1] Everyone is liable for the damage caused not only by one's own conduct, 
but also by the conduct of persons for whom one is responsible or things in 
one ' s keeping (garde) ... 
[5] Principals [maftres] and 'employers' [commettants] [are liable] for the 
damage caused by their servants [domestiques] and ' employees' [pniposes] in 
the course of the functions for which they are employed." 
There are three general requirements which have to be satisfied for a claim to be 
successful: Firstly, the prepose must be personally liable for the harm under Article 
1382-3 C.civ. In terms of this section, the prepose will be liable if three elements are 
present, namely harm, fault and causation. IS Secondly, there must be what the French 
call a lien de preposition between the commetlant and the prepose. Loosely translated, 
this means "employment relationship," but as Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche point 
out,16 this translation "would fail to account properly for the fact that the lien de 
preposition, for the purposes of Article 1384(5) C.civ., can extend beyond 
13 Other 'special' fonns of liability for the acts of others include: liability of teachers for the acts of 
their pupils, (Art. 1384.6 - which has been amended by Art. 1384.8 in order to lessen the burden on 
teachers by allowing them to escape where their fault cannot be proved), and liability of parents for the 
acts of their children (Art. 1384.4 - which bases liability on a rebuttable presumptioo of fault). 
Provisioo is also made for liability for the acts of animals (Art. 1385) and damage caused by ruinous 
buildings (Art. 1386). Whittaker "Privity of Contract and The Law of Tort: The French Experience" 
332. 
" Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law 468. 
15 These elements need no further explanation for the purpose of this study. For a detailed exposition on 
the various elements of French tort law see Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law chapter II (for the 
types of injury for which reparation may be sought), Chapter III (for an explanation of the fault 
principle), and Chapter IV (for the element of causation). The authors point out (at 468) that "it is not 
impossible that case law will evolve so as to remove the requirement that the prepose be at fault." This 
has been the topic of much discussion, but is beyond the scope of this work. 
16 Van Gerven et alinternational Tort Law 469. 
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employment relationships.,,17 The third requirement is that the tortious conduct of 
pre pose must have fallen dans lesfonctions ("within the functions") of the prepose.!8 
Once the above requirements are met an irrebuttable presumption of liability arises. 
Unlike the German example, the commettant cannot escape liability by showing that 
he or she was not at fault. 19 Furthermore, commettants cannot absolve themselves 
from responsibility by proving that the event causing the harm was a cause etrangere 
(an event which the commettant could neither foresee nor avoid)2o 
The only way in which a commeltant can avoid liability is by showing that the 
pn}pose would not have been held liable had the victim sought direct relief.2 ! This 
confirms the principle that the employer can only be held liable if the employee 
committed a delict and that if it can be proved that the actions of such employees do 
not satisfy the general requirements of delict, either through absence of one of the 
essential elements, or due to the presence of a valid defence, the employer cannot be 
held accountable.22 
4.2.3. Lien de Preposition 
Independent contractors do not qualify as pre poses for the purposes of vicarious 
liability. It is thus important to make the distinction between independent contractors 
and employees. Zweigert and Katz observe: 23 
"The French courts apply the same standards as the German courts in deciding 
whether the person who caused the harm was a 'servant' of the defendant 
\7 The authors give the example of situations where one renders gratuitous service to another. In these 
situations, the latter can be held liable for the torts of the former under Article 1384(5) despite there 
being no formal employment relationship between the parties. 
18 The second and third requirements warrant specific attention and will be discussed below. 
19 For example in the selection and supervision of the prepose. Zweigert and Katz Introduction to 
Comparative Law 636. 
20 Van Gerven et a/International TorI Law 469. 
21 Zweigert and Katz Introduction to Comparative Law 635 . In this case it would have to be shown 
that the Prepose would not have been found personally liable in delict either due to the absence of an 
essential element or the existence of a valid defence. 
22 Although this principle seems relatively obvious and straightforward it must be remembered that 
under the German civil code an employee's fault is not relevant to the enquiry. It appears that the 
French have followed the same line of thinking as the common law jurisdictions as far as this is 
concerned. 
" Zweigert and Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law 636. 
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employer in the sense of § 831 BGB 24 For this purpose one asks whether the 
assistant was in a relation of dependence on the employer, that is, whether he 
was bound to follow the orders and instruction given to him with regard to the 
execution of the work assigned to him." 
When determining the existence of an employment relationship an employer will only 
be considered as such where he or she has the power to give instructions and to direct 
how the employee's functions are to be carried out.25 In Casso Crim., 15 Februar/6 
The plaintiff was defrauded by a person who gave the impression that he was in the 
employ of the defendant. It was held that the defendant could not be liable unless he 
had actual authority over the tortfeasor. It would not suffice that the person 
committing the wrongful conduct appeared to be the defendant's subordinate. The 
court held:27 
"A lien de preposition arises when one person has the power to give 
instructions to another as to how the functions of that other person are to be 
folfilled; however, that power must really exist and not merely be apparent. ,,28 
This seems quite restrictive but the implications are not as limiting as they seem. Van 
Gerven, Larouche and Lever point out that the test is fairly broad: 29 
"It is well established under French law that the power of the commettant does 
not need to rest on a legal or contractual right; it may also arise from factual 
circumstances. Furthermore, it does not need to be effectively exercised, as 
long as it exists, nor does the commettant need to have the requisite level of 
technical knowledge to deal competently with the work of the prepose." 
Although the French test is not as comprehensive as the common law tests used to 
establish the existence of a relationship capable of founding liability, the basic 
principle is the same. The French courts also take a holistic view of the employment 
relationship and do not restrict themselves to narrow definitions. It has been 
recognised that employees in some fields are allowed a great deal of freedom when 
completing their tasks and often have to perform their functions using their own 
24 See 4.3.3. below. 
25 See Casso Civ., 4 may 1937 DH 1937,363. 
26 JCP 1972. II. 17 159. Translated by YP Salmon. 
27 Van Geryen et 01 International Tort Lmv 490. 
28 Of course, as pointed out in para 28, the apparent employer could still be held liable under Article 
1382 C.ciy. for allowing it to appear as if the tortfeasor was an employee. 
29 Van Geryen et al International Tort Lmv 491. 
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discretion. In these circumstances it is still possible for the worker to be considered a 
prepose.30 
4.2.4. Dans Ie Fonetions 
Once it has been established that a relationship capable of founding liability exists 
between the person sought to be held liable and the person who caused the harm, the 
question of whether or not the harm was caused in the performance of an assigned 
task is asked. In terms of Article 1384 (5) a eommeltanl will only be liable where the 
delict of the prepose was committed whilst performing ' the tasks for which they are 
employed' (dans les jonelions auxquelles Us les onl employes)3 l 
Like the ' course and scope of employment' enqUIry, this part of the test fails to 
establish a clear and comprehensive guideline. The French courts have had to grapple 
with similar difficulties to those faced in common-law jurisdictions. Although the 
problems surrounding this element of the test are not unique, the courts in each of the 
respective jurisdictions seem to follow distinct patterns.32 It appears that the French 
courts invariably follow an approach favourable to the plaintiff when attributing 
liability to the employer. 33 This approach is typically illustrated by the pattern which 
has developed in relevant cases. 
As far as harm caused through negligence is concerned, there is little to distinguish 
the French approach from that which is followed in the English and Commonwealth 
systems. The courts tend to look at the circumstances surrounding the commission of 
the delict and are inclined to be liberal when making the link between the employee' s 
activities and the harm. In Casso Civ. 19 December 195rf34 an employer was held 
liable when his employee carelessly caused a fire while running an errand. In this case 
the employee, a farm worker, was asked by the defendant to fetch a tool from his 
30 An example of thi s type of situation is where a doctor works for a hospital. In Casso Crim.5 March 
1992, JCP 1993 . II. 22013 it was held that a doctor who worked at the defendant hospital was the 
pn}pose of the hospital for the purposes of Article 1384 (5) C.civ. even though his professional 
activities were not directed by the hospital authorities in any way. 
31 ZweigeIt and Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law 636. 
32 As mentioned above, the jurisdictions of common law systems are beginning to tend towards a wide 
interpretation of the test, whereas the Germans are more restrictive in their approach. 
33 Zweigert and Katz Introduction to Comparative Law 637. 
34 JCP 1951. II. 6577. 
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neighbour. On the way the worker caused a fire by carelessly attempting to fill his 
petrol lighter. Similarly, in Casso Soc. 7 January 1965,35 a farmer sent his farmhand to 
assist his neighbour. While returning in darkness on a bicycle without lights, the 
farmhand collided with a pedestrian, causing injury. The farmer was held liable for 
the harm even though he had not stipulated the means by which the worker should 
return, or even the route he should take.36 
In order for liability to arise there has to be a discernable link between the harm and 
the activities for which the prepose was employed.37 Therefore, in so-called 
'deviation' cases, the nature and degree of the deviation will be relevant when 
attempting to find the necessary link. 
As in common law jurisdictions, under French law employers may be held liable for 
the intentional wrongs of their employees. The French courts have been particularly 
generous in attributing vicarious liability in circumstances where employees act for 
their own benefit and intentionally cause harm. A good example of this can be seen in 
Casso Crim. 23 November 1928,38 where the defendant's driver stopped his truck in 
order to shoot a pheasant he had spotted on the plaintiff's land. Although he had acted 
intentionally and for his own benefit, his employer was held liable. In Casso Ass.pltin. 
19 May. 198839 it was held that employees who use their position to defraud their 
employer's clients will render their employers liable40 In fact, the courts have gone 
even further to hold an employer liable for a murder committed by one of his 
employees. In Casso Crim. 5 November 195341 the defendant, the owner of a cinema, 
employed an usher who took a client into the cellars and murdered her. The defendant 
35 Bull. Civ. 1965 IV nn. 7. 
36 Zweigert and Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law 637 point out that in this situation the German 
courts would have asked whether the route or means of transport was stipulated by the employer and 
would almost certainly given this substantial weight. The French court did not seem to consider this. ft 
must be noted however, that where an employee commits a delict on the way to work ITom his or her 
home or on the way home from work, the employer will not be held liable. See Casso Crim. 28 
November 1956 JCP 1957. IV. 2. 
37 This principle was explained clearly in Casso Ass.plen. 19 June 1977, JCP 1977. n. 18730 where an 
employer was absolved ITom responsibility due to the fact that the employee's conduct could not be 
linked in any way to the performance of a designated task. fn this case the employee was involved in a 
motor accident while using a company vehicle for his own purposes. 
38 Gaz. Pal. 1928. 2. 900. 
39 DS 1988.513. 
40 fn this case an insurance agent in the employ of the defendant intentionally deceived clients and 
made off with their funds. 
41 Gaz. Pal. 1953. 2.383. 
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was held vicariously liable. This decision suggests that the employer will be liable for 
providing the opportunity to commit the offence.42 
However, as Zweigert and K6tz observe,41 "[t]he question is much disputed and 
recurrent differences of opinion between the courts of appeal and within the Cour de 
Cassation have had to be resolved by the AssembIee pIenieire.,,44 In fact, many of the 
AssembIee pleinilire decisions are difficult to reconcile with others. For example, in 
Casso Assp!en. 17 June 198345 a driver in the employ of the defendant dumped petrol 
on the plaintiffs property while attempting to steal petrol from his employer. The 
driver was on his way to fill up his own petrol tank with his employer's tanker and 
dumped the petrol on the plaintiffs property when he saw he was being followed. The 
employer was not held liable as the link between the employee's conduct and his 
appointed functions could not be made. This decisions is difficult to reconcile with 
some of the earlier cases, such as Casso Crim. 23 November 1928 and indeed Casso 
Crim. 5 November 1953. 
It is difficult to specify clear guidelines on this part of the test, but there is a set of 
general principles which guide the courts when determining the link between the 
prliposes actions and his or her appointed functions. These guidelines were explained 
by the Cour de Cassation in Casso Ass. plein., 19 May 1988, perhaps the most 
comprehensive decision on the subject. The facts were: The defendant' s sales 
representative (H) had defrauded the plaintiff (an elderly woman) by embezzling 
funds after selling her various financial products. The plaintiff sued the defendant 
insurance company in terms of Article 1384 (5), arguing that the embezzlement 
occurred while H was acting dans les fonctions . The court a quo held in favour of the 
plaintiff. However, on appeal to the criminal chamber of the Cour de Cassation the 
decision was set aside. The case was remitted for further consideration. The second 
court of appeal once again found in favour of the plaintiff. The case was finally 
referred to the Assemblee pleniere46 
42 Something which the English, Commonwealth and German authorities are vehemently opposed to. 
43 Zweigert and Katz Introduction to Comparative Law 637. 
44 The Assembhie pleniere is the full court of the Cour de Cassation . 
45 JCP 1983 . II. 20120. 
46 Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law 501. 
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The Assembltie pieniere held that in order for the principal to be freed from liability, 
three cumulative conditions have to be met. "The worker must have acted outside the 
scope of his functions, without permission, and for a goal unrelated to his powers.,,47 
It was recognised that the second two conditions did not present any particular 
difficulty, but the first, on the other hand, was decidedly more complicated. The court 
took an objective position as far as the first condition was concerned and held that "to 
act beyond the scope of one's functions is to act in a way which does not arise from 
the exercise of those functions. ,,48 
The court recognised that this position makes it almost impossible for a commettant 
to escape liability where pre poses abuse their powers (abus de fonctions). 
Nevertheless, it was willing to accept this, subject to two exceptions: First, where the 
plaintiff is aware that the prepose is abusing his or her office, the relationship between 
the victim and the prepose is taken outside the scope of the latter's functions and the 
commettant will not be held liable for the resulting harm. Secondly, where there has 
been a breach by the pre pose of a specific obligation undertaken by the commettant 
towards the victim, the former may escape liability. 
A good example of such a situation is where the employee's actions are in direct 
contrast to what he or she is employed to do. This was the case in Casso Ass.pien. 15 
November 1985.49 In this case an employer was held not liable where its employee 
deliberately set fire to the plaintiff's factory in order to demonstrate the shortage of 
fire extinguishers. 50 Here it was held that the worker put himself beyond the scope of 
his employment by performing acts which were directly opposite to his function of 
protecting the plaintiff's property51 
The same approach was adopted in the recent case of Casso Civ. 16 June 2005,52 
where the warden of an old age home extorted money out of one of the residents by 
47 Para 4. 
48 Ibid. 
49 JCP 1986. II. 20568. 
50 The prl!pose was employed by the defendant security company to guard the plaintiff's factory. 
51 It was established in Casso Crim. /9 march /992, that th is would not succeed where the prepose did 
not have a security position. It is important that the act directly contrasts with the employee's appointed 
tasks. 
52 Bull.civ. 2005. 11.I 58 at 141. 
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preying on her (the victim's) weaknesses and abusing her position as an authority 
figure.53 The warden's employers were held liable for the harm caused to the victim. 
It was held that the prtipose had acted within her assigned functions and that therefore 
the commetlant could not escape liability. The court placed a heavy emphasis on the 
fact that the prepose 's position had given her the opportunity to take advantage of the 
residents and that the commettant's delegation of tasks had created the occasion for 
her to commit the offence. 
Of course, the consequence of these decisions is that vicarious liability in France is far 
broader than it is in the English and Commonwealth systems and more obviously, the 
German system. Indeed, it could be argued that the French go even further than the 
Canadians did in Bazley v Curry by placing emphasis on the creation of an occasion 
to commit an offence. 
4.3. GERMANY 
In Germany the law of obligations is governed by the German Civil Code which is 
most commonly referred to as the BGB (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch). The BGB was 
promulgated on the 18th of August 1896 and put into force on the 151 of January 
1900.54 Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche describe the structure of the BGB as, "very 
remarkable, in that the general is constantly treated before the specific, at every level 
of the BGB structure.,,55 
The code is set out in five volumes - Book (I) is entitled 'Allgemeiner Teil ' (,General 
Part'),56 while Book (II), 'Schuldverhtiltnisse' deals specifically with obligations. 57 
The first six parts of book (II) centre around general issues, whereas at the end of part 
53 The warden convinced her victim that she was liable to be expelled from the home and that she (the 
warden) could prevent this by altering certain papers. Between January 1994 and November 1996 the 
victim made out seventy-four cheques in favour of the warden. 
54 B S Markesinis A Comporative Introduction to the German Lmv of Tort (1986) 21. This date is 
significant as the code finally completed the unification of modem Germany. For a more detailed 
historical account of German lawmaking see S Vogenauer "An Empire of Light? Learning and 
Lawmaking in the History of German Law" (2005) 64(2) eLJ 481 at 493-500. 
S5 Van Gerven et al. International Tort Law 3. 
56 Ibid. Zweigert and K5tz Introduction to Comparative Law 146 point out that "the General Part sets 
out to expound certain basic institutions common to the whole of private law which the lawyer meets 
with in the law of obligations as well as the law of property, fami ly law and the law of succession." 
57 The law of obligations deals with personal rights and provides for claims in contract, unjustified 
enrichment and tort. Book (III) deals with the law of property, Book (IV) with family law and Book 
(V) with the law of succession. See Zweigert and Kotz Introduction to Comparative Lmv 145 . 
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seven, more specific provIsions are made relating to "Unerlaubte Handlungen" 
(impermissible behaviour).58 This structure seems to provide for a balance between 
the general, principled approach followed by the French and the tort-specific English 
system. Indeed, van Gerven, Lever and Larouche are of the view that " [t]he BGB 
steers a middle course between the English and French legal systems by breaking with 
a tradition of specific heads of liability on the one hand, while on the other hand and 
after much learned discussion, not including a general clause." 59 
4.3.1. General Principles of Delict in Germany 
Tort law under the BGB mirrors the features of the Civil Code itself in that it is both 
general and specific. The general clauses inform the application of rules specific to 
recognised torts. Opoku observes:6o 
"The German law of torts consists of (a) three general clauses, (b) five 
specifically regulated torts, ( c) rules for vicarious liability, and (d) cases of 
strict liability which are provided by statutes." 
The three general clauses are better described as heads of tortious liability, and are 
laid down in §823 and §826 of the Code.61 The first clause provides for liability where 
there has been an injury affecting one of the victim's legally-protected interests. 
§826 I reads:62 
"A person who intentionally or negligently injures the life, body, health, 
freedom, property or other right of another contrar~ to the law, is bound to 
compensate him for any damage arising therefrom." ] 
The legally-protected interests are enumerated in the text and include rights to life, 
body, health, freedom, ownership and any sonstiges Recht (,other right,)M The 
58 Van Gerven et a/ International TorI Law 3. 
" Ibid. 
60 K Opoku " Delictual Liability in German Law" ( 1972) 21 ICLQ 230 at 23l. 
61 Zweigert and K5tz Introduction to Comparative Law 599. 
62 Opoku "Delictual Liability in German Law" 232 . 
6l The unlawfulness requirement is satisfi ed if one of the protected interests is invaded without legally 
accepted justification. The justifications are similar to our typical defences and includc self defence and 
necessity among others. The fault element is the same as the one followed in most common-law 
jurisdictions as it requires either intention or negligence (the negligence enquiry is strikingly similar to 
that in common-law). See Zweigert and K5tz Introduction to Comparative Law 599-602; Opoku 
" Delictual Liability in German Law" 232-233. 
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second head of liability is fo und in §823 II and provides that one who culpably 
contravenes a statute designed to protect another will be bound to compensate the 
victim6 5 The third head of liability is set out in §826 and is based on the concept of 
boni mores. Under this section:66 "A person who intentionally causes damage to 
another in a manner contra bonos mores is bound to compensate the other for the 
damage.,,67 
In addition to the general clauses the BGB makes provision for five specific tort 
situations:68 
"(a) Endangering the credit of another person; (b) violation of a woman's 
sexual honour; (c) liability for damage done by animals; (d) liability for 
damage done by bui ldings; (e) liability for breaches of official duties by civil 
servants." 
The tort process requires a three-stage approach under which harm, unlawfulness and 
fault are required. As far as the harm (Tatbestand) requirement is concerned, the facts 
of the case are examined in order to determine whether or not there has been harm to 
a legally-protected interest.69 Unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) refers to a violation of 
one of the legally-recognised interests without just excuse. 70 The unlawfulness 
enquiry is similar to ours in that it is based on an objective standard of behaviour 
which is expected of right thinking individuals. The fault (Verschulden) is more 
SUbjective in nature and refers to the dolus or culpa of the person alleged to have 
committed the offence71 Like the French, the Germans also make a clear distinction 
64 Each of the protected rights have specific characteristics and are not as broad as their respective titles 
suggest. For the purpose of this study, it is not necessary to go into the details of these rights. 
65 Zweigert and Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law 602; Opoku "Delictual Liability in German 
Law" 234 points out: "It is generally agreed that the clause refers to any norms of conduct whether 
embodied in a statute, decree, ordinance or derived from customary law." It must be noted that the 
nature of the harm is significant in that liability will only arise in circumstances envisaged by the 
protective norm or statute. In other words, the harm must result from the danger wh ich the law sought 
to eliminate. 
'" Opoku "Delictual Liability in German Law" 234. 
67 This provision is as wide as it appears and has been used by the courts to found liability for all 
manner of sins. Although the section is particularly interesting it is unnecessary to examine it in detail. 
68 Opoku "Delictual Liability in German Law" 235. 
69 For instance, the Tatbestandof§823(1) is an interference with life, body, health, freedom, ownership 
or sonstiges Recht. See Van Gerven et allnternational Tort Law 286-287. 
70 Van Gerven et allnternational Tort Law 302. 
7 1 There is a raging debate over the 'wrongfulness ' and 'fau lt' enquiries in German law. It seems that 
their authorities are not pleased with the potential overlap between the two enquiries. Although this 
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between negligent and intentional behaviour. In German law however, these forms of 
conduct often have direct bearing on the specific prohibition. For instance, liability for 
conduct which is contra bonos mores72 can only arise where the harm was intended. It 
is not sufficient that the conduct is deliberate - the harm must also have been 
intendedn In this sense, the role of intention plays a far more significant role in 
German law than it does in common-law jurisdictions. 
4.3.2. § 831 BGB - Employer's Liability for Harm Caused by Employees 
The German rule of vicarious liability is unique in that it is still dominantly based on 
the fault of the employer. Zweigert and Kiitz observe that "[i]n the Germanic legal 
family, the liability of a superior for the harm caused by his staff always depends on 
whether any personal fault of his contributed to the harm.,,74 
In this sense, although the liability of an employer for the torts of employees is a 
stricter form of liability, it is not technically a form of 'strict liability', and is perhaps 
not even what common law practitioners would describe as ' vicarious liability.7S 
Liability for harm caused by employees is dealt with under § 831 BGB. Paragraph (1) 
of § 83 I reads: 76 
"Anyone who employs another person for a task is liable for the injury 
unlawfully caused to a third party by that other person in the accomplishment 
of the task. No liability shall arise if (i) the employer (Geschaftsherr) 
exercised reasonable care in the selection of the employee and - when the 
employer himself procures tools or directs the accomplishment of the task - in 
debate is interesting, it is beyond the scope of this paper. For more detail see Zweigert and K6tz 
Introduction to Comparative Lmv 599-600 and Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law 303. 
72 In terms of §826 BGB. 
73 Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Lmv 340. 
74 Zweigert and Katz Introduction to Comparative Lmv 630. 
75 It has been suggested that there were a number of reasons why the Germans adopted the supposedly 
'weaker' rule. One reason was that a casuistic Roman approach was followed when constructing the 
law, and another, more practical reason, was that there was a fear that introducing a 'true' form of 
vicarious liability would cause unwarranted economic consequences. Of particular concern was the 
possibility of an increased economic burden being placed on small industry. Markesinis The German 
Lmv of Tort 677. See also Zweigert and Katz Introduction to Comparative Lmv 143-144. 
76 Van Gerven et 01 International Tori Law 480. There is a second paragraph to §83 1 which imposes 
liability on persons who undertake for the employer one of the tasks mentioned in the second sentence 
of paragraph (I), but as Van Gerven et 01 point out, this is of minor importance and does not warrant 
specific attention. 
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the procurement of tools and the direction [of the employee) or (ii) the injury 
would also have been caused if the employer had taken such reasonable care." 
This provision clearly indicates that fau lt plays a significant role in the enquiry. In 
English, Commonwealth, South African and French law, liability automatically arises 
where conditions similar to the first sentence of § 831 (I) are met. In German law 
however, satisfying the conditions set out in the first sentence of the paragraph merely 
creates a presumption of liability. This presumption can be rebutted by the employer 
by proving that he or she was not at fault or alternatively that there was a lack of 
causation. 77 As Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche point out, "§ 831 (I) does not 
therefore create a true regime of liability for others, but rather a regime of liability for 
presumed fault.,,78 
In order to succeed in a claim under § 831 (I) the victim has to prove three things. 
First that he or she sustained harm which was caused by the wrongful conduct of the 
employee.79 Next, that the person committing the harm was in fact employed by the 
person sought to be held liable and finally, that the harm was caused while the 
employee was carrying out his or her appointed tasks8 0 
77 Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law 480. Of course, lack of causation would also exclude 
liability in all other jurisdictions. However, this would ordinarily be dealt with when detennining 
whether or not a delict was committed in the first place. 
78 Ibid. 
7' Interestingly, fault on the part of the employee is not required. Van Gerven et 01 International Tort 
Law 481 point out that "§83 1(J) does not make the employer answer for the fault of the employee, but 
rather makes the employer liable for his or her own presumed rault." See also Zweigert and Katz 
Introduction to Comparative Law 633. 
80 Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law 481 . It must be noted that if the injured party can also prove 
the personal liability of the employee under one of the other general or specific clauses of the BGB, the 
employer and his or her subordinate will be held jointly and severally liable for the hann. However, in 
tenns of labour law an employee may be exempted from liability under certain circumstances, due to 
the fact that the quantum of damages is often disproportionate in tenns of recovery to the means of the 
employee. In the event of this right of exemption (FreisteIlllngsansprZlch) being exercised, damages 
will be apportioned between the employer and the employee. The apportionment principle is dealt with 
in §254 (1) BGB and only provides for apportionment according to the extent of the injured party's 
fau lt. However, the Federal Labour Court in BAG (Joined Chambers), 27 September 1994, ZIP 1994, 
1712 held that the principle of apportionment applied to the relationship between employers and their 
workers in that the employee is engaged in the risk creating activity of the employer and that the 
operational risk has a material influence on the causation of the hann. In view of this the employer is 
bound to indemnify his or her employee against potential damages arising out of the risk-creating 
activity. The apportionment will depend on the degree of fault - where the employee is guilty of gross 
negligence of intentional wrongdoing, he or she will bear most of the burden, whereas if there has 
merely been slight negligence, the employer will bear the whole burden (Van Gerven et 01 
International Tort Law 482). 
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The first requirement is fairly straightforward and needs no further explanation for the 
purposes of this sectionY However, the second and third requirements are 
particularly significant and are examined below. 
4.3.3. The Employment Relationship 
In order for an employer to be held liable for the harm caused by a servant82 or work 
assistant (Verrichtungsgehilfe) the existence of a relationship capable of founding 
liability must be proved.83 The Gelman test for establishing whether or not an 
employment relationship exists is strikingly similar to the one followed in common 
law jurisdictions. The German authorities have recognised the difficulties presented 
when attempting to follow the traditional 'control test' under modern employment 
conditions and have therefore taken a broader approach.84 However, the German 
approach is still not as broad as the one followed in common law jurisdictions:85 
"A person only qualifies as Verrichtungsgehiife in the sense of § 831 BGB 
when he or she is dependent on the instructions of the employer 
(Geschtiftsherr). The employer need not have a detailed right of control 
(Weisungsrecht); it is sufficient that the employer can at any time determine 
the sco~e and duration of the tasks of the employee, restrict them or terminate 
them." 6 
81 For further detail on the ' unlawfulness' requirement see Markesinis The German Law oj Tort 681-
684. 
82 The term 'servant', although now not in general use, may still be used accurately to describe a person 
performing tasks on behalf of another. Unlike the term 'master', which is now considered anachronistic 
in many countries, the term 'servant' is still used by English, Commonwealth and European countries. 
The reason for this is perhaps due to the fact that the term better describes those perfonning tasks on 
behalf of others who cannot strictly be described as employees. A common example of such a person is 
one performing gratuitous services for another. Another possible reason for the use of the term is that it 
is far less complicated and misleading than the term ' agent ' . It is submitted that if the South African 
courts looked past the various unacceptable connotations of the term and used it in an appropriate 
context, it may prove to be useful. For the sake of consistency however, the term 'employee' will be 
used throughout the remainder of this work and should be taken to represent any relationship in which 
one performs tasks for the benefit of another. 
83 For the purposes of this section, only the common employment relationship will be examined. 
Although the general distinction between employees and independent contractors is made in German 
law, it does not seem that a distinction is made between ordinary employees and agents. 
84 Markesinis The German Law oJ Tori 678. 
" BGH BGHZ 1966,3 11. Translation by A Hoffmann and Y P Salmon cited in Van Gerven el 01 
Internalional Tori Law 496. 
86 In this case it was held that §831 would not apply to partners in basic civil law partnerships unless 
one of the partners was acting as the other's subordinate when the conduct causing the harm took place. 
The structure of German partnership law appears to be far more complex and multi-faceted than our 
partnership laws and a discussion on the topic is beyond the scope of this work. It appears however, 
that partners wi ll be held liable for the wrongful conduct of their co-partners in one of two situat ions: 
firstly, where partners are seen as organs of the partnership and have the power to act in a 
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Although this test is not as broad and multi-faceted as the common law tests applied 
in the South African and English systems it is suggested that the core principles 
guiding the determination of employment are fundamentally the same. Both tests can 
successfully be used to found liability in situations where employees perform their 
tasks with a fair measure of discretion and accommodate the fact that the scope of 
control is often difficult to define in modem working conditions. 
The Germans have adopted the same approach used by English, Commonwealth, and 
South African courts in cases where employees are ' lent out' by a general employer to 
perform tasks on behalf of a temporary employer. The general employer will most 
often be held liable for the employee's torts because this employer is usually in a 
better position to direct the manner in which the employee carries out his or her 
tasks87 
As in common law jurisdictions, employers will not be held liable for the wrongful 
conduct of independent contractors,88 rendering the distinction between employees 
and independent contractors important. Markesinis points out that when making the 
distinction, "German lawyers are increasingly following the Common law example 
and looking at the entire economic relationship, not merely enlarging or adapting the 
control and direction test.,,89 
4.3.4. Damage Caused in the Exercise of an Appointed Function 
Under German law, in order for an employer to be held liable for the wrongful acts of 
an employee, the harm must have been inflicted by the latter while exercising an 
assigned function. This requirement is basically the same as the 'course and scope of 
representative capacity; and secondly, if it can be proved that one of the partners is the 
Verrichtungsgehilfe (employee) of the other; in this case, the latter may be held liable in terms of §831 
BGB. It was held that unlike general commercial partnerships or limited partnerships, the structure of 
basic civil partnerships does not allow for partners to qualify as representative organs of the 
partnerships, and thus, where these structures are concerned, it has to be proved that the wrongdoer was 
the Verrichtllngsgehilfe of the other partner at the time of the offence. 
87 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 678. 
88 As in the common law jurisdictions, the Germans have exceptions to the general rule of no-liability 
for independent contractors. Like the English, they have developed rules which provide for liability 
where harm has been caused as a result of the breach ofa non-delegable duty. Markesinis The German 
Law of Tort 679-680. 
89 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 679. 
127 
employment' requirement in English, Commonwealth and South African Law and the 
'dans les Jonctions' requirement in French law. The German expression is, 'in 
AusJiihrung der Verrichtung' and literally means "in the accomplishment of his or her 
tasks." Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche point out that although the phrases used in 
the different systems are not identical and are often not interpreted in the same way, 
there is a common idea that the scope of liability should be limited to situations in 
which a link between the conduct and the employment can be found 9o 
Markesinis notes that the rule is not particularly informative and goes on to point out 
that it is one of the most litigious aspects of the law of vicarious liability.91 The fact 
that it is not particularly informative is perhaps why it is often the most contentious 
issue faced by the courts when dealing with cases of vicarious liability in both civil 
and common law jurisdictions. 
The determination of whether or not an employee's acts can be said to have occurred 
'in the accomplishment of his or her tasks' is a question of fact and, as Markesinis 
points out, the decision is thus often ' impressionistic' and open to generalisation.92 As 
with their common law counterparts, it seems that the Germans are tending towards a 
broader interpretation of what acts necessarily fall within the course and scope of 
employment. 93 
However, it must be noted that the German law is still somewhat stricter than other 
comparable jurisdictions when it comes to this question. This strict approach stems 
from the fact that the Germans require fault on the part of the employer. Therefore, 
even if it can be proved that an employee 's wrong was committed in the 
accomplishment of his or her tasks, the employer will not be held liable unless that 
90 Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law 499-500. 
9 \ Markesinis The German Law o/Tort 680. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Markesinis The German Law o/Tort 680 is of the view that this broadening of the area of activity 
falling within the scope of liabil ity is partly due to an increase in motor traffic (and its accompanying 
compulsory insurance schemes), and partly due to a widening of the scope of acceptable risk. This 
widening has occurred due to the fact that large legal entities seem to have taken over the position of 
employer iTom natural persons. It is interesting to note that the balance is shifting in favour of 
individuals as the traditional focus of the BGB was to protect industry. This change in attitude is most 
probably due to the fact that German industry is now well developed and no longer threatened by 
socio-political upheaval and war. 
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employer was at fault in failing to exercise the necessary care when selecting the 
employee and/or in the selection of tools and giving of directions. 94 Similarly; 
"[I]f the wrong is something incidental to the work assigned (bei Ge/egenheit 
der Verrichtung) to the worker, his master will not be 'vicariously' liable 
(under § 831 BOB) for it, unless it can be shown that he himself was at fault (§ 
823 I BOB) in introducing this risk.,,95 
However, the employer may, if all other requirements are met, be held liable where 
the employee's act can be described as an improper mode of performing his or her 
assigned functions. 96 
Where an employee disobeys an express prohibition, the employer will almost always 
be absolved from responsibility. The common example here is a situation in which a 
driver gives a lift to the injured party against his or her employer's express 
instruction. Under these circumstances the employee's conduct in deliberately 
disobeying orders "is so flagrant that the accident is treated as having occurred only 
'on the occasion of his employment,,,97 and not within the course of employment. 
Interestingly, however, the employee's reasons for flouting the employer's 
instructions are relevant to the enquiry. If, for example, the driver disobeyed his 
instructions in order to further his employer's ends by delivering parcels more swiftly, 
the employer may be held responsible for the wrong98 
94 The excu lpatory proof used to abso lve the employer fTom liabil ity is discusscd in detail below. 
" Markesinis The German Law of Tort 680. 
96 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 681. BOH NJW 1971 , 31. This is much the same as the 
corresponding rule in English law. The employer will not be absolved of responsibility merely because 
the employee was performing his or her tasks in a forbidden manner. In BOHZ NJW 1968, 391 the 
manager of an information agency deliberately and wrongfully gave false references. It was held that 
although his acts were intentional and illegal, he was still operating within the sphere of his functions. 
He was performing his appointed task (to give references for the purpose of establishing 
creditworthiness) in an improper manner. 
97 Zweigert and Katz Introduction to Comparative Law 632. BOH NJW 1965, 391. As in English law, 
the mere fact that an employee's job created the opportunity to commit the wrongful act will not suffice 
to render his or her employer liable. 
98 Zweigert and Katz lntroduction to Comparative Law 632-633 , BOH NJW 1965,391. In BOH NJW 
1971 , 31 the defendant's brother (acting as the former's Verrichtungsgehilfe) was ordered to collect 10 
tons of coal. Contrary to the defendant 'S instructions, he used a lorry-train instead of the lorry to make 
the collection. On the way to the collection point, the lorry-train skidded around a sharp bcnd and 
collided with the plaintiffs car, causing the plaintiff severe injury. The reason for the defendant 's 
brother using the proh ibited transport was so that he could complete the delivery in onc trip. It was held 
that this behaviour was intrinsically connected to his orders and could therefore be considered to fall 
within his appointed function. 
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In so-called ' deviation' cases, it appears that the German authorities follow a similar 
approach to that which has been adopted by common-law jurisdictions. Where an 
employee deviates from a prescribed route and causes harm so deviating, the extent of 
the deviation will determine whether or not the employer will be held liable for the 
harm 99 
4.3.5. The Employer's Exculpatory Proof 
If the first three requirements of § 831 BGB are satisfied, the employer is presumed to 
be at fault. However, as already mentioned, this presumption is rebuttable and the 
employer will only be held liable if he is unable to offer what is often described as 
'exculpatory proof. There are two possible ways in which the employer can 
exculpate him or herself under § 831 BGB: by showing that he or she was careful in 
the selection, instruction, and training of his or her employees and that they were 
supplied with adequate equipment with which to perform their functions; and/or if the 
employer can show that the damage or injury would have occurred regardless of 
whether or not the abovementioned requirements were met. 
As far as the first aspect IS concerned, provmg proper selection, training and 
supervision IS not a burden which is easily discharged. Indeed, Markesinis 
observes: 100 
"Producing evidence that the servant was properly selected, instructed, and 
supervised has become an increasingly heavy burden for employers -
especially in those cases where the accident is caused in the context of 
carriage of passengers by buses, trains, trams, and the like." 
It seems that the duty of supervision placed on employers is particularly onerous, and 
requires frequent and active involvement in the delegation of all tasks performed by 
employees at every level of the business structure. The extent of the employer's duties 
is well illustrated by a number of cases. 
99 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 680; Zweigert and Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law 
633. RG LZ \930, 589. 
100 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 684. 
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In BGHZ NJW 1952, 418, the owner of an estate was held liable for the harm caused 
to the plaintiff by a bolting horse which was being used by one of his agricultural 
labourers to transport gasoline. It was found that the instructions given to the labourer 
were inadequate under the circumstances, and although the instructions came from the 
employer' s manager, it was held that the employer had not properly discharged his 
duty to supervise the instructions of the manager and ensure that they were adequate. 
In BGH VersR 1969, 518, a bus company was held liable for harm sustained by one 
of its passengers due to the negligent conduct of the driver. In this case the plaintiff, a 
sixty-year-old woman, slipped on a patch of ice while attempting to board the 
defendant's bus. As she was regaining her balance, the conductor signalled the driver 
to start the vehicle and the driver duly set the bus in motion. The plaintiff was struck 
by the vehicle and sustained various bodily injuries as a result. It was held that 
although the driver and conductor were given instruction on how to behave 
appropriately during their training, this was not sufficient to discharge the defendant's 
supervisory duty. The duty could only be discharged by giving the driver and 
conductor continual oral reminders of the dangers associated with icy bus stops or at 
least providing accessible written notice of the dangers and the means for avoiding 
them. 
Where the employer is a large organization it is very difficult, sometimes even 
impossible, to prove that every employee has been carefully selected and supervised. 
Under these circumstances, the Germans follow a system of 'decentralised 
exoneration' (dezentralisierter Entlastungsbeweis). In terms of this system the 
employer need only show that ' leading employees' (for example, managers or 
foremen) had been properly chosen and supervised. Once this has been proved, the 
leading employee is substituted for the real employer and will be held liable if he or 
she cannot show that the employee in question was properly selected and 
supervised. 101 
101 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 685 . The author points out that this system is not particularly 
desirable from an economic point of view, or in terms of labour-management relations, and has thus 
not been adopted by other systems which are otherwise based on the German model. (The Swiss, for 
example). 
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This practice does not seem to be particularly fair in that it imposes liability on an 
employee instead of on the main employer. Since the ultimate employer derives the 
benefit of the delinquent employee's services, that employer should be held 
responsible for any harm occasioned in the performance of those services. Moreover, 
it is unlikely that a leading employee would have the means to satisfy a compensation 
claim. The supreme court has for that reason found a way to neutralise its unfortunate 
effects "by finding fault in the real master for the way he has organised his business 
and thus made the accident possible.,,102 
4.3.6. Alternative Means of Redress for Harm Caused by Employees 
The fact that employers are able to escape liability under § 831 BGB by providing the 
necessary exculpatory proof makes it very difficult for the plaintiff to succeed. 
Indeed, most common and civil lawyers would agree that it is difficult enough having 
to get through the first two requirements. Although the duties of selection and 
supervision placed on employers are remarkably onerous and are not easily 
discharged, the fact remains that this provision still provides employers with an 
opportunity to avoid liability. 
The German authorities have recognised that in this sense §831 may unduly favour 
employers and have consequently been quick to accept methods of bypassing this 
section. Zweigert and Katz are of the view that "§ 831 BGB is thoroughly unsound in 
policy and the only reason it has remained in the BGB so long is that the judges have 
done much to undermine its effect." 103 
Markesinis discusses the three main ways by which the courts have bypassed § 831.104 
The first way is primarily applicable to legal entities. In terms of § 31 BGB 105 and § 
89 BGB, 106 private and public business entities will be held liable for torts committed 
102 Ibid. 
103 Zweigert and K6tz Introduction fa Comparative Law 634. 
104 Markesinis The German Law o/Torl 685-690. 
105 Private law entities. 
106 Public law entities. 
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by their organs. 107 The liability of these entities is closer to the true principle of 
vicarious liability in that it is absolute and requires no fault on the part of the 
employer - liability will attach to the entity if it can be shown that the representative 
was 'carrying out his or her duties' when committing the tort. 
The second way in which the courts have avoided § 831 is by holding the employer 
liable under § 823 I BGB for harm caused by a defect in the structure of the enterprise 
or failure to provide a safe system of work. 
In BGH NJW 1956, 1106 it was held that even hospitals have a duty to guide the 
actions of doctors under certain circumstances, and will be held liable for any harm 
resulting from a failure to discharge such a duty. In this case the plaintiff suffered 
harm which was caused by the treatment he was receiving from a doctor at the 
defendant hospital. 108 There was nothing to suggest that the treatment was negligently 
administered and the harm arose out of a risk which was inherent in the treatment. 
The action was based on the doctor's failure to advise the plaintiff of the risks 
involved with the treatment. It was found that the plaintiff had not been adequately 
warned. In its defence, the hospital was able to provide the necessary exculpatory 
proof required to absolve it of liability. The court used § 823 I BGB however, and 
held the hospital responsible for its culpable failure to impress upon its doctors the 
need to inform their patients of the intrinsic risks of any treatment. 
In BGH NJW 1971, 1313 the defendant's excavator, which was being used to dig a 
ditch for the purpose of moving a electricity supply cable, burst a pipe connecting the 
plaintiffs house to a main gas pipeline, causing gas to escape into the plaintiffs 
cellar. The gas caused an explosion which damaged the plaintiffs house to the extent 
that it had to be pulled down. The pipe was damaged due to the negligence of the 
defendant's employees, but the defendant was able to produce the necessary 
exculpatory proof to free him from responsibility under § 831 . However, the court 
chose to hold the employer personally liable as civil engineers who use excavators 
\01 The term 'organ' describes board members or any other duly appointed representatives. Note that 
only certain legal entities qualify under these sections - see the note on 1966, BGHZ 45, 311 in 
footnote 86. 
lOS The plaintiff's electro-shock treatment, during which his twelfth vertebra was fractured. The 
fracture rendered him bedridden for six and a half months and after recovery his right leg was left 
paralysed. He also suffered from intestinal and heart problems as a result of the treatment. 
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have a duty to safeguard the public when excavating near supply lines. 109 It was 
observed that due to the risks involved in this activity, it is incumbent on all civil 
engineers to act with extreme caution and acquaint themselves with all of the 
necessary information before attempting to dig. The court held that the defendant had 
not adequately discharged the duty to take care and was therefore personally liable in 
terms of § 823 I BGB in that this indicated a failure to adopt a safe system of work. 
The third and perhaps most interesting way in which the courts have managed to 
evade § 831 BGB is by reverting to the principles of contract. This is achieved 
through § 278 BGB, which provides for the liability of debtors for the acts of those 
they employ to fulfil their obligations. Markesinis explains: 110 
"§ 278 states that a ' debtor' - which in the instances that concern us means the 
employer - ' is responsible for the fault of his statutory agent and of persons 
who he employs in fulfilling his obligation, to the same extent as for his own 
fault'. It thus imposes upon the debtor 'strict' liability for faults of the persons 
he uses in the course offulfilling his contractual obligations." 
This provision is clearly wider and is far more favourable to plaintiffs than § 831. 
Firstly, there is no provision for exoneration, and secondly, the terms of § 278 suggest 
that those capable of rendering debtors liable for their torts do not - strictly speaking 
- have to be employees. I I I The main difficulties with using § 278 are firstly , that the 
section can only be invoked where the employer owes the plaintiff a contractual 
obligation, and secondly, that the range of remedies is often more restricted in 
contract than it is in tort.ll2 
109 'S upply lines' include gas, electricity, water and telephone lines. 
110 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 687. 
III Ibid. The author goes on to point out that there are a number of other advantages to plaintiffs who 
wish to sue under contract Among these advantages are the fact that it is easier to succeed in an action 
for pure economic loss under contract, the prescription period may be longer and the burden of proof 
may be more favourable. 
112 Markesinis The German Law of Tort 687·688. The second difficulty experienced by plaintiffs who 
choose to base their claims on § 278 is that their remedies are restricted to patrimonial loss. For 
example, a remedy for pain and suffering cannot be claimed. [n BGHZ NJW 1952, 658 the plaintiff 
was injured due to the carelessness of the defendant hospital 's chief doctor. The plaintiff claimed 
damages from the doctor and the hospital. His claim against the hospital for patrimonial loss was 
upheld (under §278 BGB), but the court would not grant the claim for pain and suffering against the 
hospital. The court held rather, that the claim for pain and suffering could be made against the doctor in 
terms of §823 [ BGB. 
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Because § 278 requires a ' relationship creating obligations' (Schuldverhtiltnis), the 
German courts have gone to great lengths to find the existence of contractual 
relationships wherever possible. As a result, the principles of contract have been 
extended to include what has been described as the ' precontractual phase' . This 
extension was first made in what Markesinis describes as 'the famous linoleum case' 
in which the concept of culpa in contrahendo was used to extend contractual remedies 
to the negotiation stage of a prospective contractual relationship. 
In the ' linoleum' case the plaintiff wished to purchase linoleum from the defendant 
company's department store. After looking through various patterns the plaintiff 
expressed an interest in a particular roll of linoleum. In order to retrieve this roll the 
defendant's sales assistant moved two others aside. These rolls fell , injuring the 
plaintiff and her daughter. It was found that the defendant's sale assistant had been 
negligent in that he had failed to move the rolls to a position with appropriate lateral 
support. It was held that although the contract of sale had not been formally entered 
into, the plaintiff s demand to see the goods and the fulfilment of this demand 
constituted a precontractual relationship capable of creating a duty of care. 
This extension of the contractual relationship creates a very wide scope for 
contractual liability and it could be argued that if § 831 BGB provided a less 
restrictive notion of vicarious liability such extensions would not be necessary. 
Indeed, Zweigert and Katz note: 1 I) 
"The English jurist Pollock stated that the strict liability of a master for the 
torts of his servants, such as exists at Common Law, was justified by the 
consideration that if it did not exist a 'huge expansion of implied, i.e. 
fictitious, contracts, to no great advantage of either law or conscience' , would 
ensue; the development of German law has vindicated this prediction to the 
hilt." 
113 Zweigert and Katz Introduction to Comparative Law 634 . 
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4.4. CONCLUSION 
Given the nature of true vicarious liability, it is not surprising that its application is 
fraught with inconsistency and that it is difficult to establish a clear line of judicial 
reasoning. The problems surrounding vicarious liability transcend jurisdictional 
boundaries and are seldom unique to a particular system. 
While the English and Conunonwealth approach to this form of liability is often 
criticised, it is a severe indictment to the German law that the courts actively seek 
alternative means of redress in order to avoid the specific provision of the 
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch dealing with vicarious liability; and although the French 
system is often praised for its awe- inspiring generality, this oversimplification comes 
at a price. Suffice it to say that none of the jurisdictions can be said to have a perfect 
system. Indeed it could be argued that certain aspects of the respective systems are 
wholly inadequate. 
136 
137 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RE-EVALUA TlNG THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
After examining the law of vicarious liability in South Africa and abroad, it is clear 
that the problems surrounding the application of this branch oflaw are not confined to 
any of the respective legal systems. There are a number of troublesome aspects which 
need to be addressed in each system. This study, however, is primarily concerned with 
the problems faced in South Africa and this chapter will concentrate on those 
difficulties. 
The social justification and main policy considerations behind vicarious liability are 
examined, with particular emphasis given to risk-related liability. Finally, the 
problematic aspects of the law of vicarious liability in South Africa are critically 
analysed with reference to the foreign systems examined in chapters three and four. 
5.2. THE SOCIAL JUSTIFICATION FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY; POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Although a number of theories are used to justify the application of the law of 
vicarious liability, it has been said that "there is no sound theoretical/legal basis for 
the imposition of vicarious liability. ,,1 Perhaps the most reasonable view is that of the 
majority of the Australian High Court in Hollis v Vabu2 which is that although there is 
no sound legal rationale behind vicarious liability; it is grounded on a number of 
plausible policy considerations3 This supports Fleming's observation that "the 
modem doctrine of vicarious liability cannot parade as a deduction from legalistic 
I McCarthy "Vicarious Liability in the Agency Context" 13. 
2 37_38 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) 54·55 (McHugh J). 
3 McCarthy "Vicarious Liability in the Agency Context" 13. 
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premises, but should be frankly recognised as having its basis in a combination of 
policy considerations.,,4 
The Queensland Law Reform Commissions has recently identified a number of 
cogent policy reasons for the imposition of vicarious liability. These policy 
considerations do not differ from what have often been described as 'theories 
justifying vicarious liability,6 However, it seems that the latter description misleads, 
implying as it does that that each of the 'theories' has an independent value and can 
alone be used as a 'theoretical justification' for the imposition of liability. It follows 
that although the various policy considerations behind vicarious liability provide a 
valuable basis when viewed together, none of them serve as valid justifications in 
their own right, but when viewed collectively the considerations provide a clear 
picture of the policy upon which the law of vicarious liability is grounded. The 
Commission identified four main factors: 7 
• Vicarious liability enables the plaintiff to obtain compensation from someone 
who is financially capable of satisfying a compensatory judgment. 
• Those who employ others to advance their own economic interest should in 
fairness be placed under a corresponding liability for losses incurred in the course 
of the enterpri se. 
• The regime promotes a wide distribution of the tort losses since the employer is 
the most suitable channel for passing them on through appropriate liability 
insurance and higher prices. 
• Vicarious liability is also a coherent doctrine from the perspective of deterrence. 
... Given that the employer will be held liable there is every incentive to 
encourage employees to perform diligently at work in all respects, and to 
discipline those who are guilty of wrongdoing. 
When examining these policy considerations it is clear that there are two dimensions 
to the social justification for attributing vicarious liability. This was recognised by 
Van Gerven, Larouche and Lever:8 
, Fleming The Law of Torls 410; See also Keeton el 01 Prosser and Keelan on The Law of TorlS 500-
50 1. 
5 Hereafter referred to as 'the Commission'. 
6 See Neelhling el 01 Law ofDelicI338-339. 
7 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Vicarious Liability, Report no. 56 (2001) 22. See the also 
London Drugs Ltd v Keuhne and Nagellnternalional Ltd per La Forest J at 338-340. 
8 Van Gerven el allnlernalional Tori Law 523. 
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"It makes ... sense [to impose liability on the employer] from a moral 
perspective (the employer is the one who deploys the workforce and derives 
the benefit from its activities) and from an economic perspective (the 
employer is arguably better placed to take efficient precautionary measures, to 
insure the liability arising from the conduct of its employees and to shoulder 
the risk by spreading the costs, as it does for other risks related to the firm)." 
These two dimensions are neatly reflected in the policy considerations listed above. 
Each of these considerations carries an element of social justification and therefore 
compel attention. 
5.2.1. 'Deep Pockets' 
It is not uncommon for an employee to be what could be described as 'a man of 
straw'. Where that is the case, it is considered reasonable that the burden should be 
shouldered by the employer because in most instances the employer is better able to 
do SO.9 The idea that plaintiffs should be entitled to claim compensation from a party 
who is better able to pay is rooted in the policy that victims should be able to achieve 
compensation regardless of the fact that the wrongdoer does not have the means to 
satisfy the claim. "However distasteful the theory may be, we have to admit that 
vicarious liability owes its explanation, if not its justification, to the search for a 
solvent defendant." lo 
5.2.2. Loss Distribution, Indemnity and Fidelity Insurance 
The practical consequence of holding employers liable for the delicts of their 
employees is that the employer will spread the cost of compensation through pricing 1 1 
or insurance and it can justifiably be said that this mitigates the employer' s loss. This 
is especially true in modern business conditions as the employer is often a large 
enterprise which, by virtue of its size and economic viability, has the ability to insure 
against the loss in this way. The result is that l2 
, Fleming The Law 0/ Torts 410 points out that this rationale was christened the "deepest pocket" 
p,rinciple by Baty Vicarious Liability (19 16) 154. 
o Queensland Law Reform Commission 23 . 
I I Queensland Law Reform Comm iss ion 24 . See also Fleming The Law a/Torts 426. 
12 Rogers Tort (2006) 883. 
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"losses caused by the torts of the enterprise ' s servants are borne in small and 
probably unnoticeable amounts by the body of its customers, and the injured 
person is compensated without the necessity of calling upon an individual, 
whose personal fault may be slight or even non-existent, to suffer the 
disastrous financial consequences that may follow liability in tort." 
Employers are also in a position to insure themselves against loss resulting from the 
conduct of their employees by taking out specific insurance policies. There are two 
types of policy which may be used by employers in order to insure themselves against 
compensatory claims: ordinary indemnity policies and fidelity policies. The former 
may only be used to insure against claims for negligence, while the latter insures 
against claims for negligence, fraud, dishonesty, theft, embezzlement and other 
situations in which an employee's integrity, honesty or fidelity is found wanting. 13 
Appropriate insurance coverage is perhaps the most efficient way in which an 
employer can guard against vicarious liability. However, in insulating an employer 
from liability, insurance coverage can be a serious drawback for employees as they 
may be sued by the insurer through subrogation. 14 Thus, if an insured employer is 
held liable for the careless or wrongful act an employee, in theory the insurer will be 
entitled to act against the employee through subrogation even though the employer 
may not wish to take action against the employee. 
In many cases employers would not be inclined to act against their employees in order 
to recover a loss sustained as a result of their delictual conduct (though this may not 
be the case where the delictual conduct is deliberate). Indeed, suing an employee for 
an act of minor negligence would not necessarily be in the interests ofthe employer. It 
would almost certainly result in the loss of the employee concerned and perhaps even 
a loss of confidence in the employer by remaining staff. An insurer claiming 
compensation from employees would most likely have a similar effect. 
Il M Parkington, A O'Dowd, N Legh-Jones and A Longmore MacGillivray & Pm'kinglon on Insurance 
Law 6ed (1975) 236, 951 , 1001. Hasten el allnlroduclion 10 Soulh African Law and Legal TheOlY 918-
919. 
14 MacGillivray & Parkington on Insurance Law 776 define subrogation as "the right of an insurer, 
who has paid for a loss, to receive the benefit of ali the rights and remedies of the insured against third 
parties which, if satisfied, will extinguish or dimin ish the ultimate loss sustained." M F B Reinecke, S 
van der Merwe, J P van Niekerk and P Havenga General Principles of Insurance Law (2002) 282 point 
out that the rights of an insured against his employee are amenable to subrogation. See Richard Ellis 
SA (Ply) Ltd v Miller 1990 (1) SA 453 (T). 
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However, if the employer releases the employee from liability (which can be done 
before or after indemnification by the insurer), the employee' s debt will be discharged 
and the insurer will not be entitled to a claim through subrogation. 15 Employers may 
also include a provision in the insurance contract denying the insurer the right of 
subrogation in order to protect employees against liability.16 In this way indemnity 
insurance can be used to protect the interests of both employers and employees. 
5.2.3. The Deterrent Effect of Vicarious Liability 
The notion that imposing liability on an employer will motivate that employer and 
indeed other employers into taking greater care over the work performed by their 
employees is a quite compelling justification for attributing liability. As the 
Commission points out: 17 
"An employer has the capacity to exercise control over the workplace 
activities of an employee. An employer may discipline an employee and, 
ultimately, an employer can terminate the employment of an employee. It is 
argued that the imposition of vicarious liability on an employer for the 
wrongful conduct of an employee might encourage the employer to exercise 
these powers, thereby reducing the risk of future harm." 
Betlem states that there is empirical proof that the enforcement of compensation 
claims acts as a deterrent. 18 This conclusion is supported by Schwartz l 9 who 
conducted comprehensive empirical research on the deterrent effect of tort law. 
Schwartz's investigations are based on the so-called 'economic deterrence' rationale 
which has been used to justify the imposition of delictual liability. In terms of this 
rationale, the threat of liability discourages parties from engaging in conduct which 
could potentially lead to liability20 
" Reinecke el al General Principles 0/ Insurance Law 277; Richard £lIis SA (Ply) Ltd v Miller. 
16 Reinecke el al General Principles of Insurance Law 277. 
17 Queensland Law Reform Commission 25; fleming The Law o/Torls 410. 
"G Betlem "Torts, a European Ius Commune and the Private Enforcement of Community Law" (2005) 
64 eLf 126 at 131. 
" G T Schwartz " Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?" (1994-
1995) 42 UCLA Law Review 377. 
20 Schwartz "Does Tort Law Really Detcr?"38 I. 
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Interestingly, this theory has come under fire from many leading commentators21 who 
argue that the deterrent effect of tort liability is not as great as the proponents of the 
economic deterrence theory would have us believe. The critics have advanced a 
number of objections in an attempt to disprove the theory and Schwartz comments on 
those considerations which seem to appear consistently.22 
It has been suggested by critics that liability as a deterrent is rendered unnecessary by 
other incentives. These incentives include morality, self-preservation, and what are 
described as 'first-party market incentives,23 As far as morality is concerned, it is 
believed that moral principles may discourage engaging in conduct which may pose a 
risk to third parties. Although this may be the case, there is a compelling counter-
argument that many potential defendants do not seem particularly concerned with the 
safety of others.24 Indeed it could be argued that in the sphere of vicarious liability, 
defendants (employers) would be even less morally motivated due to the fact that they 
are often disconnected from potential plaintiffs. 
As regards self-preservation, it is believed that under certain circumstances a potential 
tortfeasor will refrain from dangerous conduct in order to protect him or herself from 
harm. It is noted that this argument is generally restricted to cases of motorised 
transport2 5 It is obvious that, in the normal course of events, motorists are likely to 
drive with care in order to ensure their own safety. In cases of vicarious liability it is 
difficult to see how this consideration could carry much weight. Although the actual 
tortfeasor (the employee in this case) may be so motivated, it does not follow that the 
employer will be particularly concerned, unless of course the risk of incident poses a 
threat to his or her business interests. 
First-party market incentives are those which motivate businesses to take measures to 
prevent harm to customers and the public at large. This motivation revolves around 
the principle of product liability and may influence manufacturers who would stand 
21 Among them Atiyah, Fleming and White. 
" Schwartz "Does Tort Law Really Deter?" 382. 
23 Ibid. 
" Schwartz "Does Tort Law Really Deler?" 383. 
" Ibid 
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to lose sales as a result of product defects.26 Such motivation could perhaps be 
extended to situations in which third parties come into contact with a business or its 
employees. Employers may be motivated by commercial interests to insist on 
measures to protect against harm where such harm would reflect negatively on the 
image of the business. Of course this motivation only has an effect where the 
shortcomings of a particular enterprise are sufficiently publicised. This presents a 
strong argument in favour of delictual liability as it is well known that law suits attract 
a great deal of publicity. Indeed it is certain that few things are as well publicised as a 
large compensatory claim. 
Critics of the deterrence theory go further to suggest that liability insurance removes 
the incentives to those covered by nullifying the effects of the threat of liability27 Of 
course, liability insurance is dependant on the threat of liability, so although it may be 
argued that this form of insurance removes the incentives of those covered to take 
care, without the risk of liability there would be no need to maintain such policies. It 
could be said that the risk of increased premiums could act as an incentive to take 
precautionary measures. 
Another consideration which is popularly used to discount the deterrence theory is 
that in cases of negligence the conduct is often inadvertent and completely accidental. 
It is argued that "if the party's conduct is not a function of her own mental choices, 
then liability rules that appeal to the mind will not be influential.,,28 Although this is 
often the case, defendants (particularly employers in cases of vicarious liability) 
should be motivated to do as much as possible to minimise the risk of accidents. The 
fact that harm is often accidental does not mean that the risk of it occurring cannot be 
reduced by introducing precautionary measures. As Rogers points out, "If there were 
no vicarious liability, the employer's incentive to minimize the risks created by his 
activi ty would be reduced." 29 
In some instances employers create or enhance the risk of accident by adopting 
dangerous policies or encouraging reckless working habits. Where this is the case, the 
26 Schwartz "Does Tort Law Really Deter?" 382. 
"Schwartz "Does Tort Law Really Deter?" 382-383. 
28 Schwartz "Does Tort Law Really Deter?" 383. 
" Rogers TOri (2006) 883 . 
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threat or imposition of delictual liability can provide a strong incentive to change 
policies and to discourage reckless behaviour. Schwartz30 provides a particularly good 
example of this in referring to an American case in which a well-known pizza 
delivery company was compelled to change one of its policies after being forced to 
pay a compensation claim of $78 million. The company promised to deliver pizzas 
within 30 minutes after customers had placed their orders, a policy which often had 
the effect of encouraging employees to drive negligently in order to fulfil the promise. 
The incident which gave rise to the claim for compensation involved a two-car 
collision in which one of the company's drivers was involved. As a result of the case 
the company withdrew its 30 minute guarantee and adopted a number of 
precautionary measures in order to reduce the risk of future incidents. 
It cannot be said that delictual liability is the only effective deterrent against harmful 
conduct, but it must have some influence on the behaviour of potential defendants. 
Surely the possibility of liability creates at least a moderate incentive to take measures 
to avoid harmful conduct? When it comes to vicarious liability "[ e ]mployers are often 
in a position to reduce accidents and intentional wrongs by efficient organisation and 
supervision.,,31 There is a compelling argument that holding employers vicariously 
liable for the delicts of their employees encourages "imaginative and efficient 
administration and supervision, thereby reducing the risk that the employer had 
introduced into the community. ,,32 
S.2.4. The Assumption of Risk as a Basis for Vicarious Liability 
The justification that those who derive benefit from the employee 's tasks should carry 
the burden of risk attendant in the performance of such tasks is linked to the concept 
of equity. Indeed, the general feeling is that "it is more just to make the person who 
has entrusted his servant with the power of acting in his business responsible for 
injury occasioned to another in the course of so acting, than that the other and entirely 
innocent party should be left to bear the loss. ,,33 This feeling is linked to the belief that 
30 Schwartz "Does Tort Law Really Deter?" 419. 
31 Bazley v Curry para 32. 
32 Giliker "Rough Justice in an Unjust World" 273 referring to the comments of McLachlin J in Bazley 
v Curry para 33. 
33 Ibid. 
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victims should be entitled to claim compensation regardless of the wrongdoer' s ability 
to satisfy a claim. 
The assumption of risk as a justification for imposing vicarious liability has two 
aspects. The first is that of equity as described above and the second is that employers 
should be liable for the delicts of their employees because employers create the risk of 
harm to third parties by enlisting the services of others to perform tasks on their 
behalf. This is known as the 'assumption of risk rationale' and is arguably the most 
practical and perhaps most popular justification for the law of vicarious liability. 
Indeed, Lord Nicholls made the following observation in Dubai Aluminium Co Lid v 
Salaam: 34 
"The underlying legal policy is based on the recognition that carrying on a 
business enterprise necessarily involves risk to others. It involves a risk that 
others will be harmed by wrongful acts committed by the agents through 
whom the business is carried on. When those risks ripen into loss, it is just that 
the business should be responsible for compensating the person who has been 
wronged." 
In fact, in spite of what some authorities believe,3s the above justification seems to 
have filtered its way into the legal requirements for attributing this foml of liability. 
As Giliker observes, "It provides a justification for liability and a basis for future 
decision-making. ,,36 
The assumption of risk in enterprise is a significant policy consideration when it 
comes to establishing the link between an employee's appointed tasks and the 
commission of a tort or delict. Atiyah notes: 37 
"In the typical case of vicarious liability the master plays a considerable part 
in creating the circumstances in which the tort is committed. The servant is 
where he is because he is employed by the master, and in many cases the tort 
is committed on the employer's premises or with some property belonging to 
the employer." 
34 Para 21. 
3S In particular, the court in Ess Kay Electronics v First National Bank. 
36 Giliker "Rough Justice in an Unjust World" 278. 
37 Atiyah Vicariolls Liability 13. 
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Although employers are rarely involved in the commission of the delictual acts of 
their employees, in most cases it would be difficult to argue that they were not 
involved in the creation of the risk of such conduct, whether accidental or not. From 
an equitable point of view it must be argued that since the employer' s enterprise 
creates the risk of harm to third parties, that employer should be held accountable 
when such harm eventuates. As Rogers observes, there is "a rather deep-seated and 
intuitive idea that someone who, generally for his own benefit, sets a force in motion 
should have responsibility for the consequences even if he chooses others to carry out 
the task. "J8 
An argument that employees alone should be forced to bear the costs of harm which 
is often accidental and nearly always a result of an inherent risk in the employer' s 
enterprise is untenable. Indeed "[ilt is realised that if a workman is compelled to take 
upon himself all the risks of his employment, the results will be socially disastrous.,,39 
As Fleming points out, holding an employee liable will either overtax his or her 
financial resources40 or require double insurance, covering both employer and 
employee.4 1 It seems reasonable to assume that although the main purpose behind 
vicarious liability is to provide victims with compensation, it could also be seen as a 
way in which to channel liability away from an employee who would otherwise find 
him or herself in a dire situation.42 Despite the fact that vicarious liability does not 
insulate employees from personal claims, the reality is that plaintiffs who are 
successful in their vicarious claims rarely pursue personal claims against employees. 
38 Rogers Tort (2006) 882. 
39 H J Laski "The Basis of Vicarious Liability" (1926) 26 YLJ 127. J G Fleming "Employee's Tort in a 
Contractual Matrix: New Approaches in Canada" (1993) 13 OJLS 430 at 430 points out thai " [uJnder 
modern conditions of labour relalions it seems well-nigh incongruous to make employees personally 
liable for accidents they cause in the course of carrying out their tasks." 
40 Fleming The Law of Torts 411.The author goes further to point out that under modern working 
conditions it is unlikely that an employee's financial resources are equal to his or her capacity for 
causing loss. 
" Ibid. 
42 Van Gerven et allnternational TorI Law 525 . 
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5.3. RE-EV ALUA TING THE TEST FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
As mentioned earlier, the so-called 'test' for vicarious liability is divided into two 
distinct parts. When assessing the problematic aspects of vicarious liability in South 
Africa, it is necessary to isolate the two parts of the test and examine them 
individually. 
5.3.1. Relationships Capable of Founding Liability 
The first part of the test is not particularly contentious. Establishing the existence of 
an employment relationship has been made easier by the fact that the courts have 
allowed the process to be informed by principles of labour law. The new 
' multifaceted ' test adopted in Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v 
Transnet Bpk43 appears to be very reasonable and straightforward44 In fact the only 
criticism of this test is that it is not as comprehensive as it could be. Although a 
number of indicia are listed, a great deal is left to the discretion of the court in 
determining the existence of an employment relationship and it is submitted that a 
more structured approach should be followed in order to promote greater certainty. 
Perhaps the best set of guidelines can be found in the unreported Australian decision 
in Abraham Abdalla v Viewdaze Pry Ltd tlas Malta Travel.45 These guidelines do not 
cover all relevant considerations, but they provide a comprehensive list of factors 
which add value to the enquiry. 
Perhaps the most difficult and imprecise aspect of this part of the test is encountered 
when attempting to distinguish between independent contractors and agents. In these 
circumstances one of the main problems is that the terminology used by the courts is 
often misleading. For instance, the term ' authority ' is often used when attempting to 
determine the existence of a relationship capable of founding liability, when the 
authority given to agents and mandataries should be considered only when 
determining the scope of employment. It has little bearing on the nature of the 
43 See also Smit v Workmen 's Compensation Commissioner and Stein v Rising Tide Productions Cc. 
This multifaceted approach stems rrom the ' dominant impression ' test followed when establishing the 
existence of an employment relationship for the purposes of labour disputes. 
44 It is also worth noting that this approach is strikingly similar to that which is followed by the 
English courts. See Market Investigations Ltd v Minister o/Social Security. 
" See also Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd and Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd. 
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relationship between the party sought to be held liable and the party who committed 
the delict. 
Another problem is that the agency relationship is somewhat wider than the 
employment relationship and it is thus often difficult to determine whether or not an 
agent is in fact an employee for the purposes of vicarious liability.46 Although the 
English courts appear to simplify matters by not making the distinction between 
independent contractors and independent agents, it could be argued that it does little 
to promote certainty.47 Indeed, the English approach is no more amenable to 
consistency than the South African - albeit for a different reason48 It is not surprising 
therefore, that using the agency relationship to found vicarious liability has sparked 
debate in most common law jurisdictions49 
As described in chapter three, there is much academic debate surrounding the 
application of agency principles in delict and more particularly in th~ field of 
vicarious liability. Indeed, some commentators believe that agency should not feature 
in cases where vicarious liability is at issue,5o and that this form of liability should 
only be considered where an ordinary employment relationship exists. These 
commentators, however, are in the minority as most academics believe that the 
agency relationship should be capable of founding liability, if only for the reason that 
it is difficult to eliminate the agency relationship from those capable of founding 
liability without causing at least some degree of injustice. It could be argued that since 
the agency relationship is often wider than an ordinary employment relationship, 
" As mentioned in chapter 2 at 2.2.2, there are a number of different types of agent, and there is often 
confusion between 'independent agents' and 'independent contractors'. This can present a problem as 
the former category of worker can render principals vicariously liable for their delicts, whereas the 
latter, as a general rule, cannot. 
47 See chapter 3 at 3.2.4.1. 
48 The English courts seem to be less inclined to draw distinct boundaries between individual and 
vicarious liability. For instance, if an 'employer' uses an independent contractor on a building site and 
this contractor negligently harms a third party, the English and South African approaches will almost 
certainly differ, but the result may well be the same. If it is found that the 'employer' owes a duty to the 
injured party to take care, and that no such care was taken, an English court is likely to hold the 
'employer' vicariously liable for the contractor's failure to discharge what is known as a non-delegable 
duty. A South African court faced with the same set of facts is likely to disregard vicarious liability 
because the employer's duty to take care is concerned with individual liability. The court will 
automatically separate this cause of action and follow a simp le aquilian test in order to establish 
liability. 
49 Most notably in the United Kingdom and Australia. 
S<) Subject to certain exceptions. See chapter 3 at 3.2.4.1. 
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including it in the category of relationships capable of founding liability would place 
an unfair burden on principals. On the other hand, excluding the agency relationship 
would prejudice those seeking redress. 
Contemporary authorities seem inclined to protect the interests of an injured party. 
This inclination is becoming most pronounced in cases of vicarious liability, where 
the courts are becoming progressively more generous in finding relationships capable 
of founding liability, and indeed in determining what activities fall within the course 
and scope of employment. It points to a tendency in the courts in South Africa and in 
other common-law jurisdictions to look for ways to increase the scope of liability 
rather than to restrict it. In such circumstances, it follows that the agency relationship 
could very well be used to widen the scope of liability in future . In fact, it has already 
been suggested that the agency relationship could be used to found liability where the 
scope of an employment relationship does not extend as far as the scope of agencySI 
It has also been argued that where an agent is an independent contractor, the agency 
relationship can provide the exception to the no-liability for independent contractors 
rule. 52 
Interestingly, in the civil law jurisdictions of France and Germany, there is little 
confusion surrounding the role of agency in the law of vicarious liability and thus no 
extensive debate. This is because both the Germans and the French have refrained 
from making the distinction between agents and ordinary employees. The German 
term 'Verrichtungsgehi!fe' covers nearly all forms of relationship in which a person 
performs functions on behalf of another, 53 and although an agent may not always be a 
' Verrichtungsgehi!fe' , he or she can be considered to be a 'corporate organ', in which 
case the employer will automatically be held liable for actionable harm caused when 
acting in that capacity.54 Similarly, in France, principals (maftres) and employers 
(Commellants) are treated no differently from each other when it comes to imposing 
" Trindade and Cane The Law of Torts in Australia 733. As mentioned in chapter 3 at 3.2.4.1 , where 
the agent is an emp loyee of the principal, it could well be that the acts of an employee fa ll outside the 
scope of employment but remain within the scope of agency; in which case agency could be used to 
found liability. 
" Ibid. See chapler 3 at 3.2.4.1. 
53 Van Gerven el allnlernalional Tori Law 529. 
54 Van Gerven el 01 Inlernalional Tort Law 527 point out that liability for corporate organs is not 
strictly vicarious in that the conduct of the wrongdoer is deemed to be the conduct of the corporation. 
However, practically speaking, this forms an extension of vicarious liability. 
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vicarious liability55 The civil law approach makes perfect sense. After all, in 
examining the purpose behind attributing vicarious liability, it is difficult to accept a 
proposal that a distinction be made between ordinary employment and agency. 56 It is 
even more difficult to rationalise the suggestion that agency should not qualify as a 
relationship capable offounding liability. 
Returning to the South African situation, although the scope of agency may cast the 
net of liability too far in certain instances, the risk of injustice if the relationship is 
excluded is far greater than the risk of unfairness created by including it. Either way, 
it is clear that the agency relationship should feature as a relationship capable of 
founding vicarious liability. 
What remams disturbing is the general principle established in Eksteen v Van 
Schalkwyk en 'n Ander that a mandator can not be held liable for the delict of his or 
her mandatary in the absence of involvement or personal fault. 57 Surely this principle 
unduly restricts the liability of principals and mandators. In English and 
Commonwealth systems there is no such restriction and the general principle is that 
tortious acts of agents will render their principals vicariously liable as long as these 
acts fall within the scope of the agent' s authority 58 Similarly, in the French and 
German systems no distinction is made between the way in which the liability of 
employers and principals is founded. 59 
There appears to be no sOlmd reason for distinguishing between ordinary agency and 
employment when attributing vicarious liability. In fact, by requiring personal fault on 
the part of the person sought to be held liable, the implication is that a principal can 
never be held vicariously liable for the acts of an agent. Atiyah points out:60 
" Van Gerven et al International Tort Law 529 point out that " Article 1384(5) C.civ. has also been 
applied to agents, contractors, relatives or even persons who did a friendly favour." 
" And indeed the various types of agency. 
" At 45E. 
" Rogers Tort (2006) 909. 
" In fact in German law, if the wrongdoer is found to be a corporate organ, the principal ' s liability is 
far less restricted than it would be in the case of ordinary employment. See Van Gerven et 01 
International Tort Law 527. 
60 Atiyah Vicarious Liability 100. 
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"If there is any true vicarious liability for agents, it is a liability of exactly the 
same nature as liability for servants, i. e., it depends on the mere imposition of 
responsibility by the law on one person for the act of another." 
It is submitted that the agency relationship should be treated as that of employment 
when it comes to founding vicarious liability. 
As regards the other relationships capable of founding vicarious liability, there does 
not appear to be any serious difficulty. The principles governing the liability of 
owners for drivers of motor vehicles are commensurate with the purpose behind 
vicarious liability and appear to be applied in a consistent fashion. It is interesting to 
note that in South Africa and abroad the liability of owners of motor vehicles for the 
torts of their drivers is based on a relationship akin to one of agency. However, 
although agency is expressly thus recognised in the foreign jurisdictions, the South 
African authorities tend to liken the relationship between owners and drivers to one of 
employment,61 even though in most cases it would be more accurate to classify the 
relationship as one of agency. It has obviously been realised that as soon as the 
owner/driver relationship is placed into the category of agency, the courts will attempt 
to follow the principle applicable to the vicarious liability of principals and agents - a 
principle which is perhaps best avoided for reasons already discussed. 
Using the relationship between business partners to found liability is possible62 but, 
surprisingly, there is little South African authority on the subject63 The South African 
approach appears to be similar to that which is followed in Germany64 in that the 
capacity in which the partner is working will determine whether or not that partner's 
actions can render the other partner or partners vicariously liable. The difference is 
that South African authority suggests that the partner must be acting as an ' employee' 
in order for liability to arise, whereas the German law provides for liability where the 
partner was acting as an employee (Verrichtungsgehilfe) or where the partner was 
acting in his or her capacity as a representative (or organ) of the partnership. It is clear 
that the German test makes more sense and that agency should play a role in the 
61 Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus 175H-I. 
62 See Chapter 2 at 2.2.5 . 
63 The only case dealing with vicarious liability of partners is Rodrigues v Alves & Others. However, as 
stated in chapter 2 at 2.2.5, although the Appellate Division touched on the issue, the court failed to 
fresent a clear and unequivocal re lationship requirement. 
See Chapter 3 at 3.2.1.3. 
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enqUiry. As noted earlier,65 there seems to be no good reason to treat partnership 
arrangements any differently from those of agency when applying the principles of 
vicarious liability. 
Where 'borrowed' employees are concerned, the South African cases are in line with 
the decisions in the other common law jurisdictions and in France and Germany66 
The right to control the manner in which tasks are performed is a universal measure as 
far as this type of arrangement is concerned and no suitable alternative suggests itself. 
5.3.2. The Course and Scope Enquiry 
Unlike the first part of the test for vicarious liability, the so-called 'course and scope' 
enquiry is fraught with inconsistency. Indeed, when commenting on this part of the 
test Comyn J commented that "the large body of case law ... is notable for one thing, 
its inconsistency very often with an immediately preceding case. ,,67 
Although certain aspects of this part of the test present no particular difficulty, the 
South African authorities have not reached consensus on a general principle which 
can be applied to the facts of what appear to be ' like' cases in situations involving 
employees committing delicts while deviating from instructions. As mentioned 
earlier68 'deviation cases ' present the most noticeable difficulties, particularly those 
involving dishonest employees. If it is accepted, as it is suggested it must be, that this 
part of the test involves a question of fact, it is easy to understand how the application 
of a general principle is difficult. However, that is not to say that the courts should not 
attempt to find a common thread of reasoning when dealing with what are perceived 
to be 'hard cases' . It is essential that decisions as to whether or not certain conduct 
falls within the course and scope of employment are capable of being reconciled with 
one another. 
6' Ibid. 
66 See Van Gerven et allnternational Tort Law 530. 
67 Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] I All ER 918 at 920. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Tort Law 583. 
68 In chapter 2 at 2.4 . 
153 
As far as cases involving the ordinary negligence of an employee are concerned, there 
is little room for inconsistency, as the general principles provide reasonably 
comprehensive guidelines69 This study emphasises situations in which employees 
wilfully disobey instructions in order to further their own ends. An attempt is made to 
find a unifying principle capable of guiding the courts in cases where the link between 
the conduct of employees and their appointed functions appears to be capable of 
rendering employers liable yet seems too tenuous when scrutinised through the lens of 
vicarious liability. 
It seems that the traditional common law tests offer little assistance in attempting to 
find a comprehensive general principle capable of reflecting the various policy 
considerations behind vicarious liability. Indeed, it could be argued that these tests 
have stunted the development of a coherent and consistent set of rules by relying on 
vague and often ambiguous formulations of principle. In this respect the English 
'Salmond test' is no better than the South African 'course and scope' enquiry and 
therefore provides little guidance. The continental civil law systems certainly do not 
appear to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem either. In any case, it would be 
particularly difficult to adopt civil law principles in a system which is based on the 
common law model. As Boberg puts it: 70 
"Whatever may be said of our legal system in its original form, its 
contemporary orientation is far closer to the casuistic common-law systems 
than to the codified continental ones." 
Having said that, the French approach seems to have set the watermark for broadening 
the scope of liability and the Germans have shown remarkable ingenuity in their 
attempts to found liability in situations where their law does not provide adequate 
redress. Although the traditional common law tests used in the English and 
Commonwealth systems are not particularly helpful, the recent policy-based test 
adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in Bazley v Curry and the so-called ' close 
connection' test adopted by the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall appear to be 
69 For example, where a driver is involved in an accident and negligently causes harm to a third party 
while delivering goods for his employer in accordance with the employer's instructions, it is not 
difficult to attach liability to the employer. Unfortunately, it is rarely as straightforward as that. See 
also Barley v Curry para 18. 
70 Boberg "Oak Tree or Acorn?" 171. 
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moves in the right direction. The question is whether or not certain features of these 
tests or systems should be incorporated into the South African law of vicarious 
liability in order to rectify some of its shortcomings? In order to answer this question 
a brief examination of each of the respective systems is necessary. 
5.3.2.1. The French and German Approaches 
The French approach is extremely broad. In the leading case of Casso Ass. plen. , 19 
May 1988 the Assemblee pieniere noted: "To act beyond the scope of one's functions 
is to act in a way which does not arise from the exercise of those functions. ,,71 Use is 
made of what have been described as 'objective relevant factors' when establishing 
whether or not an employee's actions can be connected to the scope of employment. 
Such objective factors include:72 
Time, (did the iJ1iurious conduct occur during working time?) 
Place, (did the injurious conduct take place on work premises?) 
Means, (did the prepose use tools or other means put at the disposal of the 
prl!pose by the commellant to cause the injury?) 
The use of these factors in establishing the link between the conduct and the scope of 
employment broadens its ambit considerably and suggests that employers will be 
liable for the wrongful conduct of employees as long as the tasks entrusted provide 
the latter with an opportunity to commit an offence. In other words, employers will be 
held accountable where the employment is the sine qua non of the delict7 3 
If at first glance the French approach appears to be exceSSIve, it is not that far 
removed from the approach followed in Bazley v Curry. Although in Bazley the court 
did not go as far as to say that employers would be held liable on the basis of their 
71 Para 4. 
72 Van Gerven et allnternational Tort Law 502. 
73 Van Gerven et 01 International Tort Law 533 point out that the French approach can be viewed in 
terms of causation and that it comes close to the equivalency theory (equivalence des conditions) of 
causation. This theory corresponds with the sine qua non or I'but for" test used in the first step of the 
South African test to establish causation. The simple explanation of this view is best given by referring 
to the question: "But for the employment, would the harm have occurred?" Although this seems a bit 
too broad an enquiry (it has long been recognised that it is too broad to establish causation without 
reference to the limitation of ' legal causation '), it is difficult to see how it is any different from the 
French approach to establishing the link between the conduct of employees and their scope of 
employment. The objective factors used by the French courts to establish this link are no more 
complicated than an ordinary "but for" enquiry. 
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creation of the opportunity to commit an offence, they did base liability on the 
creation and enhancement of risk by an employer. 
There appears to be a fine line between opportunity and risk and it could be argued 
that in creating the opportunity for the employee to commit an offence the employer is 
materially enhancing the risk of the harm eventuating. For instance, in a situation in 
which an employee is entrusted with the close supervision of small children, it could 
be said that the employer is creating a opportunity for that employee to abuse his or 
her powers. It can also be said that the employer is creating or enhancing a risk by 
empowering the employee. 
Of course, although the situation mentioned above would lead to the same conclusion 
using both approaches, there are circumstances in which this would not necessarily be 
the case. A good example of such a situation would be a case in which a school 
caretaker is found to have abused a pupil. In such a case it can be said that by 
employing the worker and allowing that worker to come into contact with the pupils 
the school afforded that worker the opportunity to commit the offence. Surely then, 
under the French approach, the school would be held accountable. Under the approach 
followed in Bazley, however, it could be argued that the school did not place the 
employee in a sufficiently intimate position to create a foreseeable risk of abuse. 74 It 
could be said that although the school provided the opportunity to commit the offence 
it did not create or materially enhance a risk. It appears that this is what separates the 
two approaches. That followed in Bazley introduces a limitation which is perhaps 
necessary in that it marginally narrows the scope of liability. 
It could be argued that all forms of employment create attendant risks to varying 
degrees. Liability for these risks, however, should be limited by reasonable 
foreseeability, taking all relevant surrounding circumstances into account. 
As regards the German system, although the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch deserves praise 
for its precision and comprehensive structure, § 831 does not provide for ' true' 
vicarious liability in the sense that it does not recognise liability without fault. 
However, that accepted, it could be argued that although the French and common law 
74 See GJ v Griffiths . 
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systems proclaim their laws of vicarious liability not to include fault, they actually do. 
lt seems that the French test, along with the new tests which have recently emerged in 
England and the Commonwealth require a measure of fau lt on the part of the 
defendant. Although this 'fault' requirement is not expressly recognised, it lies hidden 
beneath the veil of the defendant's duty of care towards the plaintiff, a duty which 
seems to have been incorporated into the respective tests despite the fact that it 
introduces the element of personal fault into the enquiry. 75 
If this argument is accepted, the German principles relating to an employer's 
exculpatory proof could be relevant when attempting to find a suitable way of limiting 
employers liability. However, it seems that the German methods of exculpation do not 
appear to cater adequately for all factual situations: they tend to focus on negligence 
and their system of decentralised exoneration completely defeats the purpose of 
vicarious liability. 
5.3.2.2. A Policy-driven Approach - 'The Creation and Enhancement of Risk' 
and the Test of 'Close Connection' 
The recent expansion of the scope of vicarious liability in England and the 
Commonwealth with the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Bazley v Cuny 
and that of the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall is a promising development. 
Additionally, the attitudes of the respective courts toward the traditional 'course and 
scope' enquiry indicate a refreshingly modern outlook. It seems that the Canadians 
have managed to incorporate the policy considerations which form the foundation of 
the law of vicarious liability into the test itself, and although the English have not 
gone that far, they have at least managed to widen existing principles in order to 
achieve just results. 
In Bazley the court recognised that the traditional test was not suitable when 
attempting to found liability in cases where employees had engaged in deliberate 
misconduct. Although the courts had previously connected the actions of these 
employees with their appointed functions, this almost always involved stretching the 
" The introduction of a measure of fault into the new common law tests will be discussed in detail 
below. 
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bounds of logic by applying a singularly inadequate fiction. McLachlin J observed 
that although there are a number of different categories of cases in which the wrongful 
acts of employees could render their employers vicariously liable, the common feature 
in all these cases was the employer's creation of risk76 She went further to point out 
that employers who create a risk through their enterprise should be held liable for any 
losses incurred in the course of such enterprise. 77 
Although, as mentioned earlier, this appears to be a mere exposition of one of the 
policy rationales behind vicarious liability, the court included the creation and 
enhancement of risk in a new test. The test incorporates two guiding principles: 78 
"(1) They [courts 1 should openly confront the question of whether liability 
should lie against the employer, rather than obscuring the decision beneath 
semantic discussion of ' scope of employment' and 'mode of conduct'. 
(2) The fundamental question is whether the wrongful act is sufficiently 
related to conduct authorised by the employer to justify the imposition of 
vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is generally appropriate where there is a 
significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a risk and the 
wrong that accrues therefrom, even if unrelated to the employer's desires." 
These principles significantly broaden the scope of liability. However, unlike the 
French test there seems to be an implied limitation. Although the connection between 
the wrongful conduct and the employment does not seem to be limited in terms of 
foreseeability/9 the implication of the second principle is that provision of "mere 
opportunity" to engage in wrongful conduct will not render employers liable. In this 
sense, despite the fact that the employment may have been the sine qua non of the 
harm, the link between the conduct and the employment may still be too tenuous to 
found liability. As McLachlin J put it: "When the opportunity is nothing more than a 
but-for predicate, it provides no anchor for liability. ,,8o 
76 Para 22. 
77 Para 30. 
78 Para 41. 
79 As Fleming The Law of Torts 422 puts it: " We are not concerned with attributing fault to the master 
for fai ling to provide against foreseeable harm (for example in consequence of employing an 
incompetent servant), but with the measure of risks that may fairly be regarded as typical of the 
enterprise in question. The enquiry is directed not at foreseeability of risks from specific conduct, but at 
foreseeability of the broad risks incident to a whole enterprise." 
80 Para 40. 
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The court went further to propose a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered 
when determining whether or not the link between the employment and the conduct is 
sufficient to warrant the imposition of liability. These factors include, but are not 
limited to: 
"(a) The opportunity that the enterprise afforded to the employee to abuse his 
or her power; 
(b) The extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer's 
aims (and hence be more likely to have been committed by the employee); 
(c) The extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation 
or intimacy inherent in the employer' s enterprise; 
(d) The extent of power conferred on the employee (by the employer) in 
relation to the victim; 
(e) The vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the 
employee's power." 
Use of the above factors introduces further limitation in that they provide a basic 
framework within which the courts are able to exercise their discretion. Although it 
may seem alarmingl y broad, the policy-driven test adopted by the Canadian Supreme 
Court is not without limitation and is arguably a very sound formulation of principle. 
The so-called 'close connection' test adopted by the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley 
Hall on the other hand is not as clear and straightforward. Unfortunately, although the 
House purported to follow the Bazley decision, it refrained from introducing any of 
the policy considerations used by the Canadian Supreme Court to limit the scope of 
liability. Consequently, it appears that the English have extended the scope ofliability 
beyond acceptable limits and it is not surprising that the decision has invoked strong 
criticism.8 ! It does not provide any suitable guidelines and puts little, if any, limitation 
on the scope of employers' liability. As Giliker rightly points out:82 
"By importing the Canadian test of ' close connection' without its policy 
justifications, the House of Lords achieves a 'just' result for the victim, but at 
the expense of uncertainty." 
81 See 3.3.4.5. above; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Tort Law 595; Giliker "Rough Justice" 276. 
82 Giliker "Rough Justice" 279. 
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5.3.2.3. The South African Position 
Since the rejection of the 'creation of risk principle' by the then Appellate Division in 
Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo the South African courts have edged around the 
issue of attributing vicarious liability for the deliberate delictual actions of employees 
and have yet to come up with a clearly-defined approach to these cases. 
Although the decisions in Macala v Maokeng Town Council and Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA Bank Ltd tla Volkskas Bank 
suggested that Ngobo had not had the effect of eliminating the creation of risk as a 
basis for founding liability, the Supreme Court of Appeal completely dismissed it in 
Ess Kay Electronics v First National Bank. Since the partial re-emergence of risk as a 
basis for founding vicarious liability in K v Minister of Safety and Security, the law 
has been in a state of considerable uncertainty, an uncertainty which has not been 
eradicated by recent decisions.83 The courts have refrained from setting a general 
principle and have limited their conclusions to the circumstances particular to each of 
the respective cases. Furthermore, despite the apparent trend towards a wider risk-
based approach the Ess Kay decision still looms unchallenged. 
It could be argued that the formulation of the test in Feldman v Mall was too broad 
and that a departure was perhaps necessary in order to limit the scope of employers' 
liability. It appears that the Feldman test relied on the policy consideration of 
'assumption of risk' without providing a structured framework for its application. The 
court made no attempt to define what could and could not be considered to be risks 
inherent in an employer' s enterprise, and by placing a duty on employers without 
explaining the way in which that duty could be discharged, the court suggested that 
vicarious liability could not be escaped. However, despite its shortcomings the 
Feldman decision touched on an important policy consideration and should not have 
been dismissed out of hand. Indeed, it seems that even after Kumleben JA's attack on 
the creation of risk in Ngobo, the courts were reluctant to depart from what appeared 
to be a sound reason for attributing liability. 
83 For example, GrableI' v Nospers 8pk, which had very little to do with vicarious liability and should 
not have gone further than the employer's direct duty of care towards employees, Minister of Safety 
and Security v Luiters and Minister of Finance and Others v Gore NO. See 2.3.4. above. 
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It could be argued that the complete disregard for the assumption of risk principle in 
Ess Kay was a serious mistake. Not only did it produce a highly questionable result; it 
restricted and possibly set back the development of the law of vicarious liability. 
Since K v Minister of Safety and Security the courts have begun to realise that the 
policy considerations behind vicarious liability need to be reflected in their 
decisions.84 In order for this to be achieved, such policy considerations need to be 
factored into the test for vicarious liability. Although it seems that there has been 
movement in the right direction, the establishment of a clear general principle is 
needed. 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
The expansion of the scope of vicarious liability is an inevitable consequence of a 
changing socio-economic climate. Such changes have a direct influence on public 
policy and are therefore reflected in the decisions of our courts. The fact that the 
courts are beginning to place more emphasis on the protection of individuals in 
society is beyond dispute. Our Constitution demands this protection, as does society's 
sense of justice and equity. 
There is wide acceptance that to impose liability on employers (especially large, 
wealthy corporations) is socially justifiable for a variety of reasons and that in many 
instances the comts will stretch existing principles in order to compensate victims, 
even though the link between the employment and the delictual conduct is, at best, 
tenuous. In some ' hard cases' (such as K v Minister of Safety and Security) it appears 
that the courts decide that holding an employer liable is just and equitable under the 
circumstances particular to the case and attempt to fit existing principles to the facts. 
Obviously this does little to promote uniformity and leaves a wide scope for varied 
interpretation. Surely better for the courts to accept that the reason for attributing 
liability is that public policy requires it under the circumstances of the case. If it is 
accepted, as perhaps it should be, that the law of vicarious liability is based entirely 
on policy, it is logical that policy considerations should play the major role in 
84 This is clear from the decisions in GrableI'. Luiters and specifically Gore at para 27 (see 2.3.4. 
above). 
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determining whether or not an employer should bear responsibility for the delicts of 
his or her employees. 
It is submitted that the decision in Bazley v Curry is a model which should be 
followed and that the test for vicarious liability should focus not on whether or not an 
employee's conduct fell within the course and scope of employment, but rather on 
whether the employer's enterprise and empowerment of the employee materially 
increased the risk of the delictual conduct and hence the harm. This is clearly a more 
cogent approach in that it does away with awkward and inconsistent interpretations of 
what does and does not fall within the course and scope of employment, replacing it 
with a sound policy-based enquiry flexible enough to accommodate most, if not all, 
conceivable factual situations. Alternatively, a ' dominant impression ' test could be 
adopted, in terms of which a number of factors are examined in light of the policy 
considerations underlying vicarious liability. These factors could include: the time, 
place and purpose of the employee 's actions; the scope of the employee's instruction; 
his or her intention; and scope of authority. 
Of course, as referred to above,85 it could be argued that the Bazley test crosses the 
boundary between individual and vicarious liability by creating a duty on employers 
whose enterprises carry certain inherent risks. However, it seems that an intersection 
between direct and vicarious liability is inevitable in some cases and although it may 
go against established legal principle it appears to be necessary in order to achieve 
just results. Indeed, McLachlin J points out that " [t]he idea that the person who 
introduces a risk incurs a duty to those who may be injured lies at the heart of tort 
law.,,86 
Though this approach may seem broad, the reality cannot be overlooked that in the 
modem business environment, employers create a substantial risk to third parties by 
employing a number of people to perform tasks which often require a great deal of 
care, skill, honesty and integrity. It is in the interests of society that such employers be 
held accountable for the actions of those employees. Such a burden on employers, 
85 At 5.5 .2.1. above. 
86 McLachlin J para30. 
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heavy though it may seem, is made lighter by the fact that they are able insure against 
loss either through product pricing or appropriate formal insurance. 
In estimating the economIc impact of a broader test, it could be predicted that 
insurance premiums will increase on high-risk fidelity insurance policies, prices on 
certain products and services may increase marginally and many employers will 
exercise a greater degree of care in the hiring, training and supervision of employees. 
None of these consequences are likely to have a disastrous effect on business or the 
economy. The likely positive is that victims of delictual harm will be placed in a less 
precarious position as regards their prospect of success in claims for compensation. 
Furthermore, an untenable degree of legal confusion and uncertainty will be 
considerably reduced. 
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